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I. INTRODUCTION
Children are entitled to counsel, including a lawyer free of charge in a
delinquency case, because the Supreme Court so held thirty-five years ago in
In re Gault.' The Florida trial courts seem to have trouble properly explain-
ing to a child about the right to counsel and determining whether the waiver
is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This year, the intermediate appellate
courts ruled in a number of cases on relatively blatant violations of the juve-
nile's right to counsel. The Supreme Court of Florida weighed-in in the area,
albeit on a procedural matter. The court held that, while a motion to with-
draw a plea is generally required prior to appellate review, since the child
had no lawyer, a direct appeal would lie.2 Issues of the right to counsel also
arose in dependency and termination of parental rights cases where, by stat-
ute, Florida requires counsel for parents. The intermediate appellate courts
ruled that a parent is entitled to proper notice of a proceeding, as well as no-
tice to the attorney for the parent, that failure to appear may result in termina-
tion of parental rights.' However, the court is bound by the context of the
statute, which addresses when there must be parental appearance and when
counsel may withdraw at the appellate level.4 The proper standard for with-
drawal differs, and is dependent upon which district court of appeal is speak-
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; J.D., Boston College, 1970; B.A., Colgate University, 1967. The author
thanks Scott Turner and Diane Howard for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 387 U.S. 1(1967).
2. State v. B.P., 810 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. 2002).
3. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2002).
4. Id.
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ing.5 Finally, in both the dependency and termination area, a number of ap-
pellate court opinions deal with the question of prospective neglect, includ-
ing how to evaluate whether the neglect of one child can constitute grounds
for neglect of the other, under the 1991 United States Supreme Court opinion
in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services.6
1I. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
The 1967 United States Supreme Court ruling in In re Gault requires
the provision of counsel to children in delinquency cases, and if the child is
indigent an attorney paid for by the state.7 As reported in virtually every
juvenile survey article written by the author since 1989, the Florida trial
courts continue to fail to comply with Gault's provision of counsel require-
ment.' In V.S.J. v. State,9 the failure of the court to properly advise a child of
the right to counsel and waiver was again before the appellate court. ° As
has happened so often in Florida, the trial judge addressed the juveniles ap-
pearing before it en masse and advised the youngsters as a group of their
rights.'" Reversing and remanding for the failure to comply with proper ad-
vice of the right to counsel and failure to obtain a knowing and intelligent
waiver of counsel at every stage of the proceedings, the appellate court in
V.S.J. said, "[w]e recognize that this method [referring to the en masse ex-
planation] offers some convenience, but it also reduces the probability that
every accused will be adequately and effectively advised of his or her consti-
tutional rights."' 2 The trial courts ought to dispose of this regular violation
of children's constitutional rights and provide the proper admonition and
evaluation of voluntary relinquishment on an individual basis.
5. Id.
6. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
7. 387 U.S. at 41.
8. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2001 Survey of Florida Law, 26 NOVA L. REV. 903,
903-04 (2002) [hereinafter Dale 1]. Under Florida law, children do not have the right to coun-
sel in dependency or termination of parental rights cases. See also Michael J. Dale, Providing
Counsel to Children in Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769, 783
(2001).
9. 793 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
10. Id. at 105.
11. Id. (citing G.E.F. v. State, 782 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001)); see also
Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REV. 91, 94 (2000)
(discussing this precise issue) [hereinafter Dale 11].
12. Id. at 105-06.
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In M.Q. v. State,13 the Fifth District Court of Appeal also reversed for
failure to properly offer counsel and failure to adequately inquire as to the
waiver of counsel.' 4 The appellate court decision could not be any more di-
rect. "One proceeding even involved an en masse group advisement of rights
by the trial [court]. For this reason we write again on the duties and respon-
sibilities of trial judges with regard to offering legal representation in juve-
nile proceedings."'' 5 The court, thereafter, cited to the entire rule of juvenile
procedure governing the duties and responsibilities of the trial court to notify
children about their right to counsel.' 6 The court went on to cite other exam-
ples of failure to comply with the rules, including the following colloquy in
the opinion:
JUDGE: Would it be your desire that you need to have
an attorney, or would you like to represent yourself on
that one?
M.Q.: I'll represent myself.
JUDGE: Would you like to enter a plea of guilty or not
guilty?
M.Q.: Guilty.' 7
The court ruled that this inquiry was insufficient and then, using italics,
said the following: "The requirement is one of detailed inquiry, because it is
'extremely doubtful that any child of limited experience can possibly com-
prehend the importance of counsel."" 8
The admonition about right to counsel under the Florida Rules of Juve-
nile Procedure is also multifaceted, requiring the court to tell the child a
number of things and then inquire as to whether the child knowingly and
intelligently enters the plea and waiver of counsel based upon the under-
standing of a variety of admonitions. In J.MB. v. State,'9 the court failed to
inform the child of the possible dispositions available to the court and failed
13. 818 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 616-17; see V.S.J., 793 So. 2d at 104 (rejecting this process).
16. MQ., 818 So. 2d at 617 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165).
17. Id. at 618.
18. Id. (citing State v. T.G., 800 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2001); P.L.S. v. State, 745 So. 2d 555,
557 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting G.L.D. v. State, 442 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1983))).
19. 800 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
2003]
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to advise the child that he was entitled to be represented by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings.2 ' The appellate court found that the inquiry was
incomplete, and thus, there was no effective waiver of counsel in accordance
with section 8.165 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which is fun-
damental error requiring reversal.2'
Not only is the court's inquiry multifaceted, it must also be thorough.
In T. Mv. State,22 the court compared and contrasted the inquiry at the adjudi-
catory stage before one judge and the inquiry at the dispositional stage before
a second judge, and then recited the full section of the relevant Florida Rule
of Juvenile Procedure in the text before concluding that the judge did not
conduct a thorough inquiry.23 The inquiry made by the trial judge, essen-
tially, was whether the child understood that he had a right to counsel, that a
public defender would be appointed to represent the child if he so desired,
and the child's age.24 The appeals court found this was reversible error.25
While the trial courts repeatedly fail to properly advise children of their
right to counsel, the question of how procedurally to challenge such failure
ultimately came before the Supreme Court of Florida recently in State v.
T.G.26 The question in T.G. was whether a juvenile was required to preserve
the error, in the context of failure to advise of the right to counsel, with a
motion to withdraw a plea prior to seeking appellate review of the plea. 7 On
the adult side, in Robinson v. State28 the court held that the adult statute lim-
ited a defendant's right of appeal from a guilty plea to matters occurring con-
temporaneously with the plea.29 Thus, defendants were required to attack the
validity of the guilty plea in the trial court before challenging the plea on
direct appeal.3" The court in T. G. held that Robinson applies to juvenile de-
linquency proceedings, reading the amended juvenile statute so that juveniles
pleading guilty or nolo contendere may directly appeal an involuntary plea
only if it is preserved through a motion to withdraw the plea in the trial
court.
3
'
20. Id. at 318 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.080(b)(1), (2)).
21. Id. (citing M.A.F. v. State, 742 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
22. 811 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
23. Id. at 839.
24. Id. at 838-39 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165).
25. Id. at 839.
26. 800 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2001).
27. Id. at 206.
28. 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979).
29. Id. at 900.
30. Id.
31. 800 So. 2d at 206.
[Vol. 28: 1:1
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However, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that there is an exception
in the situation where the juvenile enters into a guilty plea without the benefit
of counsel, and the juvenile has not knowingly and intelligently waived the
right to counsel.32 While Robinson applies to a juvenile who is represented
by counsel and claims that his or her plea is involuntary due to an inadequate
plea colloquy requiring the juvenile to file a motion to withdraw the plea, the
same is not true where the juvenile entered the plea without the benefit of
counsel and did not knowingly or intelligently waive the right to counsel.33
This is fundamental error, according to the court in T.G., because of the
"unique concern for juveniles who enter pleas without the benefit of coun-
sel. 34 Thus, the court established what it described as a "narrowly drawn
and extremely limited exception to Robinson" for juveniles who enter un-
counseled pleas where the trial court fails to comply with the requirements of
the Rules of Juvenile Procedure. 35 Because there was a failure to make a
thorough inquiry into the child's comprehension of the offer and the capacity
to make a knowing and intelligent choice, and because there was not even
any offer made at the dispositional stage, the Supreme Court of Florida re-
versed and remanded.36
Florida's speedy trial rule in juvenile delinquency matters requires that
the State commence trial within ninety days. 37 Application of the speedy
trial rule, in a variety of contexts, has been repeatedly before the state appel-
late courts.38 In R.F. v. State,39 the question was whether the speedy trial
time had run, measured from the time the child was taken into custody, one
of the two tests for the running of the time period.4" The State took the posi-
tion that the child was not taken into custody when he was issued an "ar-
rest/notice to appear" document at the police station.4 ' However, the appel-
late court disagreed. 42 Relying upon section 985.03(55) of the Florida Stat-
32. Id. at 212; see also State v. B.P., 810 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 2002) (following TG. v. State
in context of waiver of counsel at plea hearing where child was shown a video that explained
the right to counsel and a public defender was consulted but never appointed).
33. T.G., 800 So. 2d at 212.
34. Id. at 213.
35. Id. (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165).
36. Id. at 213.
37. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.090(a).
38. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REV. 819, 834-35
(1999) [hereinafter Dale Ill]; Dale ll,supra note lI, at 96.
39. 798 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
40. Id.; see FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.090(a)(1).
41. R.F., 798 So. 2d at 17-18.
42. Id. at 20.
2003]
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utes,43 the court determined that the documents in evidence showed that the
child was arrested when he received the notice." The child went to the po-
lice station in response to the police officer's request that he appear there to
be arrested or processed, was issued a notice to appear, and was in fact for-
mally processed and charged.45 Thereafter, he was released to his mother.46
The court concluded that the speedy trial rule applied because the evidence
showed that the official took the child into custody and elected to release the
child to the mother.47
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court decided New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 48 in which the Court established the test for the legality of school
searches. A large body of both state and federal opinions have followed
from the T.L.O. opinion. 49 In T.L.O., the Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in the
school setting, but the balance between a child's right of privacy and the
government's need for effective control of the school setting required a lesser
standard, which the Court articulated as "reasonable" suspicion." One ex-
ample of the limitation on a child's privacy involves the school locker.5 In
Florida, by statute, the principal of a public school, or other school official
designated by the principal, has authority to search the student's locker if that
individual has reasonable suspicion of prohibited or illegal substance in that
locker.5 2 In ME.J. v. State,53 the court held that when a student was found in
a school parking lot smelling of marijuana twenty minutes after school had
begun and the student acknowledged smoking marijuana, it was reasonable
for school officials to check the locker where a knife, rather than marijuana,
was found. 54 The child's adjudication as delinquent for possession of a
weapon on school property was thus affirmed.55
43. Id. at 19. "'Taking into custody' means the status of a child immediately when tem-
porary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by law, pending the
child's release, detention, placement, or other disposition as authorized by law." FLA. STAT.
§ 985.03(55) (1999).
44. R.F., 798 So. 2d at 20.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id. at 20.
48. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
49. See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 10.07[l ],at 10-46
(2003).
50. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
51. FLA. STAT. § 232.256 (2001).
52. § 232.256(2).
53. 805 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
54. Id. at 1094.
55. Id.
[Vol. 28: 1:1
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Illegal secure detention, in violation of the risk assessment instrument
under Florida law, also occurs where the child is detained based upon non-
attendance at school, as previously ordered by the court. 6 In R.G. v. State,
no risk assessment was made out. 7 The statute is clear that such a require-
ment is obligatory. 8 Had the trial court sought to detain the child based
upon indirect criminal contempt, an order to show cause, a hearing within
twenty-four hours, and notice would have been necessary. 9 None occurred,
and the appellate court reversed.6°
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, is the following statement from
the appellate court in R.G.:
this is the sixth emergency habeas corpus petition filed against this
same judge since March 26, 2002. In each case, the Attorney
General's Office has conceded error. We would think that the
message to this trial court judge should be clear that he, too, must
follow the law. We trust that after this opinion, the trial court
judge will modify his conduct accordingly. 6'
B. Dispositional Issues
Florida provides that a child also may be confined in secure detention
following commitment and pending placement.62 The question before the
Second District Court of Appeal in J. W. v. Leitner63 was whether a child
must "meet [the] statutory 'detention criteria' to qualify for placement in
secure detention" when the commitment is to a high-risk residential pro-
gram.64 The court held that the risk assessment evaluation scheme in the
Florida statute, applying to detention criteria, is no different for children
awaiting placement in a high-risk residential facility than it is for children
awaiting placement in other facilities. 65 Furthermore, the court rejected the
State's argument that it could rely upon representations of the Department of
56. R.G. v. State, 817 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002). See generally
FLA. STAT. § 985.213 (2002).
57. R.G., 817 So. 2d at 1020.
58. § 985.213(2)(a).
59. R.G., 817 So. 2d at 1020.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See generally § 985.215(10).
63. 801 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
64. Id. at 296.
65. Id. at 297.
2003]
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Juvenile Justice that the child's lifestyle supported detention, in order to meet
detention requirements.66
In a case of first impression, the First District Court of Appeal, in L.S. v.
State,67 agreed with other jurisdictions that have "upheld the constitutionality
of similar DNA data base statutes. 68 In L.S., a juvenile pled nolo contendere
to a burglary charge, in exchange for an agreement by the State to drop a
different charge. 69 Thereafter, the State requested that the child be compelled
to give a blood sample or DNA testing as provided for by Florida law.70 The
district court of appeal rejected all of the child's constitutional arguments,
finding the statute constitutional as against the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendment claims as well as a Florida Constitutional right of privacy chal-
lenge."'
Among the dispositional alternatives, restitution is available in Florida
in delinquency cases.7" Under Florida law, jurisdiction ends when the child
turns nineteen.73 In Cesaire v. State, the question was whether the court
could consider an order to show cause for contempt after the child turned
nineteen and when the child failed to make restitution.74 The court held that
the juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the restitution order
beyond the child's nineteenth birthday, although the state statute provides for
such authority.75 Thus, the court had no jurisdiction to enter a new order
requiring the payment of restitution.76 Moreover, a subsequent order to show
cause for failure to appear and subsequent contempt was likewise void be-
cause the underlining restitutional order was void for lack ofjurisdiction.77
Until recently, Florida used the term "community control" to mean pro-
bation.78 That term has now been changed, as of 1998, to probation.79 Under
certain circumstances, a child who is on probation status and who is alleged
to have violated that status by committing another delinquent act may be
66. Id.
67. 805 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
68. Id. at 1007.
69. Id. at 1005.
70. Id. at 1006; see FLA. STAT. § 943.325(I) (2002).
71. L.S.,805So. 2dat 1008.
72. See generally G.J.V. v. State, 637 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Cesaire
v. State, 811 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
73. FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2002).
74. Cesaire, 811 So. 2d at 817.
75. Id. at 818; see also § 985.201(4)(c).
76. Cesaire, 811 So. 2d at 818.
77. Id.
78. Dale 11, supra note 11, at 96.
79. See § 985.215(2)(a); Dale 11, supra note I1, at 96.
[Vol. 28: 1: 1
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held in secure detention.8" The question before the court in D.H. v. Esteves,
was how to define probation when the statute refers specifically to "proba-
tion program."'" The court held that the term probation was more extensive
and did not just involve "program[s]," thus, ruling that secure detention was
appropriate.82
Florida's juvenile delinquency dispositional statute allows a court to or-
der placement at a restrictiveness level that differs from the Department of
Juvenile Justice's recommendation.83 However, when the court disagrees
with the recommendation it must state so on the record and its rationale must
be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.84 In K.N.M v. State,85 a
significant factor in the trial court's decision not to accept the recommenda-
tion of the Department of Juvenile Justice was the court's belief in the juve-
nile's lack of remorse and unwillingness to admit guilt.86 On appeal, the
court reconfirmed the proposition that it is improper for a trial court to ag-
gravate a sentence when a defendant fails to exhibit remorse.87 The appellate
court held that in a dispositional hearing, the juvenile has a constitutional
right to avoid aggravation of a sentence on those grounds.88
Three decades ago, in two cases, Morrissey v. Brewer89 and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,9 ° the United States Supreme Court applied due process protections
to parole revocation in the adult context, finding that a parolee had a liberty
interest in his parole. In those cases the court set up due process procedures
including: 1) written notice; 2) disclosure of evidence; 3) an opportunity to
be heard in person and present witnesses; 4) the ability to confront and cross-
examine witnesses; 5) a hearing before a neutral and detached hearing offi-
cer; and 6) a written statement of the decision.9 While the Court in the sec-
ond case, Gagnon, did not provide that there was an absolute right to coun-
sel, it said that the issue should be decided on a case-by-case basis.9 2 In MT.
80. D.H. v. Esteves, 790 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001). See generally
§ 985.215(2)(a).
81. Id.
82. D.H., 790 So. 2d at 1276.
83. § 985.23(3)(e).
84. See A.C.N. v. State, 727 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
85. 793 So. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
86. Id. at 1196.
87. Id. at 1198.
88. Id. (citing A.S. v. State, 667 So. 2d 994, 996 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); R.A.B. v.
State, 399 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
89. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
90. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
91. Id. at 782; Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 489.
92. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790.
2003]
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v. State,93 the trial court had revoked a child's parole after a hearing, finding
that an affidavit of violation was unnecessary since the child was on a sus-
pended commitment and that the effect of the revocation would be to remove
him from community control to commitment, which had been previously
imposed on the child, but suspended.94 The appellate court held, relying
upon Gagnon, that due process protections apply to a proceeding alleging a
violation of community control for juveniles.95 The court held further that
the child did not receive proper notice of the violation that served as the basis
of the revocation, and thus, it reversed.96
Florida, like other states, provides for parole revocation hearings, until
recently, referred to as community control violation hearings.97 In J.S v.
State,98 the appellate court found that the trial court violated the child's due
process rights by failing to give the juvenile adequate time to prepare for a
violation hearing. 99 The facts are worth reciting. When the case was called,
the community control officer advised the court that she was ready to pro-
ceed, and at that point the court appointed an assistant public defender to
represent the child."° The lawyer received a notice of violation of court or-
der ten minutes before, said she was not prepared to proceed, objected to the
proceeding that day, and asked for a hearing.'' The lawyer explained that
she had not had an opportunity to speak with her client, nor to investigate.'
0 2
The court offered her five minutes more and the attorney objected.0 3 The
proceeding went forward and community control was revoked."° The appel-
late court reversed, describing the court's violation of the constitutional
rights in polite terms as "palpable abuse of [judicial] discretion."' 5
The question of whether Florida's Sexual Predators Act0 6 applies to ju-
veniles has been before the court on several occasions, most recently in
T.R.B. v. State.10 7 In that case, a child pleaded nolo contendere to the charge
of sexual battery on a child under twelve, was adjudicated as delinquent and
93. 805 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
94. Id. at 899.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Dale 1I, supra note 11, at 96.
98. 796 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1256-57.
102. Id. at 1257.
103. J.S., 796 So. 2d at 1257.
104. Id.
105. id.
106. FLA. STAT. § 775.21 (2002).
107. 796 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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was then declared a sexual predator, pursuant to the adult statute.108 The
appellate court reversed, holding that adjudication of delinquency is not a
conviction for purposes of the sexual predator statute, and that there was no
legislative intent to give the juvenile court authority to declare the child a
sexual predator.'0 9 The ruling conflicts with a Second District Court of Ap-
peal decision in Payne v. State."'
C. Appellate Issues
Two courts have recently been faced with the question of how to proce-
durally handle appeals challenging sentences beyond the statutory maximum,
where the proper appellate procedure was not followed. Section 985.234(1)
of the Florida Statutes requires all juvenile appeals to proceed pursuant to
the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appellate rules provide that
an appeal may not be taken unless prejudicial evidence is preserved."' In
J.C.R. v. State 1 2 and A.M ex rel D.M v. State,"3 the Fourth and Fifth Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal, respectively, held that when a juvenile is sentenced
beyond the statutory maximum for a particular crime, a fundamental error
occurs that may be corrected without regard to preservation of issues."4
III. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
In 1997 the Florida Legislature amended chapter 39 to provide that in-
digent parents must be appointed counsel in dependency proceedings.' "' In
In re MC., 6 a mother appealed from an order denying a motion to reopen a
dependency case concerning her child.' '7 The Department of Children and
Family Services (appellee) failed to afford due process to the mother by
properly notifying her and her attorney of a motion to terminate the depend-
ency proceeding because the child had been in the custody of a matemal aunt
for an extended period of time." 8 The court order relieved the Department of
108. Id. at 641.
109. Id. (citing J.M. v. State, 783 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
110. 753 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000), rev. denied, 773 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2000);
Dale I, supra note 8, at 909-10.
111. See FLA. STAT. § 90.104 (2002).
112. 785 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
113. 790 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
114. Seeid. at 1235; J.C.R., 785 So. 2dat 551.
115. See Dale 111, supra note 38, at 828.
116. 796 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
117. Id. at567.
118. Id.
2003]
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any further supervision of the child and placed the child in the care and cus-
tody of the maternal aunt." 9 The mother wrote the court, seeking to have the
child and siblings returned to her. 20 Apparently, without her knowledge, the
Department ordered to terminate the mother's supervision.' 2 ' Subsequently,
the court appointed a new lawyer to represent the mother, and counsel filed a
motion to reopen the dependency case. 122 The Department filed a new mo-
tion to terminate supervision, despite the longstanding existence of a case
plan aimed at reunification. 123 The court, inexplicably, terminated supervi-
sion based upon the length of time that the child had been in the care of the
maternal aunt.' 24 The appellate court reversed, finding a violation of due
process in that the earlier case plan goal was reunification and that there had
been no finding that reunification would be detrimental to the child's well-
being.
2 5
Mental abuse, as defined in chapter 39 governing dependency proceed-
ings, has not been the topic of significant appellate review. That changed,
however, with the recent opinion in G. C. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies. 26 Abuse is defined as "any willful act or threatened act that results in
any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to
cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly
impaired."' 27 The question in G.C. was how to evaluate the test for willful
mental abuse. 28 The case arose from a sexual abuse claim against a father
toward two daughters. 29 The trial court found that after the alleged sexual
abuse occurred, the mother, in an attempt to gain the return of the father to
the family unit, allowed a private investigator to interview the children, and
thus, the children were subjected to willful mental abuse.'30 The appellate
court reversed, holding that the mother may have used poor judgment in tell-
ing the children the truth about the consequences of their actions and that she
was following the advice of the lawyer when she allowed the investigator
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. MC., 796 So. 2d at 568.
122. Id. at 567.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 568.
125. Id.
126. 791 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
127. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (2002).
128. G.C., 791 So. 2d at 20.
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id. at 19.
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into the home to talk to them, but that neither was sufficient to establish men-
tal abuse as defined by the law.'
The Florida courts are often asked to determine whether a child is sub-
ject to prospective neglect or abuse. Under the Florida Statutes, such pro-
spective abuse or neglect is tested by evaluating whether the child is sub-
jected to "substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the
parent or parents or legal custodian."'' In a dependency proceeding, the
state must prove the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence.'33 Flor-
ida appellate courts have held that the trial court is not obligated to wait until
the child is abused and neglected before adjudicating the child dependent.'34
In C. W. v. Department of Children & Families,3 ' the father had a twenty-
two year alcohol problem and there had been domestic violence between the
parents, thus, placing the children at risk. 36 The appellate court explained
that the father had stopped drinking and began attending Alcoholics Anony-
mous two months before the petition was filed and nearly a year before the
hearing.'37 Moreover, the mother had obtained an injunction against the fa-
ther for domestic violence four months before the dependency petition was
filed, and there had been no subsequent acts of domestic violence.' 38 There
was no evidence that the father would repeat the cycle of alcohol abuse and
domestic violence, and the children appeared to be well adjusted. 3 9 And
finally, because there was no competent substantial evidence of prospective
abuse or neglect in the record, the court reversed. 4 0
The Florida Statutes do not define how imminent the prospective ne-
glect must be. It is clear, however, that there need not be actual prior abuse,
abandonment, or neglect before the court finds dependency, just so long as
the imminent risk requirement is met.' 4' In E.M.A. v. Department of Chil-
dren & Families, 42 the court relied on an earlier ruling that where a nexus is
shown between a parent's mental disorder and a significant risk of danger to
131. ld. at 21.
132. § 39.01(14)(f).
133. Richmond v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 658 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
134. See Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 547 So. 2d 981, 983-84 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
135. 789 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 497-98.
139. Id. at 498.
140. C.W., 789 So. 2d at 499.
141. See Denson v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 661 So. 2d 934, 935 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Richmond, 658 So. 2d at 177.
142. 795 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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the child, the court need not wait for the abuse or neglect to occur.'43 In the
case at bar, there was a clear nexus between the father's mental disorder and
the inevitable prospect of another manic episode that would place the chil-
dren in danger. 44 The court added that the legislature, in writing the relevant
provision of chapter 39, did not require the injury to occur before a finding of
neglect or abuse, where the exact timing of the next manic episode could not
be predicted, but that it would happen very soon. 145 The same issue arose in
B.D. v. Department of Children & Families,46 where the court gave inconsis-
tent verbal and written findings on the issue of whether the parent's mental
illness was clearly connected to child-rearing capacity. 147 Relying on its rul-
ing in E.MA., the First District reversed and remanded for further findings,
clearly stating whether the Department met its burden to satisfy one of the
dependency grounds.
48
The issue of whether alleged abuse of one child constituted grounds for
dependency of another child was before the court in K.C. v. Department of
Children & Families.'49 A father appealed from a dependency adjudication
as to one child, based upon alleged physical abuse by the father of the girl-
friend's other child. 5' The trial court relied upon its memory of the testi-
mony in the prior proceeding, where the father was not a party, and where
testimony was not admitted into evidence in the instant proceeding to find
dependency. 5' The appellate court held, first, that there was no establish-
ment of a nexus between the father's alleged abuse of the first child and the
potential abuse of the second child;'52 citing the Supreme Court of Florida
2000 opinion of In re MF., '53 where the court reversed based upon the fact
that the trial court solely based its determination of dependency of one child
upon the dependency adjudication of the other. More significantly, the court
held that there was no competent evidence before the court in K.C.,5 4 be-
cause the trial court relied upon its memory of prior testimony, where the
143. Id. at187.
144. Id. at 186.
145. Id. at 188.
146. 797 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
147. Id. at 1265 (citing E.M.A. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 795 So. 2d 183, 186 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Richmond v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 658 So. 2d
176, 177-78 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
148. Id. at 1265.
149. 800 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 200 1).
150. Id. at 677.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2000); Dale I, supra note 8, at 913-14.
154. K.C., 800 So. 2d at 677.
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father had no opportunity to challenge the testimony or cross-examine wit-
nesses. 155
After a dependency adjudication under Florida law the Department of
Children and Family Services shall develop a case plan for each child who is
to receive services.'56 The case plan is to include a permanency goal for the
child including the type of placement. 57 In F.M. v. Department of Children
& Families,'58 a mother appealed from an order of dependency and disposi-
tion approving a case plan that had a permanency goal of maintaining and
strengthening the placement with the child's father who had taken custody of
the child.' 59 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling finding that
reunification under the Florida statute is not the only possible role of a case
plan. 60
Once a child is declared dependent and in foster care, the child is in the
legal care of the Department of Children and Family Services. The question
in Department of Children & Family Services v. G.M 6 was whether a court
order was necessary to allow a child to have surgery, specifically removal of
a cyst under the chin.'62 Chapter 39 provides that DCF may give the child
ordinary medical care and may consent to medical treatment.'6 3 But neither
term makes reference to surgery and the terms are not defined. However,
section 743 of the Florida Statutes does deal with persons who may consent
to medical care of a minor that does not include surgery."6 Thus, the appel-
late court held that routine medical examination may be authorized but a
surgery, inherently invasive by nature, is not ordinary and thus a court order
is necessary.'65
The issue of how informal dependency matters may be was before the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Department of Children & Families v.
H. W. W. 166 In that case the judge called an informal meeting in chambers to
explore options for obtaining financial assistance for the children in a de-
155. Id. at 678 (citing Petersen v. Dep't of Children & Families, 732 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 740 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1999)).
156. § 39.601.
157. § 39.601(3)(a).
158. 807 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 201-02 (citing § 39.601(5)).
161. 816 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
162. Id. at 831.
163. See § 39.407(1), (13).
164. See FLA. STAT. § 743.0645(l)(b) (2002).
165. G.M, 816 So. 2d at 832.
166. 816 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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pendency proceeding. 67 The parents of the children, although parties, were
not informed of the meeting, which resulted in an order finding that the chil-
drens's grandparent would be a "relative caregiver" under Florida law enti-
tled to receive financial assistance. 68 The appellate court reversed, stating:
We are unaware of how prevalent is this practice of a judge con-
vening "meetings" rather than conducting hearings in juvenile
cases. Such a practice does appear to be fraught with potential for
problems, however. Certainly, if one of these "meetings" appears
to be moving in the direction of court action, it is incumbent on the
court to either adjourn the meeting and convene a hearing in ac-
cordance with the rules, or to create a record establishing that
those procedures have been waived. 1
69
Two cases decided this year affirmed the principle that speedy trial
rules do not apply to dependency cases as they do in delinquency cases. In
M.T. v. Department of Children & Family Services170 and J. W. v. Department
of Children & Families,7' the courts held that there is no equivalent to Rule
8.090 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which governs speedy
trials in delinquency cases. There are time frames referenced in chapter 39,
but they are viewed by the courts as only directory and not mandatory or
jurisdictional.'72
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
As described previously in this review, Florida law provides nine dis-
tinct grounds for termination of parental rights. 173 Included among them is
the situation where a parent fails to comply with a case plan for a period of
twelve months, which constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, or
abandonment. 174 This section of the statute applies only when a parent is
provided with a case plan with the goal of reunification but not when the
goal is termination. It was this problem that arose in In re Z.JS. "' The De-
partment did not offer the parent a case plan with the goal of reunification.'76
167. Id. at 1250.
168. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.5085 (2000)).
169. Id. at 1251.
170. 816 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
171. 812 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
172. MT., 816 So. 2d at 229.
173. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1) (2002).
174. § 39.806(1)(e).
175. 787 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
176. Id. at 878.
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In that situation the Department must establish another ground for termina-
tion of parental rights. Thus, the court reversed.'
An interesting second issue in In re Z.J.S. dealt with the father's effort
to have his child placed with relatives as an alternative remedy. 178 The ap-
peals court recognized that on remand the trial court should revisit the issue
of whether the child could be placed within relatives' care. 79 Significant is
the concurrence of Judge Northcutt recognizing that parents have fundamen-
tal rights to care, custody, and management of their child, which he argued
requires the court to grant deference to the father's plan. 8°  In Judge
Northcutt's view, the constitution requires respect for a parent's private
placement decision "just as it does for the myriad other choices a parent must
make in the raising of a child."''
Failure to comply with a case plan was also before the appellate court in
In re G.R. 182 The Department of Children and Families alleged in its petition
to terminate that the mother was in material breach and did not remain drug
free. 183 The appeals court relied upon the Supreme Court of Florida decision
in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services84 to rule that
while the state has a paramount interest in protecting children from harm, the
parents have a fundamental right to the care of their children which may only
be compromised using the least restrictive means to protect the children from
serious harm. 185 Here the court found that the state acted prematurely be-
cause the mother was making rehabilitative efforts and there was no evidence
of severe neglect of the children. 86 Thus, as the court stated "there is no
compelling need to rush to judgment under these facts."' 187
A separate ground for termination of parental rights in Florida involves
one incident where the parent engaging in egregious conduct or failing to
177. Id. at 879.
178. Id. at 877.
179. Id. at 879.
180. Z.J.S., 787 So. 2d at 879 (Northcutt, J., concurring) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982)).
Many parents who are unable to tend their children elect to place them with relatives or friends
to ensure that the children receive proper care. Surely, such decisions are within the ambit of
fundamental parenting rights, and the state has no authority to interfere with them in the ab-
sence of the exceptional circumstances specified in Chapter 39, Florida Statutes.
Id.
181. Id. at 880.
182. 793 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
183. Id. at 989.
184. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
185. G.R., 793 So. 2d at 989.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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prevent egregious conduct which threatens the life or safety of the child. 88
A single act may be enough to terminate parental rights. However, that sin-
gle act must be of significant intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger
the life of the child. 89 The Second District Court of Appeal in In re D. W.90
evaluated whether in a particular factual situation one act was enough. The
court recognized that termination of parental rights must be the least restric-
tive methodology for protecting the child from serious harm.' 9' However,
under the facts of the case the Department did not demonstrate that termina-
tion was the only option to protect the child. 92 Under the facts of the case,
the mother had never been given a chance to demonstrate that she could
safely maintain a relationship with the child.'93 Thus, the court reversed. 94
As noted earlier in the section of this survey discussing dependency
proceedings, prospective neglect based upon parental abuse of one child then
can be used as evidence of a basis for termination of the parental rights to
another child.'95 That issue arose in A.C. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies,'96 where the question was, inter alia, whether the mother's act of inflict-
ing bums on a daughter should constitute grounds to terminate the parental
rights over a son. 9' The court found that there was no evidence submitted by
the Department that the single act of abuse of the prior child created a sub-
stantial risk of injury to this child and that the termination of parental rights
was in the child's best interest as the case law in Florida provides.'98 Under
Florida law a single act of abuse does not itself constitute proof of imminent
risk of abuse and neglect of that child or of another unless the behavior is
beyond the parent's control and is likely to continue and place the child at
risk. Furthermore, the termination must be the least restrictive means to pro-
tect the child.' 99
To some degree in both prospective neglect adjudications and in termi-
nation of parental rights cases, the court does have to make some prediction
about future behavior of the parent. When a prediction becomes speculation,
188. § 39.806(l)(f).
189. § 39.806(l)(f)(2).
190. 793 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
191. Id. at 40 (citing Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 41.
195. Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
196. 798 So. 2d. 32 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
197. Id. at 33.
198. Id. at 36.
199. Id.; D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d 424, 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
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the adjudication cannot stand. In re C. W. W.2 00 was a termination of parental
rights case involving a two-month old child of a mother with significant sub-
stance abuse problems. 20 ' The Department never offered the mother a case
plan with the goal of reunification but rather commenced the termination
proceeding inter alia on the grounds of future harm to the child irrespective
of the provision of services.0 2 The appellate court held that the Department
did not establish that the continuing involvement of the mother with the child
would threaten the child's life, safety, or health irrespective of services being
provided.203 The court explained that the Department could cite no case in
which parental rights were terminated solely on the basis of the birth of a
drug-dependent child.2' The court's conclusion that the mother would fail in
any attempt to comply with a case plan with a goal of reunification was
speculation, and not a valid basis for terminating parental rights.205 And fi-
nally, the court added that the Department had failed to establish that termi-
nation was the least restrictive means of preventing harm to the child, an
additional standard required under Florida law.20 6 The court therefore re-
manded.20 7
Abuse and neglect resulting in termination of parental rights can also be
proven based upon past conduct with regard to other children. In C. W. v.
Department of Children & Families,2 °8 the appellate court reviewed the facts
and concluded that termination of parental rights to siblings because of abuse
and neglect may serve as grounds for terminating parental rights, citing
Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services."9 Significantly,
there was a dissent demonstrating the difficulty with application of
Padgett.211 Judge Ervin, dissenting, argued that there must be a causal con-
nection between the past conduct and the present.2
A problematic interpretation of prospective neglect based upon parental
abuse of one child used as the basis for termination of parental rights to a
200. 788 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
201. Id. at 1022.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1023.
204. Id. at 1024.
205. C.W.W., 788 So. 2d at 1023.
206. Id. at 1025.
207. Id.
208. 814 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
209. Id. at 492; Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571
(Fla. 1991).
210. C.W., 814 So. 2d at495 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 496.
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second child is A.B. v. Department of Children & Families.2 2 In that case,
the court seemed to opine that, based upon Padgett,2 3 a parent whose paren-
tal rights have been terminated as to one child may avoid termination as to
another child "if he or she comes forward with evidence that the circum-
stances or pattern of conduct that led to termination of parental rights to the
other child cannot serve as a predictor of his or her conduct with the child at
issue. 2 14 This rationale seems to suggest that the parent must demonstrate
that his or her conduct changed after the State proved the termination as to
the other child. It does not appear that this is what Padgett held.
Another and equally important issue was before the court in A. C. v. De-
partment of Children & Families,215 involving the question of the effect of a
parent's invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in the termination of parental rights case because of an ongoing
criminal proceeding.1 6 In both A.C. and in an earlier opinion in C.J. v. De-
partment of Children & Families217 the courts held that the trial court is obli-
gated to exercise discretion when balancing the interests of the child in per-
manent placement at the earliest possible time with affording fairness to the
parents. The criminal case can take a substantial period of time and thus,
while a termination of parental rights proceeding may be continued, that con-
tinuance must be balanced against the circumstances of the child.2t 8
Problems a child encounters after being removed from the home relat-
ing to separation from the parents do not constitute grounds for termination
of parental rights. Two courts have so held. In In re F.MH.B.,219 the fact
that a child was having great difficulty adjusting to foster care and school
after separation from the parents was not a basis for termination of parental
rights.220 Similarly, in 1999 the court held in In re K.C.C.22 1 that a young-
ster's need for counseling because of anxiety as a result of separation from
the parents did not support termination of parental rights.222
Included among the grounds for termination of parental rights in Florida
is voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.223 However, even in the con-
212. 816 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
213. 577 So. 2d at 565.
214. A.B., 816 So. 2d at 686.
215. 798 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
216. Id. at 35.
217. 756 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct App. 2000).
218. A.C., 798 So. 2d at 35.
219. 803 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
220. Id. at 839.
221. 750 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
222. Id. at 41.
223. See § 39.806(1)(a); § 39.808(4).
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text of voluntary relinquishment certain procedural due process rights apply.
In L.O. v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services,224 a mother
appealed from an order terminating her parental rights based upon a prior
plea agreement in a criminal case in which she entered a guilty plea to ne-
glect and violation of probation and also consented to termination of parental
rights.225 When the Department of Children and Family Services subse-
quently filed a termination of parental rights petition and the mother moved
to withdraw her consent, the court entered an order terminating parental
rights nunc pro tunc.226 The appellate court reversed, holding that chapter 39
provides no short cuts in termination proceedings based on voluntary surren-
der of parental rights.227 An adjudicatory hearing on a petition for voluntary
termination must be held within twenty-one days after filing the petition.228
The parent was not given an opportunity to deny any of the allegations of the
petition nor to introduce testimony.229 The court thus reversed.230
A second case interpreting voluntary relinquishment of parental rights is
T.C.B. v. Florida Department of Children & Families. 23' In that case, when
the Department sought to terminate parental rights, the mother, through
counsel, made an offer of settlement or compromise providing that in return
for the cancellation of the termination proceeding the mother would carry out
her obligations under a case plan and if she defaulted, the Department would
be entitled to receive executed surrenders for the children.232 After that hap-
pened, the mother appealed a final order terminating her parental rights, chal-
lenging the settlement agreement.233 The First District Court of Appeal re-
versed, finding that the contract was in fact void as against public policy and
that it violated legislative intent.2 34 Further, the appellate court held that in
any circumstances an adjudicatory hearing must be held where the Depart-
ment would establish the elements required for terminating parental rights by
clear and convincing evidence.235
224. 807 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
225. Id. at 811.
226. Id. at 812.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 813.
229. L.O., 807 So. 2d at 813.
230. Id.
231. 816 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
232. Id. at 196.
233. Id. at 195.
234. Id. at 196-97 (citing Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d
565, 570 (Fla. 1991); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982); § 39.806(l)(a)).
235. Id. at 197.
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In addition to defining separate grounds for termination of parental
rights, Florida law provides that the court must also determine that termina-
tion of parental rights is in the manifest best interest of the child.236 Florida
law contains eleven factors the court shall consider in making this determina-
tion.237 In K.M. v. Department of Children & Families3 there was no evi-
dence that the court considered the factors regarding the best interests of the
child 9.2 " The appeals court reiterated what is clear under Florida law-that
termination shall be based upon clear and convincing evidence after review
of all statutory factors.24 °
In what one would have thought was an issue that never would have
reached the appellate court, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in E.J. v. De-
partment of Children & Families24 ' held that a successor judge may not make
a judgment based upon a reading of the court file and the transcript of a hear-
ing held before his predecessor in the absence of a stipulation by the par-
242ties.
As a practical matter which ought not require elucidation, a judgment
terminating parental rights must be based upon evidence in the record. In In
re J.MM 243 the court made findings reciting the court-appointed guardian ad
litem's beliefs about the best interest of the child being served by termination
of parental rights, that the child had formed a significant relationship with a
parental substitute, and "that no bond or love existed between the parent and
the child."2" Unfortunately, there was no evidence as to the first two; as to
the third, the evidence was to the contrary.245 Thus, where the judgment was
not based on record evidence, the court reversed.
46
Under Florida law, failure to appear at an advisory hearing in a termina-
tion of parental rights case can result in a default and termination of parental
rights.247 In In re W C.,248 a parent had his attorney appear at the advisory
hearing in a termination of parental rights case regarding two children of a
father who resided in New Jersey. The court terminated parental rights based
236. § 39.810.
237. Id.
238. 795 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
239. ld. at 1130.
240. Id.
241. 795 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
242. Id.
243. 795 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
244. Id. at 1036.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing In re C.W.W., 788 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
247. See § 39.801(3)(d).
248. 797 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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upon the failure of the father to appear.249  The Florida Legislature had
changed the statute regarding personal appearances in amendments to the
law in 1998 which precluded appearances through counsel at the advisory
hearing as the method of appearance. 5 ° The appellate court in W.C. found
that the clear intent of the legislature was that the parent personally appear
because it provides the court with an opportunity to demonstrate that it per-
forms a statutory duty of informing the parent of rights and responsibilities in
the termination case.2 ' The appellate court thus affirmed.252
On the other hand, termination of parental rights based on default can
only occur in situations set forth in the Florida statute,253 which provides for
failure to appear in either an advisory or adjudicatory hearing. In
In re C.R.,254 the court held that neither a docket sounding nor scheduling
conference at which the parent failed to appear allowed for default because
the statute did not speak to either of these two settings. 5 The court relied
upon other earlier opinions to the effect that termination of parental rights
may not be entered on default unless specifically authorized by statute.256
Appointed counsel on occasion will seek to withdraw from representa-
tion on appeal in termination of parental rights cases where the lawyer con-
cludes that the appeal is frivolous. 257 The Supreme Court of Florida has
never established a procedure for withdrawal of counsel in termination cases.
However, in Pullen v. State, the court did establish a procedure for with-
drawal of counsel in involuntary civil commitment cases under the Baker
Act.258 In so doing, the court relied upon Anders v. California,259 in which
the United States Supreme Court established the grounds for withdrawal of
counsel in criminal proceedings. The lower appellate courts in Florida have
used the Anders test for some time in termination cases. In N.S.H. v. De-
partment of Children & Family Services,26 ° the Fifth District Court of Appeal
affirmed an earlier Fifth District opinion in Ostrum v. Department of Health
249. Id. at 1276.
250. Id. at 1275.
251. Id. at 1276.
252. Id.
253. See § 39.801(3)(d).
254. 806 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing In re B.A., 745 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re A.L., 711
So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
257. Pullen v. State, 802 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. 2001).
258. Id. at 1117.
259. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
260. 803 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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& Rehabilitative Services26' in which the Fourth District established an An-
ders-like procedure for withdrawal that differs from the approach employed
in Pullen. Under Ostrum the lawyer serves a motion to withdraw on the cli-
ent with certification in the motion to the court that counsel in good faith has
discovered no valid error below, and there is an opportunity for the client to
file a brief individually or through counsel. 62 Anders as employed in Pullen
actually requires the filing of a brief indicating that there is no merit to the
appeal. 263 The Florida courts are thus split on the particular procedure, and
the issue will be decided by the Supreme Court of Florida.2"
The issue of the application of stays on appeal in termination of parental
rights cases was before the Second District Court of Appeal in In re
MA.D.265 In that case the Department filed a petition to terminate parental
rights and after an adjudicatory hearing the court denied the petition, order-
ing that the children be sent to New York for a visit with their mother pend-
ing approval of the placement using the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children.266 The Department appealed the denial of the petition to termi-
nate.267 Then after the notice of appeal was filed, the mother filed a motion
seeking immediate placement of the children with her.268 The Department
objected on the grounds that the notice of appeal constituted an automatic
stay precluding changing placement during the appeal.269 The trial court
agreed and the mother filed an emergency motion for relief of the stay in the
appellate court.27° The appeals court engaged in a process of statutory con-
struction looking at the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Florida
Statutes, and the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.T' The court con-
cluded that the provisions read together provide for an automatic stay in the
termination case when the court terminates parental rights and directs that the
child be placed for subsequent adoption.2 72 The rationale for the stay avoids
the significantly disadvantageous consequences of allowing the child to be
261. 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
262. N.S.H., 803 So. 2d at 879.
263. Id.
264. Martinez v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 785 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2001), rev. granted, 819 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2002).
265. 812 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
266. Id. at 511; FLA. STAT. § 409.401 (2002).
267. M.A.D.,812So. 2dat511.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id., see FLA. R. APP. P. 9.146(c); FLA. STAT. § 39.815(3) (2002); FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.275(a).
272. In re M.A.D., 812 So. 2d 509, 512 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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adopted only to have the termination reversed on appeal.273 The court ex-
plained that the stay did not apply to the situation where the Department had
not proven a legal basis to terminate to parental rights, and that obligating
children to remain in foster care pending resolution of the appeal would not
serve the purposes of chapter 39.274 Holding children in foster care after the
court ordered return of the children would only "prolong the state-imposed
absence of stability in the lives of these children." '275 The court did say that
while an automatic stay did not exist under the law, the Department was free
to seek a stay in the individual case based upon the circumstances of that
case.
276
In a case that may be of first impression, the First District Court of Ap-
peal recently was faced with questions of whether parents are constitution-
ally entitled to competent court-appointed counsel in a dependency proceed-
ing, and if so, what means should be used to ensure that the right is not de-
nied. The issues were raised in L. W. v. Department of Children & Family
Services. 77 The closest the court had previously come to these questions was
in the context of a dependency proceeding implicating possible permanent
termination of parental rights. In In re MR.278 the court had held that there
was the implication that counsel provide competent assistance. The court
also noted that the position in MR. was consistent with a large number of
other jurisdictions.2 79 The court looked at several cases which had indeed
dealt with effective assistance in dependency proceedings and concluded that
the right to counsel was something more than a meaningless formality.28
While immediate termination of parental rights might not be in the offing,
the court recognized that it is a possibility that the parent could lose custody
of the child or be separated from the child for a significant period of time.
The court also determined that the standard to be applied for compe-
tence of counsel is that used in a criminal case.2 1' The court noted that the
vast majority of courts have applied that standard, which had been enunci-
ated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.282 In
that case, the Court held that the performance must be deficient by falling
outside the broad range of professionally-acceptable activity and that the
273. Id. (citing In re J.R.G., 624 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 812 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
278. 565 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
279. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 554.
280. Id. at 555.
281. Id. at 556.
282. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
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deficient performance must prejudice the defense, meaning that there must
be a reasonable probability that without the unprofessional errors there might
be a different result." 3 The court in L. W. concluded that the Strickland stan-
dard is well-established and straightforward and therefore it concluded that it
ought to be applied.2"4 The procedure to be used to raise the effective assis-
tance of counsel is habeas corpus because that is the only available rem-
edy.28 5 Laches, finally, is available where there has been an unreasonable
delay in raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
286
Whether a fifteen-year-old minor who is the respondent in a termination
of parental rights case with respect to her own minor child has the right to the
appointment of a guardian ad litem and an attorney was before the Fourth
District in MC. v. Department of Children & Family Services.287 The court
answered the question in the negative, finding that there is no statutory enti-
tlement to both. 28 The court reviewed the relevant rules of juvenile proce-
dure and could find nothing in the rules nor in the statutes making special
provision for respondent parents who also happen to be minors.2 9 The court
discussed the distinction between the role of the guardian ad litem and the
lawyer finding that they were not coextensive. 20 Finally, the court found
that the term "child" referred to in both statute and court rule was not meant
to include parents who were also minors.29'
The failure of a mother's attorney, who was appointed for her because
she is indigent, to appear at a termination of parental rights hearing does not
allow the court to conduct a hearing in the absence of counsel without first
inquiring as to whether the mother wished to proceed without counsel and
whether the mother knowingly and intelligently waived her right to counsel.
In In re L.N.,292 the appellate court reversed for this reason stating what ought
to be obvious--"that the procedure followed by the trial court failed to sat-
isfy due process requirements that meaningful assistance of counsel be pro-
vided to the Mother.,
293
283. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
284. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 556.
285. Id. at 557.
286. Id.
287. 814 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
288. Id. at 451.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. 814 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
293. ld. at 1144.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Florida appellate courts have spoken vigorously and bluntly about
the failure of the trial courts to properly advise children of their right to
counsel in delinquency cases as has been reported for over a decade in sur-
vey articles in this Journal. The appellate courts also spoke to specific issues
about the right to counsel and notification in dependency and termination of
parental rights cases. Finally, the courts worked this past year to flesh out
the rules for prospective neglect, first established by the Supreme Court of
Florida in 1991 in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Ser-
Vices.294
294. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey article limns the several stages of public employment in
Florida during 2002-2003, beginning with the law governing the hiring of
not only employees, but also of public officials. For example, Florida's ef-
forts to regulate political advertising by public officials in the face of First
Amendment challenges are explored in Part II. The growing trend toward
privatizing public jobs is also touched on in this section.
Part III surveys the law governing the terms of public employment.
Under the heading of hours and wages, this section explores recent develop-
ments in the Fair Labor Standards Act involving overtime regulations.
Moreover, this section touches on the growing trend among Florida cities
and counties to adopt so-called living wage statutes that peg salaries to the
cost of living. As for employment benefits law, Part III surveys recent de-
velopments involving the Family Medical Leave Act, disability and death
benefits, public pensions, health benefits, unemployment compensation, and
occupational health and safety issues.
Part IV addresses recent legal developments governing the discipline
and discharge of public employees. For example, some public employees
have been terminated in retaliation for engaging in protected activity, for
blowing the whistle on illegal conduct committed by their employers, or for
speaking out critically on matters touching on their employment. Turning to
recent case law and legislative action involving employment discrimination,
Part IV covers discriminatory practices involving race, national origin, gen-
der, age, disability, same-sex bias, and religion. Finally, Part IV looks at
recent developments concerning remedies for employment discrimination
such as reinstatement, back pay, and the availability of attorneys' fees for
prevailing parties.
[Vol. 28: 1:29
32
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/1
2003] 2003 SURVEY OF FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW 31
Part V covers legal issues involving collective bargaining in the public
sector. In addition, recent developments concerning public unions and
grievance arbitration are touched upon.
II. HIRING, POLITICAL ADVERTISING, AND EXAMINATIONS
A. Public Officials'Political Ads
Public officials are either appointed or elected and serve in the position
for a prescribed term or at the pleasure of a higher official. Officials cam-
paigning for public office must heed state laws governing political advertis-
ing. For example, Florida law stipulates that ads supporting a particular can-
didate must disclose if it is a paid political advertisement.' "[V]iolation is a
misdemeanor punishable by up to $1,000 or a year in jail."'2 In January 2003,
a Fort Lauderdale mayoral candidate was accused of violating this law.3 At
the same time states must be wary of treading on political candidates' First
Amendment rights when regulating political advertising.
B. Privatization
Privatization, whereby formerly governmental services are undertaken
by private enterprise, continues to be a controversial issue as even essential
governmental tasks such as prison administration are contracted out.4 Priva-
tization in Florida has come under fire: "[p]oor-quality privatized services
have caused children to be stranded when school buses didn't run, disabled
people to be stuck with no transportation, sick people to face nightmarish
insurance service . . . ."' Legal issues raised by privatization in 2002-2003
include the following:
1. Despite a United States Supreme Court ruling sustaining an Ohio
school vouchers law, Florida courts are urged by the Florida Teachers' Un-
ion to conclude that Florida's voucher law violates the state constitution,
which prohibits public money being funneled to promote religion.6
I. Campaign AdApparently Violates State Law, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 31, 2003, at 7B.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Ira. P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 33 FED.
B. NEWS& J. 194, 195 (1986).
5. James Fendrich, Privatization Costs Floridians Millions of Dollars, MIAMI HERALD,
May 4, 2001, available at http://www.commondreams.org/viewsO1/0504-03.htm.
6. Does Voucher Law Violate State Constitution? Judge Hears Lawsuit, MIAMI
HERALD, July 10, 2002, at 8B.
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2. In 2000, President Clinton signed an executive order deeming air
traffic service "'an inherently governmental function."' 7 In 2002, President
Bush deleted those four words.8 On June 12, 2003, the Senate voted to bar
the government from privatizing air traffic control.9
3. On May 29, 2003, the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB")
published changes to Circular A-76, its guidelines governing the method
federal agencies use in assessing whether a commercial activity should be
undertaken by the public or private sector.'0 By these revisions, OMB aims
at opening 425,000 federal jobs to private sector competition."
4. Rep. Ralph Arza, R-Hialeah, who serves on the Florida House Edu-
cation Appropriations Subcommittee, proposed eliminating the public school
police force and contracting with city police departments to provide campus
security. 
2
C. Bus Driver's Exam
In November 2002, Miami-Dade County voters approved a half-penny
sales tax in order to double the 1,500 municipal bus drivers force by 2006."3
The date set for the bus drivers' exam, however, had unexpected conse-
quences for public school students. 4 So many school bus drivers took the
exam for the better-paying jobs with Miami-Dade Transit Agency that school
authorities struggled to provide school bus transportation after nearly one-
quarter of the workforce called in sick.'5
7. Senate Bans Privatizing Air Traffic Control, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2003, at A2 I.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Performance of Commercial Activities, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,134 (May 29, 2003).
I 1. Jason Peckenpaugh, New Rules Should Make Competition Routine in Government,
Says OMB, GOV'T EXEC. MAG., May 29, 2003, available at http://www.govexec.com/
dailyfed/0503/O52903p I .htm.
12. Matthew I. Pinzur, Dade is $55 Million Short in Spending on Teachers, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 23, 2002, at 8B.
13. David Ovalle, Schools Hustle as Bus Drivers Miss Work, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 25,
2003, at B.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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III. TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Hours and Wages
1. Fair Labor Standards Act Issues
a. Overtime
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") governs minimum wage and
overtime pay in both the public and private employment sectors.' 6 Section
213(a)(1) of the FLSA carves out a minimum wage and overtime pay exemp-
tion for any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity.' 7 For example, in Hogan v. Allstate Insurance Com-
pany, insurance claims adjustors satisfied the test for exemption from
FLSA's overtime rules as bona fide administrative employees. 8
"Current law exempts workers from overtime pay if they earn more
than $155 a week, or $8,060 a year."' 9 For the first time in twenty-eight
years, the Department of Labor ("DOL") is proposing to update this salary
test.20 The proposal would raise the minimum weekly salaries employees can
earn from $155 to $425, to count as "white collar" workers exempt from
FLSA's overtime rules.2' About twenty-two million Americans might be
affected by the DOL's new definition of white-collar workers. 2 One clear
line the proposal establishes is that all employees earning under $22,100 a
year must receive overtime pay.23 Moreover, white-collar professionals
would be exempt from overtime rules if they "manage more than two em-
ployees and have the authority to hire and fire, or if they have an advanced
degree or similar training and work in a specialized field, or work in the op-
erations, finance, and auditing areas of a company., 24 While organized labor
favors the proposal guaranteeing overtime status to all employees earning
under $22,100 a year, it worries that the broadened definition of employees
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1-4907 (2002).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2002); 29 U.S.C. § 213(A)(1) (2000).
18. 210 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2002); see also, Defining and Delimiting the
Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Em-
ployees, 29 C.F.R. § 541(2002).
19. Leigh Strope, Millions May Lose or Gain Overtime Pay, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 28,
2003, at C.
20. Id.
21. 29 C.F.R. § 541.
22. Strope, supra note 19.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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"exempt from overtime pay to include any employee in a 'position of re-
sponsibility"' covers too many workers.25 As it is, many employers already
find many ways to get workers to put in extra hours without any compensa-
tion, much less overtime as mandated by the FLSA.26
On July 10, 2003, the House of Representatives barely sustained pro-
posed labor regulations that might disqualify eight million employees from
overtime pay.27 The 213-210 vote blocked a Democratic bill that would
have prevented the Labor Department from implementing the new rules on
overtime.28
Overtime pay for Florida public employees came into play in Debrecht
v. Osceola County.29 Battalion chiefs for an emergency services department
sued Osceola County under the FLSA seeking damages for unpaid overtime
compensation but lost.3° The federal district court concluded that the plain-
tiffs were exempt from the FLSA overtime provisions, given that they were
compensated on a salary basis and fell within the statutory definition of ad-
ministrative, as well as executive, employees.3'
b. Miscellaneous Wage and Hour Issues
Under the FLSA, a group of employees are entitled to sue to recover
wages even though such a suit is not literally a class action as defined in rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 ' The difference is that an em-
ployee must "opt-in" to become a member of a FLSA class while a member
of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class must seek exclusion to avoid
ending up a member.33 On May 19, 2003, the Supreme Court handed down
its only FLSA case in the term.34 In Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard,
Inc.,3 the Court ruled that the FLSA does not prohibit removal of suit from
state to federal court. 36
25. Justin Gest, Unions Decry Proposed OT Rule, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A 17.
26. See, e.g., Edward Wasserman, Working Overtime Without Compensation, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 13, 2003, at 9B.
27. Nick Anderson, House Lets Bush Proceed With Overtime Revisions, L.A. TIMES, July
11, 2003, at A 17.
28. Id.
29. 243 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1373.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 2 16(b) (2000). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
33. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977); see FED. R. CIv. P.
23(c).
34. See Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1882 (2003).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1884.
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The circuit courts are split over whether the FLSA allows a district
court to count overpayments made in some pay periods against underpay-
ments in other pay periods.37 In this regard, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
reject such offsets while the Eleventh Circuit permits them.38
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms,
L.L. C., 39 that two Florida farmers violated the FLSA's minimum wage rules
by refusing to compensate Mexican farm workers during their first work-
week for travel expenses from Mexico to Florida.4"
2. Living Wage
"Living wage laws require employers to pay employees enough to keep
a family of four at or above the poverty line," which comes out to $18,100 a
year, or $8.70 an hour.4 The living wage concept originated in Baltimore in
1994, and today over eighty cities and counties have embraced the doctrine.4 2
In South Florida, Miami-Dade County was the first to adopt the so-
called living wage law.43 In October 2002, the Broward County Commission
voted to pay county employees a living wage of $9.57 an hour beginning in
October 2003.44 Following suit, a Miami City Commissioner urged the city
to "pay all its employees a living wage in an effort to combat poverty." ' 5
The living wage in Miami is $8.56 an hour if health benefits are provided, or
$9.81 if they are not.46 To date, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
Counties have adopted living wage laws.47 Hollywood is the most recent
South Florida city to contemplate paying all its workers a living wage.48
37. Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 827 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Herman v. Fabri-
Ctrs. of Am., 308 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2002); Howard v. City of Springfield, 274 F.3d 1141 (7th
Cir. 2001); Kolheim v. Glynn County, 915 F. 2d 1473 (11 th Cir. 1990).
38. E.g., Singer, 324 F.3d at 817 (noting circuit split on this FLSA issue).
39. 305 F.3d 1228 (11 th Cir. 2002).
40. Id. at 1232.
41. Brad Bennett, County Could Raise Minimum Pay Scale, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 7,
2002, at lB.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Qfficial Calls for Miami to Pay a "Living Wage, "' MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 30, 2002, at
3B.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Brad Bennett, County Workers to Get "'Living Wage, " MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9, 2002,
at IA.
48. Jerry Berrios, "Living Wage" Is Hot Topic for City, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. I, 2003, at
lB.
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3. Wage Gap
Men, on average, make more money than women.4 9 Part of this wage
gap can be blamed on continuing gender discrimination, but part of it stems
from non-discriminatory reasons such as the fact that many women leave the
work force either temporarily or permanently to raise a family. While
women have been closing this gap over time, little progress has been made in
the last decade.50 But in 2002-2003, the average female employee received a
five percent raise in her weekly pay while men's weekly wages rose only
1.3% to $692." Women are concentrated in the services sector and govern-
ment employment, the two sectors least affected by the last two years of eco-
nomic weakness.52 Men, by contrast, work in industries like manufacturing
and technology that have suffered most in the last two years.13 Full-time
female employees made 77.5% of what full-time male employees did in
2002. 54
4. Teachers' Salaries
The Dollars to the Classroom Act, enacted by the Florida Legislature in
2001, requires school districts that flunk statewide academic standards to
raise that part of their next budget to be spent on teachers and teacher train-
ing.55 Despite the law, thirty school districts statewide have failed to com-
ply.5 6 For example, Miami-Dade County Public Schools spent fifty-five mil-
lion dollars less on teachers in 2002 than the act mandated.57 Arguably, a
key reason so many districts feel free to flout state law is because the act
imposes no punishment for failure to comply.
58
According to the Miami Herald, Broward public school teachers re-
ceived an average pay increase of 5.5% in 2002, raising starting salaries from
$31,560 to $32,600.59 Despite statewide teacher pay raises, Florida remains
49. See David Leonhardt, Women Outpace Men in Wage Gains, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.), Feb. 17, 2003, at Al.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. id.
54. Leonhardt, supra note 49.
55. Pinzur, supra note 12.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Steve Harrison, Broward, Teachers Agree on Pay Hike, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 8, 2002,
at lB.
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thirty-first in the nation in average teacher salaries. 60 In 2001, Broward had
the third-highest starting teacher salary in the state, after Miami-Dade and
Palm Beach Counties.6'
B. Benefits
1. Family and Medical Leave Act
Under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 62 public and private
eligible employees are entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve-
month period: 1) for birth or adoption of a child or placement of a foster
child; 2) to care for a spouse, child or parent with a serious health condition;
or 3) for the employee's own serious health condition.63
During years 2002-2003, the following FMLA issues have been ad-
dressed:
1. On May 27, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in Nevada Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Hibbs,64 that states enjoy no Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity from damages suits for violating their employees' FMLA
guaranteed right to take time off for family emergencies.65
2. There is a circuit court split over whether an employer who refuses
to reinstate a worker out on FMLA leave bears the burden of establishing
that the worker would have been discharged even if he or she had not taken
FMLA leave.66 The Tenth Circuit, agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit and
disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit, has concluded that the employer bears
the burden.67
3. On December 4, 2002, the DOL proposed to repeal regulations
aimed at promoting state use of unemployment insurance to provide partial
wage replacement for parents on FMLA leave to care for newborns or newly
adopted children.68
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
63. § 2612(a)(1).
64. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
65. See id. at 1976.
66. See, e.g., Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 963 (10th Cir.
2002).
67. Id.
68. Unemployment Compensation-Trust Fund Integrity Rule: Birth and Adoption
Unemployment Compensation: Removal of Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,122 (Dec. 4, 2002).
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4. On February 5, 2003, Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.), intro-
duced a bill that would expand the FMLA to protect more employees and
offer additional grounds for taking leave.69
2. Disability and Death Benefits
In In re Jones,7° a Washington State Patrol Trooper was first placed on
temporary disability status and then on permanent disability status." In vio-
lation of the terms of his disability benefits, Jones received unlawful time
loss payments without informing State Patrol.72 When the State Patrol
learned of the payments it sued Jones and recovered a money judgment
against him.73 State Patrol wanted the illicit sums Jones received deducted
from his disability benefits.74
Later, Jones filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.75 Although the bank-
ruptcy court discharged Jones' debt to State Patrol, State Patrol continued to
deduct sums from Jones' disability benefits, so Jones sought sanctions.76 In
its defense, State Patrol contended that the sums it continued to deduct
amounted to a recoupment of disability benefits unlawfully paid to Jones.
77
At bottom, the issue boiled down to whether the State Patrol's deductions
from Jones' disability benefits amounted to a recoupment which survives
bankruptcy or was deemed a setoff which is dischargeable.7 ' The court con-
cluded that the sums involved were a recoupment and ruled in favor of the
State Patrol.79
Some public employers have begun offering a new type of disability in-
surance coverage that compensates employees who are killed or gravely in-
jured during their commute to work. ° For example, the City of Phoenix,
Arizona, purchased "commuter insurance policies after two [city] employ-
ees..., one of them a police officer, were killed on the way to work."'"
69. See generally S. 304, 108th Cong. (2003).
70. 289 B.R. 188 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002).
71. Id. at 189.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Jones, 289 B.R. at 189.
76. Id. at 190.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 193.
80. Sharon Bernstein, A New Kind of Insurance: Coverage for the Commute, L.A.
TIMES, July 15, 2003, at B2.
81. Id.
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Commuter insurance is fairly inexpensive because it only kicks in during
commuting and such deaths are infrequent. 2
3. Public Pensions
Public pension issues affecting Florida public employees during 2002-
2003 include the following:
1. Hollywood's new contract with city employees provides for a bonus
check for every year the public union's pension fund investment exceeds
expectations.83
2. Skyrocketing pension costs in Hollywood's labor contract with city
firefighters might entail a big tax increase for property owners in 2003.84
3. Under Florida law, public officials convicted of certain types of
crimes must forfeit their pensions. Miami's Fire and Police Pension Board
considered but did not resolve whether a former Miami City Manager was
entitled to keep his public pension after he was convicted of misuse of public
funds.86
4. A United States Bankruptcy judge ordered the Miami Police Relief
and Pension Fund to reimburse close to $1 million to investors fleeced by an
accountant for the fund.87 The fund board enabled the accountant to execute
his scam so the fund could recoup its losses stemming from the accountant's
fraudulent tax-exempt bond fund.88
5. Chief investment officers of seven state public pension funds urged
the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 30, 2003: to act on the
power of shareholders to nominate directors to corporate boards; to bar bro-
kers from voting proxies without explicit consent; and to bar company audi-
tors from performing tax consulting work for their audit clients.89 The group
of state officials consists of "state treasurers and investment officers who
82. Id.
83. Elena Cabral, Hollywood to Consider General Employee Pact, Pay Raises, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 18, 2002, at 5B.
84. Elena Cabral, Pension Costs Surprise Officials, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 22, 2002, at 1 B;
see also Elena Cabral, Pension Shock is Blamed on Mix-Up, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 23, 2002, at
3B.
85. FLA. STAT. § 112.3173(3) (2002).
86. Ex-manager May Hear Pension Decision Today, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 25, 2003, at
3B; see Season's Greetings from Behind Bars, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 2002, at 3B.
87. Jay Weaver, Miami Police Fund Ordered to Repay Bilked Investors, MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 15, 2003, at 6B.
88. Id.
89. Kathy M. Kristof, California; States Urge Faster Wall St. Reform; The Officers Who
Oversee Public Pension Funds Say the SEC Needs to Act Quickly on Shareholder Rights
Issues, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at C2.
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serve as trustees of public pension funds that invest the assets of [public]
employees." 90
4. Health Benefits
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), an em-
ployer owes no duty to grant health benefits, which are otherwise covered by
Medicare. 9' But in 2000, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, in Erie
County Retirees Association v. County of Erie, Pennsylvania,92 that a public
employer violates the ADEA when it accords Medicare-eligible retirees
fewer health insurance benefits than those accorded non-Medicare eligible
retirees.9' In response, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
drafted regulations that would permit employers to cut back or eliminate
health benefits when a retiree becomes eligible for Medicare without running
afoul of the ADEA.94
Federal law, such as the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act ("HIPAA"), curtails the use of exclusions for preexisting
conditions when an employee moves from one job to another.95 Pursuant to
this federal statute, the Department of Health and Human Resources issued a
"Privacy Rule," which includes an April 14, 2003 compliance deadline for
virtually all covered entities.96 In addressing the department's power to issue
this rule, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, in South Carolina Medi-
cal Association v. Thompson, that the provisions of HIPAA that govern
rulemaking do not improperly delegate legislative power to the Department
of Health and Human Services.97
"Employers and managed care companies paid $1.5 billion to $3 billion
through higher [health insurance] rates to cover part of the $24 billion hospi-
tals spent caring for [uninsured] patients . . . in 2001."' According to some
experts, employers are subsidizing the uninsured at the expense of their own
90. Id.
91. Regulations Relating to Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e) (2003).
92. 220 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 913 (2003).
93. Id. at 215.
94. EEOC Proposal Would Allow Retirement Plans to End at Medicare Without Age Act
Violation, 71 U.S.L.W. 2088 (2002).
95. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1940 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2000)).
96. S.C. Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 2003).
97. Id. at 352.
98. Milt Freudenheim, Businesses Begin to Consider the Cost for the Uninsured, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at C5.
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employees.99 For this reason, some insurers are supporting proposals for
universal health insurance.'0 0 Florida is one of a dozen states that permit
health plans to provide lower-cost policies to the uninsured that omit some or
all state mandates.' 0
Of all benefits offered by employers, the cost of health insurance has
risen far faster and far more. For example, Fort Lauderdale city employees
face huge hikes in their health insurance premiums in 2003: employee con-
tributions for families under the least costly option will increase from $40 to
$82.28 per worker every two weeks.0 2 For its part, the city pays $1.6 mil-
lion a year to ease the burden on employees. 0 3 Fort Lauderdale has a self-
funded health insurance plan which enabled it to offer its workers a wide
choice of doctors. ,04
5. Unemployment Compensation
Under Florida law, an employee who is "discharged for misconduct
connected with ... work" is disqualified from receiving employment bene-
fits.' 05 In Anderson v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 0 6 Anderson had
served several years as a senior community corrections officer for Orange
County, Florida.0 7 She was fired for misrepresentations in her efforts to
convince "a judge to sign a violation of probation warrant before the defen-
dant's probation period expired."' '  Subsequently, the Division of Unem-
ployment Compensation of the Florida Department of Labor and Employ-
ment Securities disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits for
"'misconduct connected with work.""0 9 An unemployment compensation
appeals referee ruled Anderson was entitled to benefits, but this decision was
reversed by the unemployment appeals commission.'"
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal made clear that "in deter-
mining whether misconduct has occurred, the statute should be liberally con-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Brad Bennett, City Workers Health Insurance Rates Up, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 7,
2003, at 6B.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. FLA. STAT. § 443.101(2) (2001).
106. 822 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
107. Id. at 564.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 564-65.
I10. Id. at 565.
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strued in favor of the employee and in favor of awarding benefits." ' After
reviewing the record, the court concluded that Anderson's conduct amounted
at most to poor judgment, and did not constitute willful, wanton, or deliber-
ate acts, and therefore was not misconduct as defined by statute." 2 Ander-
son's poor judgment did not disqualify her from receiving unemployment
benefits." 3
6. Workers' Compensation
Florida's Insurance Commissioner, Tom Gallagher, told the Miami Her-
ald that the "'state's workers' compensation system is failing,"' and urged
the legislature to reform the system in a special session.' 4 Among other
proposals, the Commissioner recommended premium reductions for Florida
employers and better delivery of medical services to insured workers, but
rejected a 21.5% rate increase urged by the industry.' '5 Instead, he agreed to
an increase that would raise rates an average of fifteen percent for most
businesses in 2002.16 A specific company's rate increase is tied to its safety
record and the nature of work undertaken among other factors."7
"[W]orkers' compensation rates in Florida [rank] among the highest in the
country."" 8 At the same time, benefits paid to Florida employees injured on
the job are paltry when compared with most states.' '9 Some insurance com-
panies no longer do business in Florida given that studies "found their costs
for workers' comp[ensation] were 127 percent of the premium."' 20
7. Occupational Health and Safety Issues
Violence in schools is a growing problem, so most states prohibit public
employees from carrying concealed guns on school property.' 2' Unlike most
states, however, Utah enacted a law "allowing teachers and other public
I II. Anderson, 822 So. 2d at 566 (citing Mason v. Load King Mfg. Co., 758 So. 2d 649,
655 (Fla. 2000)).
112. See id. at 567-68.
113. Id. at 569.
114. Gregg Fields, Workers' Comp Issue in Limbo, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 14, 2002, at IC.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Fields, supra note 114.
120. Id.
121. John R. Lott, Jr., Letting Teachers Pack Guns Will Make America s Schools Sqfer,
L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at M5.
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workers to carry concealed guns on school property.' 122 Today thirty-five
states have right-to-carry laws that issue permits for concealed weapons after
applicants pass a criminal background check, pay fees, and sometimes, un-
dergo training.2 3 The effect of this law may increase the odds that someone
will be able to protect himself and strengthen deterrence. 124 Before 1995,
federal law allowed teachers with concealed-handgun permits to carry guns
at school in some states." 5 According to one study, individuals with guns
helped stop nearly one-third of public school shootings since 1997.,26
C. Ownership of Copyright
Under federal copyright law, a "work made for hire" considers the em-
ployer the author of the work "unless the parties have expressly agreed oth-
erwise in a written instrument signed by them .... In Genzmer v. Public
Health Trust of Miami-Dade County,"8 a former employee and his employer
contested ownership of a computer program that the former employee de-
signed during the time he was working for the employer. 29 "Genzmer wrote
the program ... on his own time, during non-business hours, and using his
home computer."' Genzmer conducted the test phase of the program's de-
velopment on his former employer's computers. 3' Moreover, Genzmer se-
cured a copyright in the software. 
32
The federal district court began its analysis by making clear that
Genzmer's copyright certificate shifted the burden to the employer "to over-
come the presumption of the validity of Genzmer's copyright in the soft-
ware." 33 The court spelled out the "two elements to the work for hire defini-
tion: (1) the author must be an employee, and (2) the work must be [devel-
oped] within the scope of the [employee's] employment."'' 34 Since Genzmer
was clearly an employee, the court turned to the three-part test governing
whether an employee has developed a work within the scope of employment:
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Lott, supra note 121.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
128. 219 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
129. Id. at 1276.
130. Id. at 1277.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1278.
133. Genzmer, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
134. Id. at 1279-80.
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"(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part,
by a purpose to serve the master.' 35
Addressing the first element, the court ruled that Genzmer's creation of
the computer program was "incidental to his authorized acts of [conducting]
a research program, acts he was clearly employed to perform."'13 6 As for the
second element, the court made clear that the key is that Genzmer created the
program during the time period he was hired to complete the research pro-
gram.'37 Turning finally to the third element, the court concluded Genzmer's
work was driven, "at least in part," by a motive to serve his employer.'
This was evidenced by the fact that the program was tailored to suit his em-
ployer's needs and by the fact that the "program was [actually] used in the
[d]epartment to computerize reports."' 139 For these reasons, the court con-
cluded that the computer program was "work made for hire" and Genzmer
was not entitled to the copyright.'40
IV. DISCIPLINE, DISCHARGE, DISCRIMINATION, AND REMEDIES
A. Retaliation, Whistle-blowing, and the First Amendment
1. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that:
1) the employee was engaged in protected activity; 2) the employer was
aware of that activity; 3) the employee suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion; and 4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action. 4' Two Florida cases raised retaliation is-
sues, 142 calling into question the meaning of an "adverse employment action"
and what constitutes a "causal connection.' 43
Broward County, Florida, reached a settlement with its former human
rights division director who claimed her dismissal was retaliation for filing
her own racial bias suit against the county with the Equal Employment Op-
135. Id. at 1280 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957)).
136. Id. at 1281.
137. Id. at 1282.
138. Genzmer, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.
139. Id. at 1283.
140. Id.
141. Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11 th Cir. 2002).
142. See id.; State v. Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations, 842 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
143. See Brochu, 304 F.3d at 1155.
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portunity Commission ("EEOC").144 While Broward's Human Rights Board
accused her of failing to investigate discrimination claims, the former em-
ployee pointed out that she was terminated despite good evaluations and
raises over nineteen years.
45
2. Whistle-blowing
Under Florida's Whistle-blower's Act, state agencies are enjoined from
taking adverse action against state employees who make protected disclo-
sures to appropriate authorities. 4 ' In State v. Florida Commission On Hu-
man Relations, Ms. Georgalis, a Department of Transportation ("DOT")
manager, opted for resignation only in response to coercion. 47 Ms. Geor-
galis claims she was discharged because she took part in a complaint filed by
a contractor under her supervision. 48 Ms. Georgalis filed a whistle-blower
complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Rights ("FCHR"). 149
DOT refused to reinstate Ms. Georgalis, claiming she resigned her posi-
tion. 50 The circuit judge ruled that Ms. Georgalis was in fact dismissed and
so ordered the DOT to temporarily reinstate her pending the final outcome of
the complaint.' 5'
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal addressed FCHR's failure
to follow the statutory deadlines. 52 The court excused FCHR's failure for
the following reasons: 1) the statute provides no remedy; 53 2) time limit
statutes are directory rather than mandatory; 54 and 3) it would not serve the
Whistle-blower Act's legislative purpose to bar a complaining employee
from securing relief owing to FCHR's failure to follow statutory direc-
tives."'
In Allocco v. City of Coral Gables,'56 former university public safety of-
ficers unsuccessfully sued the city and university alleging, among other
144. Brad Bennett, Fired Human-Rights Official, County Agree to Settlement Terms,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 15, 2002, at 5B.
145. Id.
146. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(4) (2002).
147. 842 So. 2d at 254.
148. Id. at 254-55.
149. Id. at 254.
150. Id. at 255.
151. Id.
152. Fla. Comm 'n on Human Relations, 842 So. 2d at 253.
153. Id. at 256.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
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things, that they were discharged for reasons other than their alleged whistle-
blowing activities.'57 On the whistle-blower counts, the public employees
lost on the following grounds: 1) they failed to show that they had exhausted
administrative state remedies;... 2) the public employees' whistle-blower
claims against the university were time-barred;' 59 3) the public employees
failed to demonstrate a causal connection between their discharge and their
protected activity of reporting alleged wrongdoing by the city and univer-
sity;60 and 4) the university identified a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for
dismissing the public safety officers. 6' They violated a department order
barring "bicycle patrol officers from riding together and prohibiting more
than one bicycle patrol officer per shift;" the officer remained silent in re-
sponse to questions posed by the supervisor investigating the incident. 62
3. The First Amendment
When a public employee alleges retaliation for exercise of free speech
rights, a court must first assess the legal issues of whether the employee's
speech was on a matter of public concern and whether the employee's inter-
est in speaking outweighs the employer's interest in efficient public ser-
vice. 63 Then, the fact-finder assesses whether the speech played a signifi-
cant role in the adverse employment action and whether the employer would
have made the same decision even in the absence of the protected speech."M
This is known as the Pickering balancing test. 65
Over the last year, two state cases within the Eleventh Circuit have ad-
dressed issues raised by the Pickering balancing test. One case simply noted
a circuit court split over whether the test for deciding if a public employee's
free speech rights have been violated, i.e., the Pickering balancing test, also
governs freedom of association claims. 66 In Board of Regents v. Snyder,167
the Pickering balancing test arose in the context of whether supervisors were
157. Id. at 1323-24.
158. Id. at 1366.
159. Id. at 1367.
160. Id. at 1368.
161. Allocco, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1370.
162. Id.
163. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
164. Bd. of Regents v. Snyder, 826 So. 2d 382, 388 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Acevedo-Delgado v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 37, 45 n.11 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing
Tang v. R.I. Dep't of Elderly Affairs, 163 F.3d 7, I1 n.4 (Ist Cir. 1998) (noting, without tak-
ing part in, the split between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits over this issue)).
167. 826 So. 2d at 382.
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entitled to qualified immunity. 68 Immunity, the court made clear, turns in
part upon the nature of the constitutional right asserted and the degree to
which that right is well established within the law. 169 It is the rare First
Amendment claim that survives a qualified immunity defense. 70 Turning to
the first element of Pickering, while Snyder alleged that his speech was a
matter of public concern because it involved violations of state law and ethi-
cal standards, the court concluded that Snyder was speaking primarily as an
employee upon matters of personal interest rather than as a citizen upon mat-
ters of public concern.' 7 ' Qualified immunity protects government actors
unless their conduct violates clearly established federal statutory or constitu-
tional rights. 7 1 Under the First Amendment, "a right is clearly established
only if the plaintiff can provide case precedent involving essentially the same
speech or show that no reasonable person could believe that the first two
prongs of Pickering had not been met."'73 Since no case law involving the
same speech exists, and since Snyder's speech flunked the first prong of
Pickering, the court concluded that reasonable people could believe that
Snyder's speech was not protected under the first two prongs of Pickering,
thus the supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity.'7 4
In Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 75 a former police officer alleged
that he faced adverse employment actions in response to conduct he claimed
was protected by the First Amendment. 76 The Eleventh Circuit began its
analysis by making clear that "[w]hether a plaintiff engaged in speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment is a question of law which must be deter-
mined by the district court before a § 1983 claim can be submitted to the
jury."'' 7 7 Turning to the first element in Pickering, the court concluded that
speech involving corruption and mismanagement of a police department
"might be a matter of public concern." 78 What doomed plaintiffs case,
however, was the fourth prong, the "but-for" causation element of the
Pickering balancing test. 79 No reasonable jury, the court insisted, could
168. Id. at 387-88.
169. Id. at 388.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 389.
172. Snyder, 826 So. 2d at 390.
173. Id. at 390 (citing Martin v. Baugh, 141 F.3d 1417, 1420(11th Cir. 1998)).
174. Id.
175. 304 F.3d 1144 (11 th Cir. 2002).
176. Id. at 1147.
177. Id. at 1155 (citing Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1566 n.2 (11 th Cir.
1989)).
178. Id. at 1158.
179. Id. at 1159.
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deny that the city had a strong "legitimate reason for placing Brochu on paid
administrative leave."'' 80 By creating a secret plan to overthrow his superiors
and by sharing that plan with members of the community, Brochu knew he
would cause havoc in the police department.'8 ' For these reasons, the court
concluded that the district court erred when it rejected the city's "motion for
judgment as a matter of law on the § 1983 claim."'82
The United States Supreme Court expanded governmental liability un-
der the First Amendment in two rulings rendered in 1996, O'Hare Truck
Service, Inc., v. City of Northlake'83 and Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr.'84 In these two seminal cases, the Court ruled that the First
Amendment protects at-will independent contractors against dismissal in
retaliation for political activity.'85 However, lower courts continue to strug-
gle over what constitutes an ongoing independent contractor relationship.'86
For example, in Mangieri v. DCH Healthcare Authority,'8 7 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that a government contractor who had previous contracts for the
same sort of services before being denied contract renewal over free speech
had an ongoing commercial relationship with the government sufficient to
sustain its First Amendment claim, even absent an automatic renewal provi-
sion in its contract. 188
B. Employment Discrimination
1. Generally
Although the pair of Supreme Court rulings endorsing affirmative ac-
tion, handed down June 23, 2003, narrowly involved student admissions
policies at public colleges and universities,'8 9 there is already speculation that
these decisions might guide "employers toward wider acceptance of affirma-
tive action policies in hiring, training and promoting workers."' 90
180. Brochu, 304 F.3d at 1159.
181. Id. at 1160.
182. Id. at 1161.
183. 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
184. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
185. OHare, 518 U.S. at 726; Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685.
186. See Mangieri v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 304 F.3d 1072 (1 1th Cir. 2002), cert. dis-
missed, 123 S. Ct. 1511 (2003).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1076.
189. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
190. Richard B. Schmitt & Justin Gest, Supreme Court Rulings; Decisions May Lead to
More Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A16.
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On June 9, 2003, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 intended to make it easier for victims of discrimination to
win their cases.' 9' Specifically, in a "mixed motive" case, circumstantial
evidence of bias, even though short of "direct evidence" of discrimination, is
sufficient for the case to go to the jury.'9 2
On March 6, 2003, Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) re-introduced the
Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2003,193 under which employment discrimina-
tion damages would be excluded from income taxes.' 94
On June 12, 2003, the House of Representatives enacted legislation that
would transfer all class action lawsuits, including employment discrimination
class actions, from state to federal courts, if the claims totaled $5,000,000
and if the key defendant and fewer than one-third of the claimants were from
different states.' 95 Federal courts are widely regarded as less sympathetic to
plaintiffs in class action suits. 96
2. Race
A Jamaican-born, former Fort Lauderdale firefighter lost her suit
against the city based on claims of race, gender, and nationality discrimina-
tion. 97 A federal jury disagreed with a ruling from the EEOC that the city
had targeted the former firefighter.'98 She received a written reprimand for
injuring a duck while driving to a fire call while, allegedly, her white male
counterparts suffered no discipline for similar conduct. 99
In December 2002, Fort Lauderdale agreed to correct long-standing dis-
criminatory practices in order to settle its largest race bias lawsuit.2°° The
settlement came in the wake of warnings by the Department of Justice that
the city would be sued if it refused to settle chronic claims of employment
bias.20'
191. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2003).
192. Id. at 2154.
193. S. 557, 108th Cong. (2003).
194. Id.
195. 149 Cong. Rec. H5281-03 (2003).
196. Justin Gest, For Third Time, House OKs Reforming Class-Action Suits, L.A. TIMES,
June 13, 2003, at A24.
197. Brad Bennett, Worker Loses Bias Suit Against Fort Lauderdale, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 24, 2002, at lB.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Brad Bennett, Lauderdale, City Employee Agree to Settle Racial Bias Suit, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 14, 2002, at 9B.
201. Id.
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3. National Origin
On December 2, 2002, the EEOC issued a compliance manual on lan-
guage issues as guidance on how employers can avoid committing national
origin discrimination.2 2
4. Gender
Women make up about two percent of career firefighters nationwide,
and hazing incidents have left them uncertain as to whether they are facing
sexual harassment.2 °3 The City of Coral Springs Fire Department faced
charges of violating its own policies which ban extreme misconduct which is
defined as .'engaging in any intentional horseplay or misconduct which may
inflict bodily harm on anyone. ,,
2 1
An employer's liability for sexual harassment expands if it fails to rem-
edy complaints.0 5 In Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc.,206 the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that an employer may have failed to take quick and proper corrective
action in response to a sexual harassment complaint.0 7 For example, the
manager's report of the incident made no mention that there was an offer of
21money. 08 Moreover, not only did the manager fail to alert human resources,
but he also failed to submit the victim's own written report to human re-
sources.
20 9
Grooming cases fall into three categories: hair, dress, and appear-
ance. 2 ° Employers are on a firmer legal footing when grooming codes apply
equally to both genders.21 1 The Walt Disney Company has yet to learn this
rule, but it is making progress. In 1994, female workers were allowed to use
202. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, PUB. No. 915.003, COMPLIANCE
MANUAL SECTION 13: NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION (2002), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/national-origin.html.
203. Noah Bierman, Hazing at Fire Station Distressing, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 23, 2003, at
IBR.
204. Id.
205. Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11 th Cir. 2003) (citing Miller v.
Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1278-80 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Allen v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 647 (11th Cir. 1997)).
206. Id. at 1252.
207. Id. at 1261.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1261-62.
210. See, e.g., Richard Verrier, For Disney Workers, a Hipper Place on Earth, L.A.
TIMES, July 12, 2003, at C1.
211. See id.
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eye makeup; in 2000, men were entitled to grow mustaches.2 '1 2 In 2003, new
rules allow cornrows on men's heads, hoop earrings in women's ears, and
female employees may wear open-toe and open-heel shoes.21 3 Sandals re-
main banned.2" 4
To prove sex discrimination under Title VII, the employee must estab-
lish that the misconduct for which she was disciplined was the same or simi-
lar to what her counterparts engaged in, but that they were not similarly dis-
ciplined.2 15 In Ratley v. City of Jacksonville,1 6 the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the public
employer given that the plaintiff did not offer a single potential compara-
tor.2 1 7
5. Age
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") protects work-
ers forty years of age and over.21 8 Until recently, younger workers shut out
of job opportunities have not managed to sell courts on the notion of "reverse
age discrimination." In 2002, however, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the
ADEA does recognize claims of "reverse discrimination," in which employ-
ees younger than forty received fewer benefits than older employees.2 9 In-
deed, on April 21, 2003, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether "re-
verse discrimination" claims are actionable under the ADEA.22 °
On a statute of limitations issue, under the ADEA, the Eleventh Circuit
ruled in Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation22' that an ADEA claim accrued
on the date the employer notified the employee that he was being terminated,
not on the earlier date when he was notified that he would not earn a salary
increase or bonus.222
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g,. Anderson v. WBGM-42, 253 F.3d 561, 564 (11th Cir. 2001).
216. No. 01-16291, 2002 WL 1155560, at *1 (I I th Cir. Apr. 22, 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 885 (2002).
217. Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *3, Ratley v. City of Jacksonville, 123 S. Ct. 118
(2002) (No. 02-134), available at 2002 WL 32134883.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)(2000).
219. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
220. David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Hear Reverse Age Bias Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
22, 2003, at A 15.
221. 320 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2003).
222. Id. at 1201-02.
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In 1998, the Supreme Court addressed the question whether workers
who secured enhanced severance packages in exchange for waiving any age-
related claims must return their additional benefits before they can challenge
the waivers.223 In Oubre v. Entergy Operations Inc.,224 the Court ruled that
employees who sign releases waiving all claims against the employer and
keep the money for signing such releases do not waive ADEA claims unless
the release meets the requirements spelled out in federal law for release of
ADEA claims. 25  The Eleventh Circuit, in Watkins v. Nortel Networks
Inc.,226 held that Oubre does not apply when the plaintiff has not raised an
ADEA claim.
6. Disability
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") makes it unlawful for
employers to deny reasonable accommodation for the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,
unless doing so gives rise to undue hardship. 227 The ADA also regulates pre-
221employment medical examinations and inquiries.
The ADA protects employers with fifteen or more employees.229 In
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 3 ° the Supreme Court
ruled that the common law test of control governs whether four director-
shareholder physicians should be counted as employees toward the fifteen-
employee minimum for determining whether an employer is bound by the
ADA. 3
7. Same-sex Bias
While Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation as such, the Supreme Court, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc. ,232 ruled that some forms of same-sex harassment may violate
Title VII if the bias took place "because of sex. 233 Moreover, the Supreme
223. See generally Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998).
224. 522 U.S. at 422.
225. Id. at 427.
226. No. 02-10330, 2002 WL 1799704, at *1 (11 th Cir. July 23, 2002).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
228. § 12112(d)(2).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000).
230. 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003).
231. Id. at 1675.
232. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
233. Id. at 81.
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Court's ruling on June 26, 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas,234 striking down
Texas' sodomy law that only penalized same-sex sodomy and specifically
overruling Bowers v. Hardwick235 will make it harder for employers to toler-
ate same-sex bias.
In De La Campa v. Grifols America, Inc.,236 the Third District Court of
Appeal of Florida held that a woman who alleged that her superior sexually
harassed her, including insults and offensive behavior toward her owing to
her sexual orientation, did not state a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.137 The court failed to find the requisite level of outrageous-
ness on the part of the abuser.238
8. Religion
In the public sector both the First Amendment and Title VII protect
public employees against religious discrimination. 39 In Lubetsky v. Applied
Card Systems, Inc.,24 ° the Eleventh Circuit ruled that an unsuccessful job
applicant, who offered no proof that the employer knew that the applicant
was Jewish when it revoked its provisional offer of employment, failed to
establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination in violation of Title
VII.
z4 1
Claims of religious discrimination in the workplace have been rising
steadily even before anti-Muslim incidents that occurred in the wake of the
September 11 th terrorist attacks.242 A Pentecostal Christian, whose religion
bars women from wearing pants, is on a collision course if the job requires a
uniform that includes pants. 43 While religious bias claims comprise only a
fraction of all work-place bias claims, they are rising at a far quicker pace,
especially claims of retaliation against Muslims. 244 Title VII requires em-
ployers to make reasonable accommodations for employees' religious beliefs
and practices. 245 In one case, a postal worker alleged that he was harassed
234. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
235. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
236. 819 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
237. Id. at 944.
238. Id.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
240. 296 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002).
241. Id. at 1307.
242. Adam Geller, Workplace Tension over Religious Diversity, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 22,
2003, at IC.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. U.S. CONST. amend. I; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
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because he practices Wicca, a form of witchcraft. 246 He was not allowed to
wear a T-shirt that said "Born Again Pagan" while crucifixes could be
worn.
2 4 7
C. Remedies
1. Attorneys' Fees
Many federal statutes, including employment discrimination statutes,
provide for awarding attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff.248 Whether an
award of attorneys' fee is proper entails a two-step inquiry.249 First, the party
must be a prevailing party in order to recover.25° Second, the fee requested
by the prevailing party must be reasonable. 25' The primary consideration in
assessing the reasonableness of a fee is the degree of success obtained.252
Courts disagree over what constitutes a "prevailing party" when a law-
suit is settled. For example, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that plaintiffs who
secure a settlement in their bias suit against a state agency constitute "pre-
vailing parties" entitled to attorneys' fees even though the terms fall short of
the relief initially sought. 253  By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit noted in
American Disability Association, Inc. v. Chmielarz,254 that the circuit courts
are split over whether a private settlement, without judicial action, amounts
"to an alteration in the legal relationship of the parties" sufficient to qualify a
plaintiff as a prevailing party entitled to attorneys' fees.255
In 2001, the Supreme Court issued an opinion narrowing the definition
of "prevailing party" for purposes of recovering attorneys' fees.256 In Buck-
hannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health &
Human Resources,257 the Court rejected the so-called "catalyst test" for
awarding attorneys' fees in federal civil rights cases.258 Under this theory,
246. Geller, supra note 242.
247. Id.
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
249. Id.
250. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992).
251. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
252. Id. at 434.
253. Richard S. v. Dep't of Developmental Servs. of Cal., 317 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir.
2003).
254. 289 F.3d 1315 (1 th Cir. 2002).
255. Id. at 1319, n.2.
256. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598 (2001).
257. Id.
258. Id.at610.
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fees are recoverable if a plaintiff's lawsuit produces the desired alteration in
the defendant's conduct.259 Instead, the Court made clear, a prevailing party
must also achieve judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree
before qualifying for an award of fees.26°
The Eleventh Circuit, in Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council,26' has
read Buckhannon as applicable only to federal fee-shifting statutes that pro-
vide for fee awards to "prevailing parties. '262 In other words, the "catalyst
theory" remains viable under federal statutes 263 that authorize reasonable
attorneys' fees "whenever the court determines such award is appropri-
ate.'1,26 4
On November 14, 2002, Senator Russ Feingold introduced a bill that
would overturn the Buckhannon decision and restore the "catalyst theory. 265
When an employer requires mandatory arbitration as a condition of employ-
ment, can employees be made to bear part of the costs including attorneys'
fees? On this question, the Supreme Court of California has ruled that em-
ployers cannot shift these costs onto employees.266
Florida law authorizes elected officials, who must defend themselves
while in office, to request that their city pay attorneys' fees. 267 A former
mayor of Weston invoked this law after he paid his own attorneys' fees de-
fending against conflict-of-interest charges while in office.268 In Florida
Department of Insurance v. Amador,269 a former employee of Florida Inter-
national University sued the Department of Insurance, claiming that the De-
partment's withdrawal of legal representation for acts committed in the
course and scope of his employment constituted a breach of contract. 270 Al-
though the court never reached this issue, it did note in passing that there is
no constitutional right in Florida to have one's attorneys' fees paid.27' More-
over, whether a public employee is entitled to statutory reimbursement for
attorneys' fees incurred in defending against acts committed in the course
259. Id. at 605.
260. Id.
261. 307 F.3d 1318 (1 th Cir. 2002).
262. Id. at 1326.
263. Id. at 1325.
264. Id. at 1323 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000)).
265. See S. 3161, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
266. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 681 (Cal. 2000).
267. See FLA. STAT. § 111.07 (2002).
268. Jasmine Kripalani, Ex- Weston Mayor Seeks Payment, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 22, 2002,
at 5B.
269. 841 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
270. ld. at 613.
271. ld. at 614.
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and scope of employment is a matter for "the respective governmental
unit.., not the judiciary. ' 72
2. Reinstatement and Back Pay
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v. NLRB, 73 the United States Su-
preme Court denied undocumented employees the right to seek reinstatement
or back pay because federal law makes it unlawful to hire such workers. 4
In light of Hoffman, the EEOC decided it will no longer seek these remedies
for undocumented employees who are fired or not hired. 75 Despite Hoffman,
however, the DOL will persist in seeking back pay for undocumented work-
ers for violations of the FLSA.276
V. PUBLIC SECTOR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ISSUES
A. Public Unions
"Florida... is a 'right-to-work' state, which means an employee cannot
be forced to join a union to hold a job. 277 Many northern states, however,
have laws that allow unions to charge non-union members the cost of negoti-
ating for nonmembers.2 7 ' For the first time in Florida, a public union has
proposed a plan under which non-union members must pay an "administra-
tive fee" to defray the cost of negotiating new contracts that would benefit all
bargaining unit workers.279 It is unclear whether such a fee violates Florida's
"right-to-work" laws.80
Many states have enacted statutes modeled on the Federal Hatch Act,
which regulates the partisan political activities of public employees.28 ' For
272. Id.
273. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
274. Id. at 147-52.
275. Rescission of Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to Undocumented
Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws, EEOC Pub. 915.002 (June 2002),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/undoc-rescind.html.
276. See Fact Sheet #48 Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Immigrant Workers: Effect of
Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the Wage and Hour Division, United States
Dep't of Labor (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.dol.gov/ esa/regs/compliance/whd/
whdfs48.htm.
277. Daniel A. Grech, UTD Seeks to Collect Fee from Nonunion Teachers, MIAMI
HERALD, July 22, 2002, at 3B.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id.
281. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2000).
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example, under a Miami-Dade County School District board rule, "[n]o em-
ployee shall use his/her official authority or influence for the purpose of co-
ercing or influencing another person's vote. 282 Nevertheless, days before
Florida's gubernatorial race in 2002, thousands of public school teachers in
Miami-Dade County were asked by their public union to send home a letter
to parents endorsing one candidate for governor whose election would "sig-
nificantly improve public education in Florida. 283  This endorsement by
Florida's largest teachers' union has been criticized as an illegal attempt to
coerce or influence another person's vote.284
B. Collective Bargaining Issues
Whether certain public employees are entitled to unionize in Florida
turns on the statutory definition of "public employee." In Murphy v. Mack,285
the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that deputy sheriffs were not public em-
ployees.2 86 But twenty-two years later, in Service Employees International
Union, Local 16 v. Public Employees Relations Commission,2 7 the same
court largely undermined the rationale of Murphy by ruling that deputy court
clerks were public employees entitled to collective bargaining rights under
state law.288 In Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Ass' v. Williams,289 the
Supreme Court of Florida largely overruled Murphy by ruling that deputy
sheriffs were "employees" entitled under the Florida Constitution to collec-
tively bargain. 29" Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded there was no
compelling state interest in denying deputy sheriffs their right to engage in
collective bargaining.29'
Under the Florida Statutes, managerial employees and administrative
personnel are prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining.292 In Dade
County School Administrators Ass 'n, Local 77 v. School Board of liami-
Dade County, 93 a public employee union sought to represent a bargaining
282. Matthew 1. Pinzur, Union Asks Dade Teachers to Push McBride in Letters, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 2, 2002, at 9B.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. 358 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1978).
286. Id. at 826.
287. 752 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2000).
288. See id. at 573-74.
289. 838 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2003).
290. Id. at 545.
291. Id. at 552.
292. FLA. STAT. § 447.50 1(l)(f) (2002).
293. 840 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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unit made up of assistant principals and vice principals. 294 The Florida Pub-
lic Employees Relations Commission denied the union's petition concluding
that the assistant principals were managerial employees and administrative
personnel. 9 5 On appeal, the court declined to reach the question of the con-
stitutionality of the state statute barring such employees from joining a un-
ion.2
96
In Ponce Inlet Professional Fire Fighters, Local 4140 v. Town of Ponce
Inlet,297 a union representing firefighters filed an unfair labor practice claim
with the state labor board alleging that the town had violated state law298 by
unilaterally changing the compensation of firefighters by putting in place a
new pay plan.2 99 The board found that while the town was aware that the
union opposed the new pay plan, it failed to make an effective demand to
bargain.300 Absent such demand, the board ruled that the union did not estab-
lish a prima facie statutory violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith
over the terms and conditions of employment. 30 1
In International Union of Painters & Allied Trades v. Cape Coral, Lo-
cal Union 2301,302 a public union petitioned the state labor board to modify
a bargaining unit comprised of clerical and administrative personnel em-
ployed by the city.303 The test for adding positions to an existing bargaining
unit is whether the classifications at issue share a "community of interest"
with the classifications within the bargaining unit.3°4 The board accepted the
hearing officer's recommendation to add the two classifications to the bar-
gaining unit.30 5
In South Walton Professional Firefighters Ass 'n v. South Walton Fire
District,0 6 a firefighters' union filed a bargaining unit clarification petition
with the state labor board seeking to exclude the newly created classification
of division chief/EMS coordinator from the unit.07 Both the hearing officer
and the board dismissed the union's petition, concluding that since the new
294. Id. at 1104.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 28 Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. 33287 (2002).
298. FLA. STAT. § 447.501(l)(a), (c) (2002).
299. Ponce Inlet, 28 Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. at 33287.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. 28 Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. 33288 (2002).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. 28 Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. 33289 (2002).
307. Id.
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position had never been included in the bargaining unit, it was unnecessary
to exclude it.3"'
Often in Florida, when public employees are renegotiating labor con-
tracts with their governmental employers, the two parties resort to public
displays to bring pressure to bear on the opposing party to agree to its terms.
For example, in January 2003, the United Teachers of Dade threatened to
"launch protests across the county and stonewall the district's plan to start
school in early August until the two sides settle on pay increases., 319 More-
over, the teachers' union refused to negotiate any other term in the contract
until salaries had been settled.' 0
C. Arbitration
The Supreme Court of Florida has made it clear that where a public un-
ion retains contractual control over the arbitral portion of the grievance pro-
cedure and it refuses to process a grievance to arbitration because the com-
plaint lacks merit, the governmental employer owes no duty to arbitrate the
dispute. 31 In Austin v. Pembroke Pines, Fire Department,3 2 two firefighters
scored high enough on a promotion test to be placed on an eligibility list, but
were later deleted from the list when a qualification for taking the test
changed." 3 Without union assistance, the two firefighters sought to arbitrate
this dispute with the city; the city, however, refused to pursue arbitration
because the firefighters were not represented by the union.31 4 The firefight-
ers then claimed before the state labor board that the city committed an un-
fair labor practice by refusing to arbitrate the firefighters' promotion griev-
ance.3" 5 The state labor board summarily dismissed the firefighters' petition
as procedurally defective.31 6 Not only did the petition fail to include the par-
ties' contract or the grievance, but it also failed to include the names of the
individuals involved and the time and place of acts triggering the dispute.3 7
308. Id.
309. Matthew 1. Pinzur, Salary Stalemate Prompts Warning by Teachers, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 25, 2003, at 3B.
310. id.
311. Galbreath v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 446 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1984).
312. 28 Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. 1 33286 (2002).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Jd.
316. id.
317. Austin, 28 Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. at 33286.
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Moreover, the charge was time-barred by the six-month statute of limita-
tions."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The year spanning from 2002-2003 offered a typical array of public
employment law issues. Every stage of employment, from hiring, to the
terms of employment, to employment discrimination, to discipline and dis-
charge, summons up its own set of issues at the federal, state, and local lev-
els. Post-retirement also encompasses such issues as public pensions, dis-
ability retirement, death benefits, and others. In contrast to private sector
employment, which by and large goes unnoticed by the media, public sector
employment draws widespread microscopic news attention. Besides case
law and legislative enactments, news stories provide a wealth of curious facts
and figures in this precinct of the law.
318. Id.
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Some were sentenced to death. Without warning or just cause, all
were one day swept off the streets, forcibly separated from their
families and friends, and ultimately bound over into a maddening
nightmare.
Post-conviction DNA tests performed on critical pieces of biological
evidence proved they were innocent simply, elegantly, and defini-
tively. But resurrecting their lives, and those of their loved ones, all
shattered by unthinkable injustice, is a complex and messy process.
Yet it must be undertaken at once, as a matter of common decency,
* Catherine Arcabascio is an associate professor of law at Nova Southeastern Univer-
sity, Shepard Broad Law Center. She also is Co-Founder and Co-Director of the Florida
Innocence Project. I would like to thank my co-director, Craig Trocino, for the countless
hours he has devoted to the Project. In addition, I also would like to thank the Innocence
Project in New York, particularly Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld for inspiring us to start the
Project, and David Menschel for always being available for a brainstorming session. And
finally, I would like to extend a heartfelt thanks to all the students of the Florida Innocence
Project, especially Andrea Edwards, Linda Naish, Adrienne Sampson, Kathleen Bonczyk,
Ellyn Bogdanoff, and Carrie Lane. They are the heart and soul of the Project, and without
them we would not exist.
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as a signal we can face the truth, as a measure to redeem our aspira-
tion that America should be, can be, fair and just.'
I. INTRODUCTION
To date, 138 people have been exonerated in the United States through
the use of DNA testing.2 On October 1, 2001, section 925.11 of the Florida
Statutes, entitled "Postsentencing DNA Testing," went into effect; its proce-
dural counterpart, rule 3.853 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
entitled "Motion for Postconviction DNA Testing," went into effect on Oc-
tober 18, 2001.? The purpose of both section 925.11 and rule 3.853 is to
provide movants a means by which they can challenge a conviction when
there is "a credible concern that an injustice may have occurred and DNA
testing may resolve the issue."4 Both section 925.11 and rule 3.853 set forth
the requirements that must be met before a convicted movant will be allowed
access to physical evidence from his case that could be subjected to DNA
testing.5
Since section 925.11 and rule 3.853 went into effect, the Florida Inno-
cence Project 6 and other organizations like it have been working together to
represent many indigent movants in the State of Florida.7 The litigation
strategies that are contained in this article are a direct result of the combined
experience and efforts of all the members of these organizations.
The organization of this article primarily will track the structure of rule
3.853, because the rule procedurally dictates the format of the motion. If it is
necessary to the flow and understanding of the concepts presented in this
article, a section of rule 3.853 may be discussed out of chronological order.
There are some differences between the rule and the statute that will be dis-
cussed throughout this article; cites to both the rule and statute will be in-
i. TARYN SIMON, THE INNOCENTS 8 (Lesley Martin ed., 2003).
2. See The Innocence Project, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Aug. 22,
2003).
3. FLA. STAT. § 925.11 (2002); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853.
4. Zollman v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting In re
Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing), 807 So.
2d 633, 636 (Fla. 2001) [hereinafter Amendment]).
5. § 925.11(2)(a)(1)-(6); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(l)-(6).
6. The Florida Innocence Project was founded in 1999 at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. It provides pro bono legal assistance to convicted defendants
who maintain that they are innocent and that DNA can exonerate them.
7. There is no automatic right to counsel in these post-conviction proceedings. See infra
Section V.
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cluded in the footnotes. As is customary in practice, the motion for DNA
testing will be referred to as a "3.853 motion."
II. WHO MAY SEEK RELIEF
Not all movants are entitled to relief under section 925.11. "A person
who has been tried and found guilty of committing a crime and has been
sentenced by a court established by the laws of this state may petition that
court to order the examination of physical evidence . . . ."' Rule 3.853 is
silent with respect to this distinction, although the rule proposed by the Flor-
ida Bar Criminal Procedure Rules Committee did include language that
authorized testing for those who entered guilty or nolo contendere pleas.9
The Supreme Court of Florida chose to remove it.' ° Accordingly, a movant
who enters an outright guilty plea will be barred from seeking DNA testing
under the statute." In Reighn v. State,"2 the First District Court of Appeal
held that the movant's motion requesting DNA testing was barred under sec-
tion 925.11 because section 925.1 l(1)(a) of the statute only allows one who
"has been tried and found guilty of committing a crime" to file a 3.853 mo-
tion.'3 Because the movant had pleaded nolo contendere prior to her trial, the
First District Court of Appeal found that she, too, was barred.'4
While a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article,
there is a valid argument that excluding those who plead guilty from obtain-
ing DNA testing is unjust and may be unconstitutional. In his concurring
opinion in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Harvey v. Horan,5
denying a rehearing en banc for a movant seeking DNA testing through a
§ 1983 action, Judge Luttig included some strongly worded dicta regarding a
movant's right to access evidence.' 6 He stated, "that there is a residual, core
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment which, in certain, very limited circumstances, gives rise to a
procedural due process right to access previously-produced forensic evidence
8. § 925.11(1)(a).
9. See generally FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853. See also Amendment, supra note 4, at 634.
10. See Amendment, supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. 834 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
13. Id. at 253 (quoting § 925.1 l(l)(a)).
14. Id.
15. 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002) (reviewing petitioner's section 1983 action that sought
access to the evidence in his case sometime after his conviction in a Virginia court). The sole
issue before the court was whether a section 1983 action was the appropriate vehicle for him
to access that evidence. See id.
16. Id. at 308.
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for purposes of STR DNA testing."' 7 Judge Luttig further explained, "[a]t
least as classically understood, it is not a right of procedural due process.
And neither is it a typical substantive due process right. But it is a right that
legitimately draws upon the principles that underlay all of these-a concep-
tual and constitutional fact" that eluded the majority." While Judge Luttig
did not discuss this principle within the context of guilty pleas, his reasoning
should nonetheless apply to those who pleaded guilty. Indeed, the process of
negotiating pleas is so deeply rooted in our criminal justice system that it
should not be treated differently than a conviction when determining who
should be entitled to access evidence. Innocent people do sometimes take
pleas, just as they sometimes confess to crimes they did not commit.' 9
Similarly, in the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion adopting rule
3.853, Justice Anstead concurring in part and dissenting in part, also objected
to the denial of 3.853 relief for those who plead guilty:
Of course, we know as a fact the overwhelming majority of crimi-
nal cases are resolved through plea negotiations and, hence, any
DNA testing under the legislation excluding those cases will be
limited to a small percentage of convicted defendants. To be sure,
however, we also know that plea bargaining often results in many
cases of pleas of convenience or best interests where the defendant
simply acknowledges that the uncertain risk of trial on additional
and more serious charges compels him to accept conviction and
punishment even while maintaining innocence. We have consis-
tently recognized that courts should grant relief when a fundamen-
tal injustice has been demonstrated regardless of whether the de-
fendant was convicted by trial or by plea. 0
Justice Anstead also pointed out that access to DNA testing is in es-
sence a claim of illegal detention under the "constitutional writ of habeas
corpus," which is provided for in Florida's Constitution.2 ' Moreover, the
Supreme Court of Florida possesses exclusive jurisdiction over proper pro-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 311.
19. See, e.g., Prosecutors Seek Reversal in Central Park Jogger Case, REUTERS NEWS
SERV. (N.Y.), Dec. 6, 2002, available at http://www.bet.com/articles/l,,clgb4807-5525,00.
html (reporting that after another man confessed to the crime and DNA testing confirmed he
was guilty, prosecutors asked the court to reverse the convictions of five defendants for the
rape of a jogger in New York's Central Park on April 19, 1989 on the grounds that the video-
taped confessions of the then teenaged defendants were coerced by police).
20. Amendment. supra note 4.
21. Id.
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cedures for invoking the writ. 22 The ability to file a writ of habeas corpus is
available to a movant, regardless of whether or not he pleads guilty.23 The
only issue, according to Justice Anstead, is whether a "fundamental injustice
has occurred.,
24
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FILING 3.853 MOTIONS
Despite the recommendations of numerous attorneys across the State of
Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted a rule that included a statute
of limitations.2 5 The Florida Innocence Project suggested in its comments to
the Rules Committee that:
The inclusion of a two year time limitation in Proposed Rule 3.853
(d)(1) compromises the very purpose of the rule. No one can pre-
dict what changes in DNA testing will occur in the future. The
only thing that can be predicted is that new methods and new tech-
nologies will be developed. History reinforces science's un-
equivocal record of endless discovery and refinement of knowl-
edge.26
In addition, because this particular group of cases is so old, a proper and
thorough investigation takes more than two years.27 These and other com-
ments opposing the time limitation failed to persuade the supreme court.28 It
adopted a rule that includes time limitations for three categories of cases, so
that it would mirror section 925.11.29
The first states that a movant must file a 3.853 motion "[w]ithin 2 years
following the date that the judgment and sentence in the case became final if
no direct appeal was taken . . . or by October 1, 2003, whichever occurs
later."3 The second applies to cases where there has been a direct appeal. In
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 637.
25. See Emergency Petition to Create Rule 3.853 Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
(DNA Testing) at App. B, In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating
Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing), 807 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2001) (No. SC01-363), available at
http://www.flcourts.org/sct/clerk/briefs/2001/201-400/01-363_appendixB.pdf (last visited Oct.
16, 2003) [hereinafter Emergency Petition].
26. Id.
27. Unpublished data compiled from the over 700 requests for assistance received by the
Florida Innocence Project; see also Emergency Petition, supra note 25.
28. Amendment, supra note 4, at 635.
29. Id. See generally FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853; § 925.11.
30. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(d)(l)(a); § 925.1 l(i)(b)(l)..
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those cases, the motion must be filed "within 2 years following the date that
the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal . . . or by October 1, 2003,
whichever occurs later."' 3' Finally, in a death penalty case, the motion must
be filed "within 2 years following the date that collateral counsel was ap-
pointed or retained subsequent to the conviction being affirmed on direct
appeal" or by October 1, 2003, whichever occurs later.32 Thus, all motions
involving cases in which the convictions were final prior to October 1, 2001
must be filed by October 1, 2003. 33 That many of the cases that fall under
the purview of rule 3.853 will be barred by the statute of limitations is obvi-
ous because DNA technology did not exist as it does now.
This is particularly troubling because this group of cases is most bur-
dened by the statute of limitations. Many of the affected cases are fifteen or
twenty years old. It is not uncommon to find cases from the 1970's, which
have records that have been archived for many years, if they still exist at
all. 3' The Florida Innocence Project has received requests for assistance in
cases dating back as early as 1959.
The same problem exists in locating the physical evidence in these
cases. 35 These are the cases that were tried during a time when DNA testing
did not exist, was too new to be available in all cases, or was in its infancy
and less reliable tests were being conducted on the evidence.
Although a majority36 of the states that have enacted DNA statutes do
not include a testing deadline in their statute, the Florida Legislature chose to
include such a provision.37 The inclusion of this time limitation makes it
entirely possible that innocent movants will have lost their opportunity to be
exonerated.
If the deadline passes, a movant still may be able to file a 3.853 motion.
Rule 3.853(d)(1)(a) allows a motion to be filed at any time "if the facts on
which the petition is predicated were unknown to petitioner or the peti-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Zollman v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (de-
ciding the filing of a 3.853 motion twenty-three years after rape conviction); Galloway v.
State, 802 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (deciding the filing of a 3.853 motion
based upon a 1979 conviction of two counts of robbery and one count of sexual battery).
35. See, e.g., King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 2002) (dismissing defendant's
motion for DNA testing due to determination that vaginal washings and rectal swab no longer
existed).
36. This includes states that allow testing during the entire period of a defendant's incar-
ceration.
37. Compare FLA. STAT. § 925.1 l(l)(b)(I), with ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(A) (2001),
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2003), and N.Y. CRIM. P. LAW § 440.30 (McKinney
Supp. 2003).
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tioner's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence."38 Rule 3.853's due diligence requirement is similar to the due
diligence requirement in rule 3.850, which governs motions to vacate, set
aside, or correct sentences.39 If a fact could have been discovered with due
diligence but was not, most courts will deny a 3.850 motion as being un-
timely.40 The question of due diligence under 3.853 is not yet ripe and thus
no caselaw exists that interprets it. It would seem, however, that the courts
would interpret rule 3.853's due diligence requirement the same way that it
interprets rule 3.850. This section however, is crippled by the fact that gov-
ernment agencies have the right to destroy the evidence once the two-year
statute of limitations has expired.4
A less elegant option would be to file a 3.853 motion that is facially suf-
ficient, but not thoroughly investigated. The court will review the motion
and based upon the facts provided in the motion, may deny it for facial insuf-
ficiency. If it is denied for facial insufficiency after the October 1, 2003
deadline has passed, the decision will have to be appealed. In that case, the
district court of appeal may simply give the movant leave to file a facially
sufficient motion. If it is denied substantively, the movant may still have an
opportunity to file a second 3.853 motion. Currently there is no caselaw
barring successive 3.853 motions. However, 3.853's statutory cousin, 3.850
has a healthy body of caselaw that bars successive motions on the theory of
finality.42
There are several strong constitutional arguments that exist which may
prevent the statute of limitations from acting as a bar to accessing evidence.
Should Florida legislators during the coming legislative session choose to
ignore the call to extend the statute of limitations, the battle to conduct DNA
testing after the October 1, 2003 deadline in this class of cases no doubt will
be fought in court on constitutional grounds.43
38. FLA. STAT. § 925.1 l(I)(b)(2) (2002).
39. Compare FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(d)(I )(B), with FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b)( 1).
40. Correll v. State, 698 So. 2d 522, 523-24 (Fla. 1997).
41. § 925.11 (4)(a), (b); see also infra Section IV.A.3.
42. See. e.g., Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 1992) (holding that interpretation
of FLA. R. CRIM P. 3.850(f) means that a successive motion may be dismissed if it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief).
43. For a more detailed discussion of the constitutional arguments, see Emergency Peti-
tion, supra note 25; see also NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS (Sept. 1999), at http://www.ncjrs.org/
pdffiles I/nij/1 77626.pdf [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING].
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IV. FACIAL SUFFICIENCY FOR A 3.853 MOTION
Rule 3.853 requires that a motion for DNA testing contain five state-
ments that must be made "under oath" by the sentenced movant.44
A. The Statement of the Facts
In order to be considered facially sufficient, a 3.853 motion must con-
tain "a statement of the facts relied on in support of the motion, including a
description of the physical evidence containing DNA to be tested and, if
known, the present location or last known location of the evidence and how
it originally was obtained."45
Normally, one can use the trial transcripts to provide the court with a
recitation of the underlying facts in a case. If the conviction is old, however,
it is likely that some documents, including the transcript, will be difficult to
locate because there is no one set rule that governs how long public offices
must keep transcripts. In some circumstances, the movant or his family may
have a copy of the trial transcript. If neither has it, then it is possible that one
of the movant's prior lawyers may have a copy, so make sure to inquire with
both the trial lawyers and the appellate lawyers. If that also leads to a dead-
end, most of the trial transcripts in criminal cases are warehoused by the At-
torney General's Office in Tallahassee.
If all else fails, neither the rule nor the statute technically requires that
the trial transcript be the only source regarding the facts.4 6 In Zollman v.
State,47 the Second District Court of Appeal held that the determination of
whether the 3.853 motion is facially sufficient "requires consideration of the
facts of the crime itself and the other available evidence."'48 Nothing prohib-
its the use of facts from other transcribed proceedings such as hearings and
depositions as long as the facts of the crime itself are established. Like 3.850
motions, which allow the defense to argue that newly discovered evidence
should permit the movant to obtain a new trial, it appears that facts outside
the record may also satisfy the requirements of rule 3.853.
A movant or his attorney wishing to file a 3.853 motion also should col-
lect all of the police records and other documents from the case. These
documents should have been turned over during discovery and should be
obtainable through the movant or his prior counsel. However, because these
44. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b); § 925.11 (2)(a).
45. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(1); § 925.11(2)(a)(1).
46. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853; § 925.11.
47. 820 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
48. Id. at 1063 (emphasis added).
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cases are normally very old, it may be difficult to retrieve them. Thus, an
attorney should make a public records request, commonly known in Florida
as a Chapter 119 request, to each and every law enforcement agency in-
volved in the movant's case and to the State Attorney's Office.49 Pursuant to
Chapter 119, a movant is entitled to obtain copies of public records that are
maintained in a state public agency.5 ° Some of these documents also may
help in establishing the underlying facts of the crime should the transcript not
be located.
1. Determining Which Underlying Facts to Include
Developing a persuasive factual recitation that provides the basis for an
exoneration claim is one of the most difficult and important parts of drafting
a 3.853 motion. The facts should be presented as completely as possible.5'
Similar to a direct appeal or a 3.850 motion, a 3.853 motion should con-
tain basic factual information regarding the charges presented to the jury, the
crime or crimes of which the movant was convicted, the sentence he re-
ceived, and the trial judge who presided over the case.52 The facts section
also should contain specific details about the actual underlying crime, i.e.
where and when the crime occurred, whether there were any witnesses, how
the movant was identified, whether or not there were other suspects, and
most importantly, what physical evidence was collected.53
Other facts that relate to the prosecution and defense theories at trial
also should be presented. For example, if a prosecutor proceeded on the the-
ory that only one person raped the victim, that fact should be included in the
statement of facts. At the post-conviction stage, a prosecutor may attempt to
argue that even if the results of a DNA test indicate that the semen does not
belong to a movant, that result does not necessarily exonerate him. Some of
these arguments are founded upon new theories that were never presented at
trial. Even though there was never another person alleged to have been in-
volved in a crime, the prosecution may attempt during post-conviction pro-
49. FLA. STAT. § 119.011 (2002).
50. § 119.011(2) (meaning of agency is, "any state, county, district, authority, or munici-
pal officer, department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of gov-
ernment created or established by law").
51. See, e.g., Galloway v. State, 802 So. 2d at 1174 (denying pro se defendant's 3.853
motion on the grounds that his allegations failed to properly assert how DNA testing could
exonerate him. Court held that the fact that only co-defendant's DNA was on the defendant
and at the scene of the crime did not mean that the defendant was not present when the sexual
battery was committed).
52. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(1)-(5).
53. Id.
2003]
71
: Nova Law Review 28, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
NOVA LA W REVIEW
ceedings to argue in a single perpetrator rape case that there could have been
another person present who participated in the crime and who deposited the
semen. Thus, it is important to present the facts as completely as possible.
In Knighten v. State, the prosecutor argued during trial that a pubic hair,
found in the bedroom where the rape of two women had taken place, could
have been Knighten's. 54 At trial, the defense relied upon a misidentification
theory." To rebut that theory, the prosecution "relied heavily" on the pubic
hair:
She also told you that those two pubic hairs could have originated
from Toney Knighten. No emotionalism, no room for mistake.
Ask yourself what is the probability that someone with pubic hairs
exactly like Toney Knighten's was in that trailer in that bedroom
and on that carpet. Its [sic] not very likely.56
The prosecutor then argued that the chances of a mistaken identity were
slim given the hair evidence." The Second District Court of Appeal clearly
took the prosecutor's closing arguments into account when it held not only
that Knighten's motion was facially sufficient but also that DNA testing of
the pubic hair should be granted.5"
Keep in mind that each case is factually distinct and, apart from the tra-
ditional facts like conviction, date of conviction, judge and sentence, a sepa-
rate determination will have to be made regarding what facts may prove piv-
otal and crucial. The cases cited above suggest that a somewhat holistic and
broader view of 3.853 litigation is more effective. While a bare bones recita-
tion of the facts might meet minimal facial sufficiency, other facts may prove
necessary in establishing that DNA can exonerate the movant. Having a
narrow focus will only allow the prosecution more leeway to argue against
exoneration. Moreover, if the motion is denied summarily without a hearing
at the trial level, the record on appeal will be limited to the allegations in the
motion.59 Thus, providing the court with a full record is crucial.
2. Describing the Physical Evidence
The second component of rule 3.853(b)(1) requires the movant to in-
clude "a description of the physical evidence containing DNA to be tested
54. 829 So. 2d 249, 250 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Jd. at 251.
58. Id. at 252.
59. Zollman v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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and, if known, the present location or last known location of the evidence
and how it was originally obtained." 60 Note that this section does not place
the burden specifically upon the movant to establish with absolute certainty
the whereabouts of potential evidence. It merely states that if it is known,
the movant should provide the court with that information. Indeed, in this
post-conviction process, the movant or his attorney are in the most disadvan-
taged position to locate the evidence. Fairness demands that the burden
should squarely be on the prosecution to find out whether or not evidence in
a case still exists and where it is located.
To date, there has been no Florida district court of appeal case that
explicitly states how this burden is to be allocated or satisfied. In Huffman v.
State,6' the movant stated in his 3.853 motion "that the last known location of
the evidence was at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement in Tampa
or at the Sarasota County Police Department., 62 In response to the motion,
the State did not "indicate whether the rape kit was still available for test-
ing. 6 3 "The trial court acknowledged that the State failed to allege whether
the evidence sought to be tested was still available for testing," but it never
fully addressed the issue in its opinion, having decided to deny the 3.853
motion on other grounds.' However, it appears that the Second District
Court of Appeal did not assume that the burden rested completely with the
movant.65 In Borland v. State,66 the Second District Court of Appeal held
that "a finding by the trial court that DNA evidence does or does not exist is
a factual determination" and thus, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary
hearing.67 If the State provides an unsworn statement that evidence does not
exist, that assertion alone will be insufficient and the court must hold an evi-
68 6dentiary hearing. Moreover, an affidavit from the State will not suffice.69
"'An affidavit serves as the functional equivalent of testimony which is con-
tradictory to the allegations sworn as true by the movant.'70
Despite an urge to take the inflexible position that the defendant should
not conduct a diligent search for the evidence, a defendant or attorney filing
a 3.853 motion nevertheless should make an attempt to locate the evidence.
60. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(1); FLA. STAT. § 925.1 1(2)(a)(1) (2002).
61. 837 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
62. Id. at 1148.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1149.
65. Id.
66. 848 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
67. Id. at 1289; see also Marsh v. State, 852 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
68. Borland, 848 So. 2d. at 1290.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 662 So. 2d 729, 730 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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First, knowing exactly what evidence exists will assist in formulating
stronger exoneration arguments. Second, even though an evidentiary hearing
should be granted, it remains unclear if there is some due diligence require-
ment attached to locating the evidence.
3. Locating and Preserving the Evidence
If the transcript is available, it will be easy to determine whether any
physical evidence was admitted at trial. That information also is easily ob-
tained from the court's records. However, the record will not reveal what
other evidence was collected but never tested. Police reports can provide
information about what evidence the police collected regardless of whether
any testing was done on it.71
When DNA testing was first used, a large sample of blood, saliva, se-
men, or other bodily fluid was necessary in order to conduct the testing.
With today's methodologies, a sample of physical evidence the size of a pin-
head can be tested.72 Thus, DNA can be found on a small cigarette butt,
toothpick, a sweaty article of clothing, the handle of a weapon, eyeglasses,
facial tissues, stamps, tape, mouthpiece of a bottle or can, urine, feces, a bul-
let, bite mark, or fingernails.73 A pin-sized stain on a garment that was col-
lected at the scene of the crime could easily have been overlooked and never
tested. Or, a hair that may only have been subjected to microscopic compari-
son could today be subjected to mitochondrial DNA testing even if there is
no root. 74 It can even be tested using the newer PCR/STR method to deter-
mine whether there is semen on the hair.75
If a garment or other item has been subjected to either earlier rudimen-
tary DNA testing or to ABO blood typing, the "stain," in all likelihood, was
cut from the item of clothing. The cutting may have been used entirely in the
earlier testing and therefore it will not be available for new testing. How-
ever, there may be tiny fluid spatters around the area where the garment was
cut that now can be subjected to new testing. In short, DNA can be found on
71. See FLA. STAT. § 119.011 (2002); see also discussion infra Section IV.A.
72. ANDRES A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
910-911 (4th ed. 1995).
73. NAT'L INST. JUSTICE, WHAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT DNA EVIDENCE: WHAT IS DNA?, http://www.ncjrs.org/nij/DNAbro/id.html (last
modified September 1999).
74. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 24. Mitochondrial testing can be
done on samples that are not suited for other types of testing. Id. at 28. It can be done on
dried bones, teeth, or hair shafts or on samples that contain little or degraded nuclear DNA.
Id.; see also infra Section IV.B.
75. See also infra Section IV.B.
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virtually anything. "[W]herever anyone goes, whatever anyone does, he
leaves something behind .... Thus, the net in the search for evidence
should be cast as widely as possible.
In very old cases, there is a strong possibility that the evidence has been
destroyed. With the exception of section 925.11 (4)(b), there are no set rules
governing the period of time for which an agency must keep evidence before
it is allowed to be destroyed." In fact, some jurisdictions had no rules in
place ten or twenty years ago. More recently however, many jurisdictions
have implemented rules that require the evidence to be maintained for ex-
tended periods of time, such as the length of the sentence or until an execu-
tion in a death penalty cases has been imposed.
Whether or not the evidence is destroyed will depend largely on where
the evidence has been maintained. In addition, some offices will not find the
evidence during a first attempt and will hastily report that the evidence does
not exist. Do not automatically assume that this is true or accurate. With
some luck and persistence, you still may be able to find the evidence.
In Florida, if the evidence was introduced at the movant's trial, it will
remain under the jurisdiction of the clerk's office in the courthouse. If evi-
dence was not used at trial, usually because it was not or could not be sub-
jected to any forensic testing or the testing was deemed inconclusive, then
the police department that arrested the movant usually will store the evi-
dence.78 In order to locate this evidence, provide the police or sheriffs de-
partment that arrested the movant with the original case number and if possi-
ble, the evidence identification numbers. If the police department is unwill-
ing to provide this information over the phone, file a Chapter 119 request.7 9
In recent years, several law enforcement organizations, such as the Broward
Sheriffs Office and other local police departments, have merged so it may
be quite time consuming to track down where evidence wound up after the
merger.
There are other places where evidence may be located. In rape cases,
slides are made as part of a "rape kit" at the hospital where the victim was
treated.8" Some of those hospitals may have kept a slide or set of slides. It is
worthwhile to find out which hospital treated the victim. If that information
cannot be discovered however, the movant or his attorney should make sure
to include the name of the hospital in the 3.853 motion as a possible source
of evidence. If it can be determined that the hospital's common practice
76. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 72, at 963.
77. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 24.
78. Id.
79. See§ 119.011-.19.
80. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 46.
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requires that slides be kept a particular amount of time, that information also
should be included in the motion. That way, the movant can request that the
court order the hospital to look for any slides related to the case. In addition,
there may be evidence located at pathology departments, clinics, or doctor's
offices." If the case involves a murder, also check at the medical examiner's
office.82
Sometimes the lab that did the original testing will keep some of the
slides or photographs of the results of earlier DNA tests.83 In Florida, the
common places to search are the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Laboratories, which are located in Jacksonville, Tallahassee, Daytona Beach,
Pensacola, Fort Myers, Orlando, and Tampa Bay.84 In addition, there are
local county labs such as the Broward Sheriffs Office or the Miami-Dade
County Laboratories that may have evidence. In some cases, samples also
may have been sent to other private independent labs either by the prosecu-
tion or by the defense.85 Samples also may have been sent to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Laboratory for testing. 6
Regardless of whether the movant actually locates the evidence or not,
he should send a letter to each and every agency where the evidence could be
located requesting that the evidence be preserved and that notice be given to
the defense should the agency wish to destroy any evidence in the case.8 7 In
the letter, the movant should cite to section 925.1 1(4)(a), which states:
Governmental entities that may be in possession of any physical
evidence in the case, including, but not limited to, any investigat-
ing law enforcement agency, the clerk of the court, the prosecuting
authority, or the Department of Law Enforcement shall maintain
any physical evidence collected at the time of the crime for which
a postsentencing testing of DNA may be requested.88
Section 925.11 (4)(b) requires that the evidence shall be maintained for
at least the time periods of section 925.1 1(1)(b), which outlines the statute of
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME LABORATORY SERVICES, at
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/crimelab/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2003).
85. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 838 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2002).
86. Id. at 1076. For more information on the FBI laboratory visit http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/labhome.htm.
87. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 46.
88. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853 (containing no language regarding the destruction of evi-
dence).
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limitations for filing 3.853 motions. Thus, if a defendant does not take a
direct appeal, the evidence in his case must be maintained for two years fol-
lowing the date that the judgment and sentence became final, or October 1,
2003, whichever is later.89 If the defendant files a direct appeal, the evidence
in his case must be preserved for two years following the date that the con-
viction is affirmed on direct appeal or October 1, 2003, whichever is later.9 °
In a death penalty case, the evidence must be preserved for sixty days after
the execution of sentence.9' Rule 3.853 contains no provisions regarding the
destruction of evidence.92
However, a government agency may dispose of the evidence before the
expiration of these time periods if the following conditions are met. First,
the agency must notify the defendant, any counsel of record, the prosecuting
authority, and the Attorney General.93 Second, the agency must not "receive,
within 90 days after sending the notification, either a copy of a petition for
postsentencing DNA testing filed pursuant to this section or a request that the
evidence not be destroyed because the sentenced defendant will be filing the
petition before the time for filing it has expired."94
This portion of the statute is internally inconsistent with section
925.11 (1)(b)(2), which allows a movant to file a motion for DNA testing
after the statute of limitations has expired if the facts upon which the motion
is predicated could not have been ascertained with due diligence. 95 Thus,
even though the statute allows for testing beyond the two-year period, the
evidence can be destroyed immediately after the statutes of limitations have
run.
Even if the search for evidence is unsuccessful, the motion should none-
theless be filed. It should list all of the places the evidence was last known to
have been located and include a request that the court order the prosecution
to search for the evidence in all of the listed locations. If the prosecution
alleges that it cannot locate the evidence, the movant should request that the
court require the prosecution to provide proof that the evidence has been
destroyed. That proof should be submitted in the form of a sworn affidavit
from the person responsible for the evidence in the particular location where
it was allegedly destroyed. The affidavit should either detail the futile at-
tempt to locate the evidence or should have the affiant swear that the evi-
89. FLA. STAT. § 925.1 I(1)(b), (4)(b) (2002).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853.
93. § 925.11(4)(c)(I).
94. § 925.11(4)(c)(2).
95. Compare § 925.1 !(c)(1)-(2), with § 925.11 (1)(b)(2).
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dence was destroyed. If the evidence was destroyed, the court should require
the agency that destroyed it to provide documentation of its destruction pro-
cedures and also to provide proof of destruction.
B. Statement that the Evidence Was not Tested Previously or That Previous
Testing Was Inconclusive
Rule 3.853(b)(2) requires a statement "that the evidence was not tested
previously for DNA."96 In the alternative, if testing was done previously, the
movant must include a statement that the results of previous DNA testing
were "inconclusive and that subsequent scientific developments in DNA
testing techniques likely would produce a definitive result., 97 If the case
falls within the first category of cases, then satisfying this part of the rule is
relatively simple. If DNA testing was not done, then that statement alone
will satisfy rule 3.853(b)(2).
Prior to 1988, one can almost assume that no DNA testing was con-
ducted in a case. While trace evidence items including hair, blood, semen, or
other bodily fluids routinely were collected, at best they were subjected to
rudimentary tests such as ABO blood typing, tests to determine whether
there was spermatozoa present, and microscopic hair comparison. In 1988,
however, Tommie Lee Andrews became the first person in the United States
to be tried and subsequently convicted using DNA evidence.98
Yet, one cannot assume that all cases that were prosecuted after 1988
utilized DNA testing. Cases exist dating from 1988 to 2001 in which the
prosecution did no DNA testing even though DNA testing could have pro-
duced exonerating results. There are various reasons why there may not
have been testing. In some cases, the labs may not have been able to com-
plete testing either because they were too busy, machine malfunctions oc-
curred, or the prosecutor simply did not request testing. In addition, DNA
testing routinely was done, for example, in rape and murder cases but other
cases such as burglaries were not considered "DNA" cases even though there
now are ways to test the collected trace evidence.
Today, many labs conduct a type of DNA testing called PCR/STR.99
With a more modem testing method, such as PCR/STR, a pin-size amount of
96. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(2); § 925.11(2)(a)(2).
97. Id.
98. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
99. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 27.
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sample can be replicated and then tested.'00 PCR is the acronym for Poly-
merase Chain Reaction and STR is the acronym for Short Tandem Repeat.'°'
The term PCR applies to different types of testing that can vary in "reli-
ability and effectiveness.' ' 0 2 PCR is not actually a testing method but rather
it is a way to amplify or duplicate a DNA sample and thus "may be likened
to a molecular xeroxing machine."'0 3
In some cases, even though results were reported as being conclusive,
by today's standards they should be deemed inconclusive. For example,
rudimentary PCR-DQ Alpha testing provides results that are not sufficiently
discriminating.'" According to the National Commission on the Future of
DNA Evidence, "[a] falsely accused individual may be included as a possible
donor of a DNA sample with this test system."' 0 5 However, an inclusion
with DQ-Alpha testing, would have, in the past, been interpreted as a "con-
clusive" result.0 6 If an older version of DNA testing was done, and "results"
were obtained, ask an expert to review the data and determine whether those
results should be deemed inconclusive.1
0 7
Another type of testing that is used is called Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphisms, or RFLP.' 8 This type of DNA testing however,
requires a greater amount of sample to test. 09 The sample should be dime-
sized or larger."0 The use of RFLP testing could have produced inconclusive
results either because the DNA sample was too small or too degraded.' ' If
testing was done previously, a lab report will indicate whether the results
were inconclusive.
In addition to the PCR/STR and PCR Mitochondrial DNA testing meth-
ods, there are other new testing methods available today."2 For example, Y-
chromosome testing is useful when only the male portion of a mixed DNA
sample is relevant to the case. ' 3 It also may be useful to test fingernail
scrapings from a female victim when the assailant was a male or in multiple
100. Id.
101. ld.at68.
102. Donald E. Riley, DNA Testing: An Introductionfor Non-Scientists, ScI. TESTIMONY
19 (1998), at http://www.scientific.org/tutorials/articles/ riley/riley.html.
103. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 72, at 877.
104. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 24.
105. Id. at 27.
106. Id. at 34.
107. Id.
108. ld. at 26.
109. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 72, at 891.
110. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 26.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 29-30; see also Riley, supra note 102.
113. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 29-30.
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male assailant cases." 4 While ultimately the laboratory conducting the DNA
test may be in the best position to determine which type of testing is best for
a case, the movant should be aware of the options available to him and
should request in his 3.853 motion that these new testing methods be used.
Both rule 3.853 and section 925.11 require that the Florida Department
of Law Enforcement's Laboratory conduct post-conviction testing.' While
section 925.11 does not offer an alternative to this mandate, rule 3.853 does
provide one." 6 Rule 3.853 allows that the court "on a showing of good
cause, may order testing by another laboratory or agency certified by the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors or the National Forensic
Science Training Center when requested by a movant who can bear the cost
of such testing. ""' If the Florida Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE")
is not equipped to conduct the more specialized types of DNA testing needed
in a particular case, then that should be sufficient "good cause" for the court
to order testing at an independent certified laboratory."8
A movant also should consider requesting that tests be conducted at a
laboratory other than the FDLE for another reason. The FDLE laboratories
have 2100 backlogged cases." 9 According to a recent newspaper article in
the Miami Herald, the average turnaround time for DNA testing at the five
FDLE laboratories is currently 164 days, or more than five months. 21 Such
serious delays in obtaining testing should establish good cause to send the
specimens to another lab. That is assuming that the movant can absorb the
cost of doing so.1
2
'
Whichever lab ultimately does the testing, the movant should always
request that the lab split the sample. 22 This will ensure that there is suffi-
cient sample remaining should additional testing be required. 23
If DNA testing was done previously in a case, then there are two other
issues to consider before submitting a 3.853 motion. First, assess whether re-
114. Id.
115. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853 (c)(7); § 925.1 1(2)(h).
116. Id.
117. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853 (c)(7).
118. Some prosecutors have stipulated to testing the evidence at a different laboratory.
119. Wanda J. DeMarzo & Daniel de Vise, DNA Testing a Challenge For Busy Crime
Labs, MIAMI HERALD, June 29, 2003, at IA. In January of 2003, the St. Petersburg Times
reported that the FDLE had almost 2700 backlogged open cases and 8300 additional samples
from prison inmates awaiting testing. FDLE Labs Have Thousands of DNA Requests Pend-
ing, Paper Says, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28, 2003, at 3B [hereinafter FDLE].
120. FDLE, supra note 119.
121. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(7).
122. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 24.
123. Id.
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analyzing the DNA will exonerate the movant. In Hartline v. State,'2 4 the
pro se movant argued that he was entitled to new DNA testing on the
grounds that the state's expert witness testified the DNA evidence was in-
conclusive. 2 5 However, in denying the motion, the court held that even if
the DNA were re-examined, he had admitted to engaging in sexual activity
with the minor/victim. 1
26
Second, strongly consider having an expert review the testimony of the
expert witnesses and the lab reports to ensure that the conclusions drawn by
the expert are in fact correct and that the protocols used by a lab were proper
and were followed. In Murray v. State,127 the Supreme Court of Florida re-
versed the murder, burglary, and sexual battery convictions of Gerald
Murray because of errors made during DNA testing by the state's expert.'28
At the 1994 trial, the state admitted hair evidence that the prosecution main-
tained matched Murray's. 129 The defense presented its own witnesses, one of
whom had worked with the state's expert and who actually performed the
DNA test. 130 Dr. Warren testified that he had committed "several serious
errors" during the testing and that they had not maintained the proper testing
controls. 13 ' The defense witness testified that the results were inconclusive
and unreliable. In addition, Dr. Howard Baum, an assistant medical exam-
iner in New York City also testified for the defense that these results were
inconclusive and unreliable.' 32
In order for a DNA test to be considered reliable, "there must be an in-
dependent review by a second qualified analyst."' 33 After the testing, Dr.
Warren concluded that the tests were inconclusive.' 34 His supervisor, the
prosecution witness, disagreed and submitted a lab report, which concluded
that the results were conclusive, and that they were consistent with
Murray's.135 As the Court noted, "one of the elements of a second independ-
ent review is to ensure that the results of the initial review were reliable, and
124. 806 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
125. Id. at 595-96.
126. Id.
127. 838 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2002).
128. Id. at 1081.
129. Id. at 1076.
130. Id. at 1077.
131. Id.
132. Murray, 838 So. 2d at 1077.
133. Id. at 1080.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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should the two analysts disagree, the tests should be deemed inconclusive in
the absence of further analysis.'
3 6
The defense also questioned Dr. Warren about the failure to document
some of the tests:
Q: Do you have an explanation for why there were those clerical
errors that you'd like to share with the jury?
A: Well, we were quite busy at the time. We were very busy, as a
matter of fact. If you look at the evidence on some of these work
sheets you will see gels from different-evidence from different
cases ganged together on the same gel and it was, at the time, an
expedient issue there.
Q: And, sir, I know that this is not easy for you. Would you admit
that the paperwork and the documentation that came out of Micro
Diagnostics at that time was below what would be normally ac-
cepted?
A: It was, to be blunt, sloppy.
Q: Thank you, sir.
A: And below standards.' 37
Needless to say, this exchange raises serious concerns and highlights
the problems that may occur at the testing phase. Unlike the circumstance in
Murray, however, some of those failings at the testing level may not neces-
sarily come to light at trial. Thus, it always is a good idea to work with an
expert so that she can give an independent opinion about the results that were
provided by the state.
C. Statement of innocence and Exoneration
Rule 3.853 requires a movant to explicitly state that he is innocent of
the crime. 138 This rule was adhered to strictly in Coombs v. State,'39 where
the trial court denied the petitioner's pro se motion in part because he failed
to state that he was innocent. The movant also must explain how DNA test-
ing will exonerate him. 40 Neither the rule nor the statute provides a defini-
tion of exoneration. In Galloway v. State,14 1 the First District Court of Ap-
peal provided a dictionary definition of exoneration and incorrectly at-
136. Id. at 1081.
137. Murray, 838 So. 2d at 1081 n.7.
138. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(3); § 925.11(2)(a)(3).
139. 824 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
140. Id. (citing FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(3)).
141. 802 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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tempted to use that as the standard by which to measure whether a motion for
DNA testing should be granted.142
However, the rule and the statute do provide the correct legal standard
to apply in determining whether to deny or grant the motion. A court is re-
quired to make a finding, inter alia, of"[w]hether there is a reasonable prob-
ability that the movant would have been acquitted or would have received a
lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial.' 43 The Su-
preme Court of Florida has applied this standard.' 4
Drafting this part of the motion also can be quite difficult. If it is
drafted inartfully, it will be fatal to the success of the motion. Part of the
problem lies in failing to provide the court with the different types of testing
that can be done and the numerous possibilities regarding exoneration. The
trouble does not arise with the "one perpetrator/one victim" type of cases but
with those that are factually more complicated. For example, if there are two
or more perpetrators in a rape, one could first make an argument that if none
of the samples match the movant, then he should be exonerated. In some
multiple perpetrator cases, however, that argument will not be enough to
satisfy a court. The court could find that if the sample does not match the
movant, he has nonetheless been convicted as a principal in the case under an
acting in concert theory and as such, will not be exonerated. However, the
defense should make a much more thorough argument to the court. The bet-
ter argument would include an additional statement that if none of the sam-
ples match the movant or his co-movants, then the movant should be exoner-
ated with DNA testing. This argument also should be included if there is
trial testimony that the perpetrator of the crime did not ejaculate during the
rape, but other co-perpetrators did ejaculate. If the sample does not match
the co-defendants and there is testimony that both raped her, there could be a
reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the movant at trial.
In Galloway, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the appellant's
3.853 motion. 45 Appellant had been convicted with two co-defendants of
robbery and sexual battery. 146 In his 3.853 motion, he merely alleged that his
DNA would not match the DNA recovered at the scene of the crime and
from the victim's body. The court noted that the evidence could not demon-
142. Id.at1175.
143. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5)(C); § 925.11(2)(f)(3).
144. See, e.g., King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237, 1247 (Fla. 2002); see also Huffman v. State,
837 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Dedge v. State, 832 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2002); Hartline v. State, 806 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
145. 802 So. 2d at 1175.
146. ld. at 1174.
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strate that defendant did not participate in the crime.'4 7 That may be true.
However, if DNA testing had been done and one or more semen samples
were found from the sample taken from the victim and none matched any of
the defendants, then those results could indeed exonerate the defendant. 148
In the alternative, a movant can provide a statement of how DNA test-
ing will mitigate his sentence. 149 To date, there has been no case in which a
movant in a non-capital case has argued that testing could mitigate a sen-
tence. However, in a case where the movant has been convicted in one trial
of various different crimes, it is conceivable that he could be exonerated of
one of those charges and not the others. Accordingly, there could be a miti-
gation of the overall sentence meted out to the movant.
D. Identification of Movant
Rule 3.853 also requires a statement that identity was a genuinely dis-
puted issue at trial. 5 ' The movant also must explain why identification was
an issue at trial.'5 ' The fact that a victim identifies a defendant does not
mean that identity is a genuinely disputed issue at trial.'52 Perhaps the most
comprehensive discussion regarding this point can be found in Zollman.'53
In Zollman, the victim was forced into her car, driven to a remote area, and
raped.'54 After the attack, she identified Zollman in a line-up as her attacker.
She then identified him again at trial. 55 Zollman's "defense at trial was mis-
identification."' 156 Nonetheless, "the trial court found that identity was not
'genuinely disputed' at trial" because the victim identified the movant at
trial.'57 The Second District Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that "[t]he
supreme court has recognized that there is a substantial body of academic
work challenging the reliability of eyewitness identifications in criminal
147. Id. at 1175.
148. Without reading the full transcript of the case, it is impossible to establish with cer-
tainty that the argument could have established the exoneration element of Galloway's 3.853
motion. However, the case does provide a fairly common factual scenario in which this strat-
egy can be implemented.
149. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(3); § 925.11(2)(a)(3).
150. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(4); § 925.11(2)(a)(4).
151. Id.
152. Knighten v. State, 829 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Zollman
v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
153. 820 So. 2d at 1062.
154. Id. at 1060.
155. Id. at 1061.
156. Id. at 1062.
157. Id.
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cases."' 58 "Thus, the fact that the victim identified Zollman as her assail-
ant... does not mean that identi[fication] was not genuinely disputed.' ' 59
Even if there is significant evidence of guilt presented at trial, including
some sort of identification, a movant will nonetheless be entitled to DNA
testing if the testing will shed light on the movant's guilt or innocence. 160
In contrast, in Marsh v. State,16 1 the court held that a defense of consen-
sual sex at trial would preclude a movant from claiming in a 3.853 motion
that identity was at issue. 16 Similarly, a self-defense defense claim pre-
sented at trial may also be a bar to obtaining DNA testing.
In sum, an attorney should argue that identity is an issue in any case
where the movant claims he did not commit the crime, regardless of whether
the movant was known to the victim or other witnesses or was merely identi-
fied by the victim or other witnesses.
E. A Statement of any Other Facts Relevant to the Motion
Because there is no requirement that the verified 3.853 motion contain
only facts from the trial transcript, the decision to include other facts must be
made on a case-by-case basis. If there are facts outside of the record that are
helpful to the case, then they ought to be included in the motion. For exam-
ple, there are situations where, during the course of the police investigation
or of the defense's investigation, facts are discovered but are not elicited at
trial. Some of those facts, in retrospect, may support the theory that someone
else committed the crime. If that is true, then those facts should be included
in the motion.
V. PROCEDURE
A copy of the motion must be served on the prosecutor and a certificate
of service must be attached to the motion.'63 Similar to a 3.850 motion, once
the 3.853 motion is filed it will be sent to the assigned judge. 6 This is nor-
mally the judge who originally tried the case. If that judge is no longer on
the bench or has been transferred to a different court, the case will be as-
158. Zollman, 820 So. 2d at 1062.
159. Id.
160. Huffman v. State, 837 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (including
evidence at trial of a fingerprint match, phone calls traced to defendant's house that were
made to the victim's house after the attack, and a voice identification of defendant at trial).
161. 812 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
162. Id. at 580.
163. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b)(6); § 925.11(2)(a)(6).
164. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(1); § 925.11(2)(b).
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signed to another judge. The court must then determine if the motion is fa-
cially sufficient. 165 If the court finds that the motion is facially insufficient, it
will deny the motion without requiring the prosecution to respond. 66 How-
ever, a trial court may not summarily deny a 3.853 motion "if the record
conclusively shows that the defendant is not entitled to relief.' 67 If the mo-
tion is facially sufficient, it must order the prosecution to respond.
168
If the court deems the motion facially sufficient, it will issue an order to
show cause and the prosecutor will have thirty days to respond. 69  Rule
3.853 also allows the court to provide the prosecution with more time to re-
spond. 7° Subsequently, the court will review the prosecution's response and
must enter an order on the merits or set it for hearing.' If the case proceeds
to a hearing, the court may appoint counsel if there is a finding of indigence
and if the court determines that counsel is necessary. 7 2 The movant may file
for rehearing from an order denying relief within fifteen days after the ser-
vice of the order. 73 This will toll the time for filing an appeal.'74  Either
party may take an appeal from an adverse ruling within thirty days from the
day the order was rendered.'75
The court must make three findings in its ruling. 7 6 First, the court must
determine "[w]hether it has been shown that physical evidence that may con-
tain DNA still exists."' 77 Second, the court must determine "[w]hether the
results of DNA testing of that physical evidence likely would be admissible
at trial and whether there exists reliable proof to establish that the evidence
containing the tested DNA is authentic and would be admissible at a future
hearing."'78 Finally, it must determine "[w]hether there is a reasonable prob-
165. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(2); § 925.11(2)(c).
166. See id.
167. Zollman v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059, 1063 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
168. Id.
169. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(2); § 925.11(2)(c).
170. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(2). Section 925.11(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes con-
tains no such language.
171. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(3); § 925.1 l(2)(d).
172. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(4); § 925.1 l(2)(e).
173. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(e); § 925.11(3)(c).
174. Id.
175. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(f); § 925.11 (3)(a)-(b).
176. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5); § 925.1 1(f).
177. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5)(A); § 925.1 1(2)(f)(1).
178. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5)(B); § 925.11(2)(f)(2). The language of section 925.11
differs slightly from rule 3.853 in that it does not use the word "authentic" but rather, requires
that the evidence cannot have been "materially altered."
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ability that the movant would have been acquitted or would have received a
lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial."''79
If the court orders DNA testing, the movant may have to pay for the
testing unless he is indigent. 180 If the movant is indigent, the state bears the
cost of the testing.' 81
If the DNA testing provides exonerative results, the movant must file a
motion to vacate the sentence or move for a new trial by filing a 3.850 mo-
tion based upon newly discovered evidence.'82 Realistically, it is quite diffi-
cult for the prosecution to retry these old cases, especially when the DNA
results will be admissible at trial. However, they still may attempt to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
Advances in science finally have provided us with a means to challenge
a criminal justice system that is by no means perfect and to correct the injus-
tices that it has created. New DNA testing methodologies now allow us to
determine someone's innocence with virtual certainty.
While section 925.11 is a step in the right direction, it does not go far
enough to remedy the failings of the criminal justice system. As long as we
continue to rely upon rote pleas for the disposition of the vast majority of
criminal cases and ignore such serious issues as misidentification and false
confessions, there always will exist the possibility that an innocent person
will be convicted of a crime. If what we strive for is a criminal justice sys-
tem that provides us with fair and precise results, then DNA testing should
be available as a remedy to anyone at anytime who can establish that he has
met the requirements of section 925.11.
No one knows exactly how many wrongfully convicted individuals who
long ago gave up any hope of being exonerated remain incarcerated. These
are the very same people who may not even know that there are new tech-
nologies that can exonerate them or that there are organizations, like the
Florida Innocence Project, who will assist them. If we do not allow these
individuals to request DNA testing, our system will always be plagued by the
unacceptable reality that an innocent person has been convicted and remains
incarcerated for a crime he did not commit.
179. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5)(C); § 925.11(2)(f(3).
180. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(6); § 925.1 1(2)(g).
181. Id.
182. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(d)(2).
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VII. ADDENDUM
On September 5, 2003, the Florida Criminal Procedure Rules Commit-
tee voted by a two-thirds majority to propose to the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida an emergency amendment to rule 3.853 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which would extend the October 1, 2003 deadline for one year.
That motion was filed on September 17, 2003. On September 19, 2003 the
Florida Innocence Project filed an Emergency Petition to Invoke All Writs
Jurisdiction asking the Supreme Court of Florida for a constitutional writ that
would prevent the destruction of biological evidence without notice.
On September 30, 2003, the Supreme Court of Florida consolidated the
emergency petition filed by the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee and the
emergency writ filed by the Florida Innocence Project. The court noted the
urgency of this matter and expedited oral argument. That argument is set for
November 7, 2003.
In order to allow the court more time to consider the petitions, it sus-
pended the October 1, 2003 deadline in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.853 (d)(1)(A) until further order from the Court. Moreover, the Court held
in abeyance the October 1, 2003 deadline in Florida Statutes section
925.11 (1)(b)(1).
Justice Lewis, in a special concurrence, stated that there was no ques-
tion that the court had jurisdiction to consider issuance of the writ. More-
over, Justice Lewis wrote that the Supreme Court of Florida has the constitu-
tional authority to amend Rule 3.853. Chief Justice Anstead and Justices
Pariente and Quince concurred with Justice Lewis. Justices Wells, Cantero
and Bell dissented, finding that the majority did not have jurisdiction to sus-
pend a provision of the statute nor the constitutional authority to mandate
that evidence be maintained.
On October 21, 2003, the Senate Committee on Criminal Justice and the
Senate Judiciary Committee held a joint meeting to discuss the possibility of
amending section 925.11 of the Florida Statutes to extend the testing
deadline.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Charles Dickens wrote that being involved in a suit in England's Court
of Chancery was like: "being ground to bits in a slow mill; it's being roasted
at a slow fire; it's being stung to death by single bees; it's being drowned by
drops; it's going mad by grains."' One hundred and fifty years later, lawsuits
still evoke similar feelings in litigants. However, as one association of attor-
neys has pointed out, Dickens' warning still fails to keep them away from the
courts:
Hundreds and hundreds of people are exposed to such torture each
year, some of them actually choosing to initiate the process. They
invariably find the experience painful, protracted, and expensive.
Yet there remains a queue of victims impatient for their turn .... 2
Yet an ever-increasing throng has discovered the pursuit of justice need
not involve protracted pain. Presently in Florida, parties and attorneys rou-
tinely mediate their legal disputes, highlighting Florida's national recognition
as a leader in the field of mediation.3
"Mediation" means a process whereby a neutral third person called
a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dis-
pute between two or more parties. It is an informal and non-
adversarial process with the objective of helping the disputing par-
ties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement. In me-
diation, decision making authority rests with the parties. The role
of the mediator includes, but is not limited to, assisting the parties
I. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 53 (Oxford University Press 1987) (1853). Earlier
in the novel, Dickens suggests that the following motto hang over the doors of the Court of
Chancery: "'Suffer any wrong that can be done you, rather than come here! "' Id. at 3.
2. Collaborative Law Alliance of New Hampshire, available at
http://www.collaborativelawnh.org (wrongly attributed the quotation to Dickens' Bleak
House) (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
3. Bruce A. Blitman, Mediation in Florida: The Newly Emerging Case Law, FLA. B. J.,
Oct. 1996, at 44.
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in identifying issues, fostering joint problemsolving, and exploring
settlement alternatives.
4
With over two decades of court-connected mediation, Florida courts
have developed an extensive body of case law.5 This article seeks to memo-
rialize mediation's coming of age by collecting, discussing, and analyzing
the significant cases that comprise Florida's mediation common law, divid-
ing cases into five subject areas: confidentiality, appearance at mediation,
mediation agreements upheld by courts, mediation agreements overturned by
courts, and procedural and related matters. To avoid duplication, with few
exceptions, cases appear in only one subject area, although many appropri-
ately fit within two or more. Discussion of the over fifty Florida statutes that
mention mediation, as well as the applicable rules of procedure, lies beyond
the scope of this article. They will, of course, be noted when necessary to
understand or distinguish a case or concept, as will specific Florida Rules for
Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators.
Mediation is a household word. One need only read the newspaper, lis-
ten to the news on radio or television, or surf the net to learn that distin-
guished statesmen are mediating in the Middle East, owners and players of
professional sports teams are mediating to divert a strike, or union members
and employers are mediating a new employment contract. If individuals
have not been directly involved with mediation, they probably know some-
one who has. The breadth of mediated matters ranges from a peer mediation
at school to mediation of a murder case following mistrial.6
Mediation is not new. "Use of mediation, similar to that which we see
today, can be traced back several hundreds, even thousands of years."7
4. FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (2002).
5. Florida's experience typifies that of the rest of the country. "In this new era, media-
tion is becoming more institutionalized, regularized and uniform. Or, expressed in different
terms, mediation is now reflecting the interests and values of the legal order. During the past
two decades we have witnessed an explosion of interest in mediation among judges and law-
yers." James J. Alfini, Mediation's Coming of(Legal) Age, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 153, 153
(2002).
6. Despite the doubts of some commentators, Escambia County Judge Frank Bell sent
the case of Derek and Alex King, two brothers convicted of killing their father, to mediation.
Following trial, the judge threw out the murder convictions, and sent the case to mediation for
determination of appropriate sentences. The matter was fully resolved in mediation. State v.
King, Escambia County Circuit Court Case No. 2001 CF 005612 available at
http://205.152.130.14/cvweb_lb.asp?ucase id.=31993884; ABA Journal eReport, Friday,
Oct. 25, 2002.
7. KIMBERLEE A. KOVACH, MEDIATION PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE 25 n. 16 (2d ed. 2000).
"Use of mediation has been documented in ancient China over two thousand years ago. See,
2003]
91
: Nova Law Review 28, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
NOVA LAWREVIEW
"Florida entered the ADR [Alternative Dispute Resolution] movement in the
mid-1970s with the establishment of 'citizen dispute settlement' (CDS) cen-
ters and pilot divorce mediation programs ....
In 1987, after Florida had experienced its great success with the
early CDS and divorce mediation programs, the Florida Legisla-
ture adopted one of the nation's most comprehensive court-
connected (read: [I]nstitutionalized) mediation and arbitration
statutes. Trial judges were given the broad discretion to order any
civil case to mediation or arbitration subject to Florida Supreme
Court rule.9
In 2001, over 100,000 cases were referred to court-connected mediation
programs.' ° Numerous other cases were privately mediated by the parties
before, during, or subsequent to suit. For many cases, mediation obviated
the need for court intervention. At the present time, all twenty judicial cir-
cuits refer a portion of their caseload to mediation." In addition, state appel-
late as well as federal cases are being mediated.
Over 5000 individuals have been certified as mediators by the Supreme
Court of Florida, and approximately 14,000 have completed Supreme Court
of Florida certified mediation training programs.' 2 Displaying commitment
to excellence in Alternative Dispute Resolution, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida has created three standing ADR committees: the Supreme Court Com-
mittee on ADR Rules, the Supreme Court Committee on ADR Policy, and
the Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee. It has also created two grievance
boards: the Mediation Training Review Board and the Mediator Qualifica-
tions Board. Additionally, Florida's Dispute Resolution Center offers an
ADR Innovative Grant Program allowing courts to apply for seed money to
create innovative dispute resolution projects. 3 To foster confidence in the
mediation process, and encourage mediators to keep abreast of ethical re-
sponsibilities and new developments in the law, Florida requires certified
mediators to comply with the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
for example, Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 55 CAL. L.
REV. 1201, 1205 (1996)."
8. Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 903, 905 (1997).
9. Id. at 907.
10. FLORIDA MEDIATION ARBITRATION PROGRAMS: A COMPENDIUM viii (Kimberly Ann
Kosch & Sharon Press eds., 15th ed. 2002).
11. Id.
12. Id. at ix.
13. Id. at vii.
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Appointed Mediators and to complete sixteen hours of continuing mediator
education every two years.
Mediation has a long rich history, setting it apart from other ADR proc-
esses. Unique in its peacekeeping mission, mediation employs a neutral third
party who does not render a decision for the parties. 4 Rather, it stresses self-
determination of the parties, respecting their ability to make decisions. 5
"Mediation is not presented here as a panacea for the existing ills of our judi-
cial institutions, but rather as a dynamic process that must be understood
before being applied and one that can be particularly helpful in a number of
different kinds of disputes, including family conflicts and divorces."' 6 The
body of case law discussed in this article reflects the extent to which media-
tion has become an accepted and expected part of our legal system.
11. CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Protection of Confidentiality
"One of the fundamental axioms of mediation is the importance of con-
fidentiality. It is deemed necessary to foster the neutrality of the mediator
and essential if parties are to participate fully in the process."' 7 Confidential-
ity is the foundation on which mediation rests, allowing parties to build trust,
share information, problem solve, and decide whether to reach resolution.
"The assurance of confidentiality is essential to the integrity and success of
the Court's mediation program, in that confidentiality encourages candor
between the parties and on the part of the mediator, and confidentiality
serves to protect the mediation program from being used as a discovery tool
for creative attorneys."' 8 "Mediation could not take place if litigants had to
worry about admissions against interest being offered into evidence at trial, if
a settlement was not reached." 9
14. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.210.
15. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.230. Mediation emphasizes self-
determination, the needs and interests of the parties, fairness, procedural flexibility, confiden-
tiality, and full disclosure. Id.
16. Esdale v. Esdale, 487 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Marga-
ret S. Herrman, Book Review, 19 FAM. L.Q. 465 (1986) (reviewing Jay Folberg & Alison
Taylor, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT
LITIGATION (1984), 19 FAM. L.Q. 465 (1986)).
17. Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides
With Confidentiality, 35 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 35 (2001).
18. In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 636 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Lake Utopia Paper Ltd.
v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979)).
19. D.R. Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A. of W. Palm Beach, 819 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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Mediation confidentiality may be bolstered by statutory privileges, rules
of evidence, rules of procedure, ethical rules, and contract law. "Although
mediators usually tell the parties that the proceedings are confidential, the
mediators [sic] promise does not create an evidentiary privilege or other pro-
tection that will be judicially recognized. ''20 In Florida, mediation confiden-
tiality is granted by statutory privilege. 2' The privilege is held by the parties,
but may be asserted by the mediator on their behalf. "Each party in a court-
ordered mediation proceeding has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent any person present at the proceeding from disclosing communica-
tions made during such proceeding. 22  Similarly, statutory privileges also
protect family, 23 mobile home, 24 and citizen dispute settlement center media-
tion communications.25
20. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of
Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91, 92 (1999).
21. In State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the court
found no authority for the mediator's statement that the parties' communications during me-
diation were confidential and identified the legislature as the "proper branch of government
from which to obtain the necessary protection." Id. at 482. "[P]rivileges in Florida are no
longer creatures of judicial decision." Id. at 481 (citing Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)). Subsequently, in 1987 the legislature enacted a confidentiality
privilege for court ordered mediation. Ch. 172, 1987 Fla. Laws (enacting FLA. STAT. §
44.302(2) (1987)). In 1990 Ch. 188, 1990 Fla. Laws amended and renumbered this statute as
FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3). Prior to creating a privilege for court-ordered mediation, the legisla-
ture enacted a confidentiality privilege for family mediation (Ch. 96, 1982 Fla. Laws creating
FLA. STAT. § 61.21(3), renumbered § 749.01(3) (1982)), a confidentiality privilege for Citizen
Dispute Settlement Center mediation (Ch. 228, 1985 Fla. Laws creating FLA. STAT.
§ 44.201(5) (1985)), and a confidentiality privilege for mobile home mediation (Ch. 198, 1990
Fla. Laws adding FLA. STAT. § 723.038(9) (1990)). The confidentiality privilege for family
mediation was renumbered § 44.101(3) in 1985. Since 1986 the confidentiality privilege for
family mediation has been codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.183(3). (Ch. 220, 1986 Fla. Laws).
22. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2002). This statutory section further provides that "all oral
or written communications in mediation proceedings, other than the executed settlement
agreement, are exempt from the requirements of [Florida Statutes] chapter 119, and shall be
confidential and inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent legal proceeding, unless all par-
ties agree otherwise." Id.
23. FLA. STAT. § 61.183(3) (2002).
Each party to a mediation proceeding has a privilege during and after the proceeding to refuse
to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing communications made during the proceed-
ing, whether or not the contested issues are successfully resolved. This subsection shall not be
construed to prevent or inhibit the discovery or admissibility of any information that is other-
wise subject to discovery or that is admissible under applicable law or rules of court, except
that any conduct or statements made during a mediation proceeding or in negotiations concern-
ing the proceeding are inadmissible in any judicial proceeding.
Id.
24. FLA. STAT. § 723.038(8) (2002). "Each party involved in the mediation proceeding
has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any person present at the proceeding from
[Vol. 28:1:87
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Mediators governed by Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
Appointed Mediators have a duty to protect the confidentiality of the media-
tion process.26 "A mediator shall maintain confidentiality of all information
revealed during mediation except where disclosure is required by law."27
During the orientation session, the mediator must inform the mediation par-
ticipants that "communications made during the process are confidential,
except where disclosure is required by law."2 Additionally, "[i]nformation
obtained during caucus may not be revealed by the mediator to any other
mediation participant without the consent of the disclosing party. 2 9 Media-
tors must also maintain confidentiality regarding mediation records, and
while participating in training and research activities may not disclose identi-
fying information.3°
Attorneys and parties may mistakenly assume that all mediation com-
munications are confidential. However, only some mediators are required to
comply with the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Media-
disclosing, communications made during such proceeding, whether or not the dispute was
successfully resolved." Id. This statutory section further provides:
[T]here is no privilege as to communications made in furtherance of the commission of a crime
or fraud or as part of a plan to commit a crime or a fraud. Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed so as to permit an individual to obtain immunity from prosecution for criminal con-
duct.
Id. The last sentence is the original language from the privilege for court-ordered mediation
enacted in 1987. Ch. 172, 1987 Fla. Laws. In 1990 this language was deleted from the privi-
lege for court-ordered mediaion. Ch. 1988, 1990 Fla. Laws.
25. FLA. STAT. § 44.201(5) (2002).
Any information relating to a dispute obtained by any person while performing any duties for
the center from the files, reports, case summaries, mediator's notes, or other communications
or materials, oral or written, is confidential and exempt from the provisions of section
119.07(I) and shall not be publicly disclosed without the written consent of all parties to the
dispute. Any research or evaluation effort directed at assessing program activities or perform-
ance shall protect the confidentiality of such information. Each party to a Citizen Dispute Set-
tlement Center proceeding has a privilege during and after those proceedings to refuse to dis-
close and to prevent another from disclosing communications made during such proceedings,
whether or not the dispute was successfully resolved.
Id.
26. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360. The ethical rules provide standards
of conduct for certified and court-appointed mediators. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD.
MEDIATORS 10.200. For other mediators, the rules are merely advisory. Accordingly, only
mediators governed by the ethical rules are subject to disciplinary proceedings pursuant to the
rules. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.700.
27. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a).
28. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.420(a)(3).
29. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(b). Caucus refers to private meet-
ings between the mediator and one or some of the mediation participants. Id.
30. FLA. R. CERT. &CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(c).
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31 32tors," and only some mediated matters are covered by statutory privileges.
Additionally, Florida's evidentiary exclusion is more limited than the media-
tion statutory privileges, as it only limits admissibility of settlement negotia-
tions at trial.33 Consequently, in an attempt to safeguard the confidentiality
of mediation communications, attorneys, mediators, and parties are entering
into carefully crafted confidentiality agreements prior to mediation to pro-
vide contractual protection and clarity.34
Florida Statutes provide inconsistent direction regarding a mediator's
role in protecting the confidentiality of the mediation process. The statutory
privilege for court-ordered mediation provides that each party to a mediation
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and prevent anyone present at the media-
tion session from disclosing communications made during the mediation
proceeding.35 Yet, Florida statutory law requires mandatory reporting of
child abuse and neglect, as well as abuse and neglect of the elderly and indi-
viduals with disabilities.36 These matters, the statutes direct, must be re-
31. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-AP'PTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a). Only certified mediators and
court-appointed mediators are obligated to comply with these rules.
32. See FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3), § 61.183(3), § 723. 038(8), § 44.201(5) (2002).
33. FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2002). See Ehrhardt, supra note 20, at 102, for analysis of the
protection provided to mediation proceedings by rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
34. "[I]t is up to the parties during non-court-ordered mediation to provide by agreement
confidentiality of the mediation. Absent that agreement there currently is no statute, constitu-
tional provision/interpretation, or rule that extends confidentiality to non-court-ordered media-
tion." State v. Trull, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. D289, D290 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2002). Statutory
confidentiality privileges do apply to court-ordered, family, mobile home, and citizen dispute
settlement center mediations. See supra notes 22-25.
35. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2002). The first Florida statute granting a privilege for
court-ordered mediation provided in relevant part:
There is no privilege as to communications made in furtherance of the commission of a crime
or fraud or as part of a plan to commit a crime or a fraud. Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed so as to permit an individual to obtain immunity from prosecution for criminal con-
duct.
FLA. STAT. § 44.302(2) (1987). This language was deleted in 1990. Ch. 188, 1990 Fla. Laws
(amending FLA. STAT. § 44.302(2) (1987)). In 1992, a proposed amendment providing for
exceptions to the mediation privilege was not adopted. It read:
There shall be no privilege and no restriction on disclosure in relation to communications
which give the mediator knowledge of, or reasonable cause to suspect, that a child has been
abused or neglected. There is no privilege and no restriction on disclosure as to communica-
tions made in furtherance of the commission of a crime or fraud or as part of a plan to commit
a crime or fraud. Nothing in subsection (3) shall be construed so as to permit an individual to
obtain immunity from prosecution for criminal conduct.
H.B. 183 (1992).
36. FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2002); FLA. STAT. § 415.1034 (2002). Additionally, Florida
law prohibits the concealment of public hazards. The applicable statute does not require man-
datory reporting, but does provide:
Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public
hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any information which may be useful
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ported by anyone who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect the prohib-
ited conduct.37 What then is the mediator's obligation if she learns of child
abuse during the mediation? Many court certified mediators construe the
statutes in conjunction with their ethical obligation to keep everything confi-
dential except where disclosure is required by law, 38 and read the statutes as
requiring confidentiality with the exception of their legal obligation to report
abuse and neglect. 39 However, not all who mediate in Florida are bound by
Florida's ethical rules for mediators, and some mediators may not believe
they are required by law to report abuse and neglect.
Canons of statutory construction, presumptions that vary in strength ac-
cording to the importance of the policy behind them,40 are helpful in constru-
ing these apparently conflicting statutes. However, as many disagree on
when these canons apply as well as their relative weight, they will not pro-
vide a definitive answer to our question. They will, regardless, assist in for-
mulating plausible ways to construe the statutes and offer a basis for rea-
soned interpretation. Speaking off the record, one mediator acknowledges
that one judge in the state believes the later statute (mediation privilege) con-
trols the earlier statutes (reporting abuse and neglect), and the statute specific
to mediators controls the general mandatory reporting statutes. While a
canon does provide that a newer statute controls because it has the effect of
repealing the earlier one, it only has that effect to the extent of the inconsis-
tency.4 This canon applies when it is impossible to interpret two statutes
harmoniously. If one reads the mediation confidentiality statute as requiring
that everything except the written agreement is confidential, one might
choose to employ this canon to reach the conclusion that mediators need not
report abuse and neglect. If however, one believes the statutes may be inter-
preted harmoniously (the mediators keep confidentiality with the limited
exceptions required by the other statutes), the canon is not appropriately ap-
plied.
Another canon provides that the specific provision controls the general
one. 42 Many mediators employ this canon to determine that they have an
to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the pub-
lic hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced.
FLA. STAT. § 69.081(4) (2002).
37. FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2002); FLA. STAT. § 415.1034 (2002).
38. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a).
39. FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2002); FLA. STAT. § 415.1034 (2002).
40. See generally, RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT (NITA 2002).
41. Id. at 96 (citing Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1234
(Fla. 2000)).
42. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 40, at 90.
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obligation to report abuse and neglect which the legislature specifically ear-
marked for mandatory reporting. This interpretation is consistent with the
mediator's ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality except where re-
quired by law, and the approach to read in pari materia new statutes that
concern the same subject matter.43 "In pari materia, 'part of the same mate-
rial,' provides that new legislation be interpreted to make it consistent with
existing statutes that concern the same subject matter."'  Mediators gener-
ally prefer interpreting the statutes as coexisting harmoniously, requiring
them to honor confidentiality, yet report child and vulnerable adult abuse and
neglect.
Nonetheless, neither statutory construction nor case law adequately ad-
vises a mediator as to the breadth of and possible exceptions to mediation
confidentiality privileges. One case does highlight the tension between the
public policy to communicate child abuse and the public policy to honor
confidentiality. 45 In C.R. v. E., the parties agreed to resolve their differences
through the mediation/arbitration forum offered by the Christian Conciliation
Service of Central Florida, Inc. ("CCS"). 46 The matter to be resolved was the
parents' allegation that a Catholic priest had fondled their minor daughter. 7
CCS rules included one entitled "Confidentiality" which read: "All state-
ments made during the conciliation process will be of a confidential nature
and will not be made known to persons not involved in the process."'4' The
CCS arbitrators reached a decision, finding that "the priest had touched the
daughter in an inappropriate manner on several occasions and that the
Church was negligent in retaining and supervising him. '49 The arbitration
panel found against the priest and the Church jointly and severally in the
amount of $250,000.50 Subsequent to payment of the full amount by the lo-
cal Diocese to the parents, counsel for the parents informed church counsel
that they considered any confidentiality agreement null and void.5 The court
of appeal disagreed, affirming per curiam the trial court's refusal to dissolve
a temporary injunction enjoining the parents from communicating with third
parties regarding the proceeding.5 2 The strong well-reasoned dissent main-
tained the requirement of confidentiality was void as a matter of public pol-
43. Id. at 45.
44. Id.
45. See C.R. v. E., 573 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
46. Id. (Cobb, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1089.
50. C.R., 573 So. 2d at 1089 (Cobb, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1088.
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icy, 53 and moreover, a person who takes money on an agreement to conceal a
felony is guilty of a third degree felony.54
Florida mediators, attorneys, and parties need clear guidance as to what
is not confidential during mediation. The statutory confidentiality privileges
apply to only some of the many mediated cases. The mediation privilege for
court-ordered cases leaves doubt as to the mediator's obligation to report
matters that may be deemed "required by law," and does not clarify what, if
anything, is required by law. Additionally, mediators who are not certified
or court-appointed do not have the ethical obligation to keep mediation
communications confidential unless required by law. Given the many vari-
ables, confidentiality will vary greatly based on whether a privilege applies,
the court ordered mediation, the mediator is certified, and the parties entered
into a confidentiality agreement. The legislature would do well to clarify the
confidentiality privilege with careful attention to the experiences and con-
cerns of the mediators, attorneys, judges, and parties. In State v. Trull, a
circuit court respectfully suggested "the Legislature review the wisdom of
extending confidentiality to non court-ordered mediation conducted by certi-
fied mediators who are subject to the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
Appointed Mediators.9
55
B. Enforcement of Confidentiality
Florida judges have recognized the importance of confidentiality to me-
diation and have enforced mediation confidentiality agreements and privi-
leges. Judges may also severely sanction mediation participants who do not
abide by confidentiality agreements. In Paranzino v. Barnett Bank, the trial
court dismissed plaintiffs case with prejudice finding that plaintiff and her
attorney deliberately and willfully breached the confidentiality provision in
their Mediation Report and Agreement.56 After attending court-ordered me-
53. Id The public policy cited by dissent provides "any person ... who knows, or has
reasonable cause to suspect, that a child is .. .abused . . . shall report such knowledge or
suspicion to the (Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services) ...." CR., 573 So. 2d at
1089 (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1989)).
54. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 843.14(4) (1989)).
55. 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. D289 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2002).
56. 690 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). The parties and their counsel,
signers of the report and agreement, agreed to be bound by confidentiality agreements and not
to disclose any discussions unless agreed to in writing by the parties or ordered by the court.
Id. Further, they agreed that the mediation was covered by the provisions of Chapter 44 of the
Florida Statutes and rule 1.700 et seq. of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 728.
Section 44.102(3) of the Florida Statutes provided that communications in a court-ordered
2003]
99
: Nova Law Review 28, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
NOVA LAW REVIEW
diation at which the parties did not settle, Victoria Paranzino and her attorney
disclosed to a Miami Herald reporter the settlement offer made by Barnett
Bank during their mediation conference.57 The resulting article which ap-
peared in the Miami Herald's Tropic Magazine recounted Paranzino's ver-
sion of the facts of her case and statements, attributed to her attorney, dis-
cussing the settlement offer.58 The appellate court affirmed the imposition of
the harshest sanction of dismissing the case with prejudice, finding that ap-
pellant Paranzino and her attorney deliberately violated the court order set-
ting the matter for mediation, breached the confidentiality provision in the
Mediation Report and Agreement, and disregarded the governing statute and
rule of procedure by disclosing the settlement offer to the Miami Herald. 59
The trial court based its ruling on strong public policy honoring mediation
confidentiality.6" "If the trial court were to allow this willful and deliberate
conduct to go unchecked, continued behavior in this vein could have a chill-
ing effect upon the mediation process. '
"The confidentiality of the mediation negotiations should remain in-
violate until a written agreement is executed by the parties."62 Each party to
a court-ordered mediation has a privilege to prevent disclosure of the com-
munications made during the mediation proceeding.63 Other than an exe-
cuted settlement agreement, all oral and written communications are confi-
dential and inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent legal proceeding,
unless all parties otherwise agree.6' Courts will neither recognize oral media-
tion agreements nor hear testimony alleging their existence.65 In Hudson, the
wife and her attorney appeared at the final hearing for dissolution of mar-
riage alleging an oral mediated agreement and presenting an unsigned ver-
sion of the alleged agreement, with the mediator's signature on the back.'
Although the mediation agreement was never reduced to writing, and neither
the husband nor his attorney appeared at the final hearing, the trial court en-
mediation proceeding be confidential and inadmissible in subsequent legal proceedings. The
court ordered the parties to mediate at appellant's request. Id. at 726.
57. Paranzino, 690 So. 2d at 726.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 729-30.
60. Id. at 728.
61. Id. at 729; see also Floyd v. St. Johns County Fla., 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 440 (7th
Cir. Feb. 24, 1998).
62. Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Cohen v. Cohen,
609 So. 2d 785, 786 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 9).
63. Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 8 (citing FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (Supp. 1990)).
64. Id.
65. Id at 9.
66. Id. at 8.
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tered a judgment and later denied the husband's motion to vacate. 67 The ap-
pellate court found that the admission of the "agreement" poisoned the well,
necessitating that the judgment be vacated and the matter be tried anew.6"
Disclosure of confidential mediation information has also been pro-
posed as possible justification for disqualifying judges.6'9 The Supreme Court
of Florida in Enterprise Leasing addressed the certified conflict "on the issue
of whether the disclosure of confidential mediation information to the trial
judge is in and of itself sufficient to disqualify the trial judge."7 ° The court
held "we approve the decision in Enterprise Leasing, which held a judge is
not automatically disqualified from presiding because of knowledge of con-
fidential mediation information, and disapprove the Fourth District's deci-
sion in Fabber to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion."' A
party seeking disqualification of a judge in a mediation context must allege
specific facts to demonstrate a reasonable belief he could not get a fair trial.72
Florida's supreme court recognized that confidentiality of the pro-
ceedings is crucial to mediation by mandating that '[i]f the parties
do not reach an agreement as to any matter as a result of media-
tion, the mediator shall report the lack of an agreement to the court
without comment or recommendation,' and by further requiring
that '[i]f an agreement is reached, it shall be reduced to writing.' 73
Comparable rules of procedure similarly restrict what a mediator may report
to the court for family 74 and dependency mediation. 75
Not only may mediators assert the confidentiality privilege on behalf of
the parties, mediators governed by the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
Appointed Mediators have an affirmative obligation to do so, including mov-
ing for a protective order.7 6 In Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, the par-
67. Id
68. Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 9.
69. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2001).
70. Id. at 965.
71. Id. In Fabber v. Wessel, 604 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) the trial judge
was disqualified from continuing as judge on the case because in the course of denying a
motion to compel compliance with the settlement agreement, he was privy to the terms of the
parties' alleged agreement. Id. at 534.
72. Enterprise Leasing Co., 789 So. 2d at 968.
73. Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730) (emphasis in original).
74. FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.740(f).
75. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(o).
76. "'A mediator shall maintain confidentiality of all information revealed during media-
tion except where disclosure is required by law." FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS
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ties failed to reach a written agreement during court ordered mediation.77
Nonetheless, Royal Caribbean moved to enforce an oral mediation agree-
ment and subpoenaed the mediator to testify at the hearing on their motion.78
The court of appeal recognized that the privilege afforded to the parties in
mediation proceedings, and asserted by the mediator in the trial court, was
codified by the Florida Legislature. 79 Accordingly, it affirmed the trial
court's decision to grant the mediator's motion to quash the subpoena and to
refuse to hear testimony regarding the mediation.8°
In a second case involving Royal Caribbean, following court-ordered
circuit civil mediation, the mediator submitted a report to the court indicating
that the parties had reached total impasse on all issues.8 ' Royal Caribbean
moved to enforce settlement, claiming that a settlement was reached by the
parties and sought to have the court review a document purporting to be the
settlement agreement.82 The appellate court found that the trial court had
departed from the essential requirements of law by ordering an in camera
inspection of the purported agreement and holding an evidentiary hearing on
Royal Caribbean's motion." "In order for a settlement agreement reached
during mediation to be binding, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730 clearly mandates that it
be reduced to writing and executed both by the parties and their respective
counsel, if any."84 If the parties do not effectuate an agreement in accor-
dance with the dictates of rule 1.730(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, "the confidentiality afforded to parties involved in mediation proceed-
ings must remain inviolate." 5
10.360. Additionally, "the mediator should not voluntarily testify, and, if subpoenaed, should
either file a motion for protective order, or notify the judge in accordance with local proce-
dures, that the mediator is statutorily required to maintain the confidentiality of mediation
proceedings." Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 96-005. This is an advisory
opinion issued by the Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, subsequently renamed Media-
tor Ethics Advisory Committee.
77. 614 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
78. Id
79. Id. at 520.
80. Id.
81. Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 641 So. 2d 515, 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
82. Id
83. Id. at 517.
84. Id. Contra Jordan v. Adventist Health Sys., 656 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (enforcing mediation agreement signed by the parties, but not their counsel, when
parties operated under the terms of the mediation agreement).
85. Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517 (citing Royal Caribbean v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
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Nonetheless, if the parties at mediation do not effectuate an agreement,
the real parties in interest, even if not present at the mediation proceedings,
are entitled to know about the issues in dispute and mediation efforts.86 In a
court-ordered mediation between a condominium association and a devel-
oper, the parties did not reach agreement. 7 Subsequent to the mediation, the
developer wrote a letter to the individual unit owners advising them of the
proceedings and the settlement offer the association had rejected.8 Revers-
ing the trial court's order imposing sanctions on the developer, the court of
appeal interpreted section 44.102(3) of the Florida Statutes to grant a privi-
lege to each party involved in a mediation proceeding, and found nothing in
the statute that precluded parties from disclosing communications to other
parties, whether present at or absent from the mediation proceeding.89
C. Rules of Procedure Impact Confidentiality
Executed mediated agreements survive the mediation process, but must
bear the requisite signatures to be recognized as valid by the courts.90 Rules
of procedure in conjunction with applicable substantive and mediation law
provide the answer as to who must sign the agreement. In the circuit civil
matter of City of Delray Beach v. Keiser, "[a]t the mediation, a handwritten
memorandum was prepared, which set forth the terms of a settlement."'" The
attorney for the City of Delray Beach signed the memorandum, but neither
party signed the document.9 2 Subsequent to the mediation, the City Commis-
sion declined to approve the settlement.93 The appellate court reasoned that
there was no mediation settlement agreement for rule 1.730 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that parties sign their mediation agree-
ment.9 4 Thus, the court of appeal found that the trial court erred in enforcing
the agreement.95 "[C]ounsel's signature, even when executed in the presence
86. Yacht Club S.E., Inc. v. Sunset Harbour, 843 So. 2d 917, 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 918-19.
90. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2002). The privilege for court-ordered mediation provides
that "[a]ll oral or written communications in a mediation proceeding, other than an executed
settlement agreement .... shall be confidential and inadmissible as evidence in any subse-
quent legal proceeding, unless all parties agree otherwise." Id. See also additional mediation
privileges identified in notes 23-25 supra.
91. City of Delray Beach v. Keiser, 699 So. 2d 855, 856 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
92. Id. at 856.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Keiser, 699 So. 2d at 855.
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of the party, was insufficient to satisfy the signature requirement of Rule
1.730. "96 Conversely, when the parties sign the mediation agreement but
counsel do not, the agreement may be upheld by the court.97 In Jordan v.
Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., the court found the lack of signatures
by counsel was a technical detail, and held that the parties' signatures were
sufficient to bind them to their settlement agreement when the parties had
operated under the terms of the agreement.9" While attorneys' signatures
may be a technical detail, parties' signatures are required on circuit civil me-
diated settlement agreements.
In determining whether mediated agreements should be recognized,
family law courts also look to requirements established by the applicable
rules of procedure. 99 In Graves v. Graves, the court held that the only way
the parties may enter into an enforceable agreement was to follow the rules
of procedure, and parties may not avoid the requirements by orally agreeing
to an alternative procedure during mediation.' °° During the mediation, the
parties reached an oral agreement which they recited before a court re-
porter.' O' The wife refused to sign the written agreement the husband's at-
torney prepared by incorporating the terms of the oral agreement.0 2 When
Graves was decided, family mediation matters were governed by Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. They are now governed by Florida Family Law
Rules of Procedure, which specifically address the matter raised in Graves,
and provide that the mediation agreement may be electronically or steno-
graphically recorded.'03
Attorneys and mediators must be well-versed in the rules of procedure
in their specific courts, for the various rules differ markedly. Florida Family
Law Rules of Procedure do not bind parties to the agreement if counsel was
not present when the mediation agreement was reached, and counsel serves a
written objection within ten days from service of a copy of the agreement.'0 4
Rules governing small claims actions do not require either parties or attor-
96. Id. (citing Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517).
97. Jordan v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 656 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995), rev. denied 663 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1995).
98. Id. at 202.
99. Graves v. Graves, 649 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
100. Id. at 286.
101. Id. at 285.
102. Id.
103. FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.740(f)(1) (2002).
104. Id.; see Kalof v. Kalof, 840 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (interpret-
ing this rule as applying to the limited circumstance in which counsel for one of the parties
leaves the mediation before the settlement agreement is ready, and not establishing a ten-day
window within which anyone present at mediation can move to set aside the agreement).
[Vol. 28:1:87
104
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/1
FLORIDA MEDIATION CASE LAW
neys to attend mediation if the party sends a representative with full authority
to settle.' °5 For dependency mediation, parties attending the mediation must
sign the written mediation agreement. 6 The parties and participants who
must attend are identified in the court order, which also names the parties
and participants who are prohibited from attending the mediation sessions.'0 7
D. Waiver of Privilege of Confidentiality
The parties to the mediation hold the mediation confidentiality privilege
and may elect to waive it. Should all parties involved in the mediation waive
the privilege, the mediator may not assert the privilege on anyone's behalf.
An individual party may intentionally or unintentionally waive the privilege.
In McKinlay v. McKinlay, the wife wrote a letter to her then-attorney inform-
ing him that the stipulation agreement she entered into during mediation was
not fair, that she was "under severe emotional distress," and pressured into
signing the agreement. '08 When the husband's counsel sought to have the
mediator testify in response to wife's allegations of intimidation and duress,
her counsel objected, asserting that mediation matters are privileged and con-
fidential.'0 9 "The trial court found that Wife had not waived her statutory
privilege," and refused to allow the mediator to testify or proffer testi-
mony." ° The court of appeal reversed and concluded "Wife waived her
statutory privilege of confidentiality and that, as a result of the waiver, it was
error and a breach of fair play to deny Husband the opportunity to present
rebuttal testimony and evidence." ' Similarly, another case held "it was
proper for the trial court to allow the former husband to testify about the me-
diation proceeding where the ... wife sought relief from the plain terms of
the settlement agreement .... ,,112 "A party seeking relief from a written set-
tlement agreement on the basis of his or her intent [or] thoughts at the time
the agreement was entered into may not assert that matters discussed during
the negotiations of that agreement are privileged."' 3
105. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(e).
106. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(o)(1).
107. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290 (1)(1).
108. Mckinlay v. Mckinlay, 648 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
109. Id. at 808.
110. Id. at 809.
111. Id. at 810.
112. Taylor v. Taylor, 650 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
113. Id. (citing Mckinlay v. Mckinlay, 648 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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The mediation confidentiality privilege extends to physical evidence." 4
In Chabad House-Lubavitch v. Banks, the court of appeal found the trial
court had erred in admitting into evidence the site plan that was a direct
product of the parties' mediation." 5 Had the site plan been otherwise dis-
coverable the result would have been different for the mediation privilege,
applying only to mediation communications, does not suspend discovery or
prevent the introduction of otherwise discoverable evidence.'6 In fact, in-
formation obtained during mediation may lead to additional discovery re-
quests, and may form the basis for appropriate motions.' 7 In Broward
School Board v. Cruz, the School Board received at mediation, for the first
time, a report from the Plaintiffs neuropsychologist." 8 The report consti-
tuted otherwise discoverable evidence, and is therefore distinguishable from
the site plan in Chabad.' Previously, the trial court had denied the School
Board's request for an independent medical examination of the Plaintiff,
based on Plaintiffs representation that he had not placed his neurological
condition at issue, had not retained a neurologist, and did not intend to pre-
sent testimony from a neurologist. 20 The court of appeal found: "[b]ecause
the cause of Cruz's mental condition and, specifically, the change, if any, in
his neurological state, was the central issue in this trial, the School Board
should have been allowed the opportunity to have its own expert conduct an
independent [medical] examination.''
An ever-growing body of mediation case law responds to the parties'
various pleas for court intervention to correct, modify, or set aside mediation
agreements. When courts look behind the mediation agreements and take
testimony from the parties as to what transpired at mediation, they cast aside
confidentiality. In Haffa v. Haffa, the wife alleged that the mediation agree-
ment contained a serious scrivener's error, reflecting that her husband was to
transfer twenty-five shares of stock to her, when they had agreed the number
114. Chabad House-Lubavitch v. Banks, 602 So. 2d 670, 672 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
115. Id.
116. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2002); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710(c); FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.741(a).
117. In contrast, hearsay evidence as to information learned at mediation is inadmissible.
See Price v. City of Boynton Beach, 847 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
("[t]estimony of a witness that a... mediator had expressed concerns about threats made by a
[party] was inadmissible as hearsay").
118. 761 So. 2d 388, 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000), a.f'd, 800 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2001).
119. The site plan in Chabad was a mediation communication and therefore protected by
the mediation privilege. The doctor's report in Cruz existed independent of the mediation,
was not covered by the privilege, and was otherwise discoverable.
120. Cruz, 761 So. 2dat391.
121. Id. at393.
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was 2,505.2' The wife's attorney subpoenaed the mediator to testify. Over
the mediator's objection, the circuit court judge ordered the mediator to tes-
tify on the limited issue of the alleged scrivener's error.
23
Courts balance the benefit of honoring confidentiality with the detri-
ment of denying a party the opportunity to seek the relief of modifying or
setting aside the mediation agreement. In D.R. Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart
U.S.A. of West Palm Beach, the court of appeal directly addressed the issue
of confidentiality, focusing on whether the mediation resulted in an executed
settlement agreement. 1
24
The reason for confidentiality as to statements made during media-
tion where a settlement agreement is not reached is obvious. Me-
diation could not take place if litigants had to worry about admis-
sions against interest being offered into evidence at trial, if a set-
tlement was not reached. Once the parties in mediation have
signed an agreement, however, the reasons for confidentiality are
not as compelling. There is, of course, no confidentiality as to "an
executed settlement agreement."' 
25
Courts have given parties the opportunity to prove, among other mat-
ters, fraud, 12 6 extortion, 27 mutual mistake, 28 misrepresentation, 21 and media-
tor misconduct"' as bases for seeking relief from mediation agreements. The
section after next will discuss cases pertaining to mediation agreements, in-
terpreted, modified, upheld, or overturned by the courts.
111. APPEARANCE AT MEDIATION
A. Obligation to Attend Mediation
The term "voluntary court-ordered mediation" seems oxymoronic.
While the process of mediation may occur by operation of law, parties de-
termine their level of participation. Judges do order parties to attend media-
tion sessions. However, once at mediation, the parties have self-
122. Haffa v. Haffa, No. 93-13422-FC12 (Fla. 1 1th Cir. Ct. 1994). Conversation with
mediator Meah R. Tell on September 17, 2003.
123. Id.
124. 819 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
125. Id. at 973-74 (citing FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2001)).
126. Gostyla v. Gostyla, 708 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
127. Cooper v. Austin, 750 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
128. D.R. Lakes, Inc., 819 So. 2d at 974.
129. Still v. Still, 835 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
130. Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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determination and decide whether they will settle all, some, or none of the
matters in controversy.' 3' Florida courts have sternly sanctioned both parties
and attorneys who failed to attend court-ordered mediation sessions. Sanc-
tions include case dismissal, struck pleadings, attorney's fees, and costs
charged against attorneys or clients. With the widespread utilization of me-
diation and relatively new proliferation of rules of procedure specifically
geared to the mediation process, case law clarifies the attorney's obligation
to attend and advise clients to attend mediation. Attorneys who improperly
advise their clients run the risk of irate clients sanctioned by the court and
diminished coffers following their personal assessment.
For circuit civil court-ordered mediation, attorneys representing parties
have an obligation to both attend and have their clients attend.'32 In Carbino
v. Ward, the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida found that defendant
Ward failed to appear at mediation without good cause despite the fact that
he, in good faith, relied on his attorney's advice that he need not attend. 33
The appellate court further found that the trial court, upon motion, was obli-
gated to award attorney's fees and costs against the party failing to appear. 31
"To hold otherwise would substantially weaken the sanction mechanism
which the Supreme Court saw fit to make mandatory upon a party's failure to
appear at mediation without good cause."' 35 For circuit civil cases,
a party is deemed to appear at a mediation conference if the fol-
lowing persons are physically present:
(I) The party or its representative having full authority to settle
without further consultation;
(2) The party's counsel of record, if any;
(3) A representative of the insurance carrier for any insured party
who is not such carrier's outside counsel and who has full author-
131. FLA. R.CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.3 10.
132. Rule 1.720(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure delineates who must attend
circuit civil (civil cases over $15,000) mediations. Court orders or stipulations by parties may
alter the requirements. Id.
133. 801 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
134. Id. at 1031. Rule 1.720(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides "if a
party fails to appear at a duly noticed mediation conference without good cause, the court
upon motion shall impose sanctions, including an award of mediator and attorneys' fees and
other costs, against the party failing to appear."
135. Carbino, 801 So. 2d at 1031.
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ity to settle up to the amount of the plaintiffs last demand or pol-
icy limits, whichever is less, without further consultation.'
36
The Carbino court was the first Florida court to address the question of
whether a defendant needs to personally appear for mediation when his in-
surance company sends a representative with full authority to settle up to
policy limits. 3 7 Interpreting rule 1.720(b), it answered in the affirmative,
finding that persons from all three applicable categories were required to be
present at the mediation. 3 Specifically, the court found that sub-section
(b)(1) applied "to a party such as a corporation, partnership, incapacitated
person, or minor which must appear through a duly authorized representa-
tive.' 39 Further, the court found the adjuster, while meeting the settlement
requirements of subsection (3), did not meet the requirements of subsection
(1) for his authority was only up to policy limits and Plaintiffs' demand was
not so limited. 4°
Whether a party, representative, or attorney needs to appear at media-
tion depends on the governing court order and rules of procedure and prac-
tice. The Supreme Court of Florida adopts the rules of practice and proce-
dure for conduct of court-ordered mediation.' 4 ' The most demanding rule
requiring appearance at mediation applies to circuit civil mediation mat-
ters. 42 The Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure governing appearance at
mediation only requires that the named party be physically present at the
mediation conference, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties. ' 43 Counsel
is not obligated to attend in the discretion of the mediator and with agree-
ment by the parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.'44 Appearances at
dependency mediation are both ordered and prohibited by the court.' 4' The
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure direct the court to enter an order naming
parties and participants who must appear, as well as parties and participants
136. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b).
137. Carbino, 801 So. 2d at 1030.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1031.
140. Id.; see also Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99-002 (July 3, 1999); Mediator
Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-010 (March 22, 2002); Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 2002-001 (March 22, 2002).
141. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(1) (2002).
142. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b).
143. FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.740(d).
144. Id. Rule 12.741(2) provides for mandatory sanctions against a party who fails to
appear at a duly noticed mediation conference without good cause.
145. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(l).
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who are prohibited from attending the mediation.'46 Unlike the other media-
tion sessions requiring the appearance of parties, in small claims actions an
attorney may appear on behalf of a party at mediation if he has full authority
to settle without further consultation. 4 7 A nonlawyer may also appear on
behalf of a party with written authority to appear and full authority to settle
without further consultation. 48
Courts are sanctioning parties for failing to attend mediation sessions
based on their court orders, as well as applicable rules of procedure. In
Transglobal Land Trust v. Balamour, the court dismissed the landlord tenant
case with prejudice for the plaintiff landlord's failure to attend the court or-
dered mediation and subsequent failure to show cause why the case should
not be dismissed for his nonappearance.'49 Similarly, parties who fail to
abide by a court order to attend appellate mediation are subject to sanctions,
including the award of attorney's fees and mediator fees. 50 A party's obliga-
tion to obey a court order to attend mediation is not negated by presence at
the mediation by counsel with full authority to settle.' 5'
Attorneys are also the object of court sanctions for their mediation er-
rors. Although rule 1.720(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure only
provides for sanctioning parties who fail to appear,' 52 trial courts have the
inherent authority to appropriately assess attorney's fees and costs.'53 Attor-
neys who fail to attend court-ordered mediation and advise their clients that
they need not attend may face attorneys' fees and costs assessed against them
in favor of the opposing party.'54 Similarly, attorneys who fail to timely file
mediation summaries without good cause may face the imposition of sanc-
tions personally against them.' 55 When the attorney is the transgressor, "it is
more appropriate to impose sanctions against counsel rather than dismiss the
appeal, as dismissal would punish the client for the transgressions of her at-
torney.
'156
146. Id. Rule 8.290(l)(5) authorizes sanctions against a party or participant who was or-
dered to attend mediation, but failed to do so without good cause. The court, in its discretion,
may impose sanctions.
147. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(e).
148. Id.
149. Transglobal Land Trust v. Balamour, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 202 (17th Cir. Ct. Jan.
14,2002).
150. Segui v. Margrill, 844 So. 2d 820, 821 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
151. Id.
152. Fredericks v. Sturgis, 598 So. 2d 94, 96 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Nunes v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 703 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
154. Id.; see also Dunning v. Metro. Ins. Co., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 39 (Fla. 3d Cir. Ct.
Nov. 6, 2002).
155. Carter-Harris v. Williams, 764 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
156. Id.
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Trial courts must find a sufficiently high level of misconduct by the
party to justify the severe sanction of striking his pleadings.'1 7 In Williams v.
Udell, the trial court abused its discretion by striking appellant's pleadings
for failing to attend mediation and properly reply to a request for production,
when both incidents of misconduct were attributed to the attorney's derelic-
tion of duty.'58 If a court enters a default judgment against a party for failure
to attend a court-ordered mediation, the default order "must contain specific
findings of the noncomplying party's willful or deliberate refusal to obey the
court order."' 59 Additionally, the severe sanction of striking pleadings be-
comes subject to heightened scrutiny when matters such as child custody and
support are at issue. 60
B. Authority to Settle at Mediation
Key to a determination of whether the appropriate people appeared for
mediation is whether they had the requisite authority to settle. No statute,
rule, or court order requires that parties settle during mediation sessions.
"There is no requirement that a party even make an offer at mediation, let
alone offer what the opposition wants to settle."'' Courts and rules may
require authority to settle; they do not require intent to settle, let alone actual
settlement. Florida's statutory definition of mediation clearly states, "deci-
sion making authority rests with the parties."' 62
Courts have levied sanctions against parties who sent representatives to
mediation without authority to settle. In Physicians Protective Trust Fund v.
Overman, the circuit court judge ordered the entire board of trustees to attend
the resumption of mediation after the self-insured trust failed to send a repre-
sentative with authority to settle the case to the court-ordered mediation.' 63
The court of appeal held the lower court had not departed from the essential
157. Williams. v. Udell, 690 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
158. Id. at 732-33.
159. Rodriguez v. Kalish, 766 So. 2d 411, 411 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also
Smith v. Wal-Mart, 835 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing trial court's dis-
missal of case and remanding for an explicit determination whether party's failure to attend
mediation was willful).
160. Brownell v. Brownell, 685 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
161. Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
162. FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (2002).
163. 636 So. 2d 827, 827-29 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The mediator had adjourned
the mediation because the representative from Physicians Protective Trust had no dollar au-
thority to settle the case. Subsequently, the Overmans filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to
rule 1.720(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
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requirements of law and declined to interfere by certiorari." Similarly, in
Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, the trial court sanctioned the petitioner for
sending a representative and an attorney to mediation who were not author-
ized to pay anything to settle the case. 165 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal denied the petition for writ of certiorari seeking to overturn the court
order. 166 Chief Justice (then Judge) Anstead, dissenting, aptly noted:
Mediation is an excellent means of providing the parties with an
opportunity to come together in a non-adversarial setting under the
guidance of an expert at dispute resolution to determine if they can
agree to a solution of their dispute without the need for a full-
blown court trial and all the baggage and risks such a trial in-
volves. 1
67
He continued: "However, mediation is not designed to force a settle-
ment in any case, especially those cases where the lines are so clearly and
solidly drawn that the parties, in absolute faith, simply take diametrically
opposed positions that ultimately require a court-imposed resolution after a
trial on the merits."'1
68
Judge Anstead had highlighted the importance of parties' self-
determination in the mediation process.69 Precisely because mediation of-
fers the opportunity to come together and share information and perspectives,
parties may alter their once diametrically opposed positions. For mediation
to truly offer a settlement opportunity, the parties must have the ability to
change their minds, should they see fit. Consequently, sending people who
have "marching orders" not to settle is a waste of the participant's time and
energy. 7° On the other hand, sending people who decide not to settle after
participating in the mediation is most appropriate.
Court orders may equate failing to appear for mediation without full au-
thority to settle with failing to appear at all.' 7' Consequently, if parties reach
agreement, they may not later look to overturn it based on inadequate author-
164. Id. at 829.
165. Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, 525 So. 2d 519, 519 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(per curiam).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 5 19-20 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 520.
169. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.310.
170. See FLA. R. Cv. P. 1.720(b) (setting attendance requirements and mandatory sanc-
tions).
171. W. Waste Indus., Inc. v. Achord, 632 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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ity to settle. 7 2 "Since agreement was reached by the parties at mediation, it
is nonsensical to say that petitioner was not present at mediation.'"
IV. COURTS SEEK TO UPHOLD MEDIATION AGREEMENTS
A. Mediation Environment
Inevitably, when people enter into settlement agreements, some will try
to renege on their agreements. Courts will honor the parties' fundamental
right to contract and enforce the contracts even when the bargain seems to
favor one side. 74 "The incentive to file an action, impulsively settle, then
challenge the settlement after final judgment would permit parties to manipu-
late the privileges of litigation, waste judicial resources, and compromise
finality in these judgments."'' 75
Parties looking to overturn settlement agreements have limited bases for
doing so. "In fact, the reasons for such limitations are even more compelling
in the case of a mediated settlement agreement."'' 76 In Crupi v. Crupi, the
appellate court, determining whether to enforce a marital settlement, agreed
with the trial court "that three Xanax pills, and anxiety and pressure to settle
are insufficient proof of coercion necessary to set aside such an agreement.
Otherwise, few, if any, mediated settlement agreements would be enforce-
able."' 177 Identifying the safeguards available to litigating parties who par-
ticipate in court-ordered mediation, another court said, "[m]ediation agree-
ments are reached under court supervision, before a neutral mediator. The
mediation rules create an environment intended to produce a final settlement
of the issues with safeguards against the elements of fraud, overreaching,
etc., in the settlement process."'171 Courts have also given weight to other
factors usually present in court-ordered mediation cases, including represen-
tation by counsel and access to discovery, experts, and the court. 179 Addi-
172. Id. at 681-82.
173. ld. at 682 n. 1.
174. Petracca v. Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904, 913 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
175. Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d 707, 713 (Fla. 2001).
176. Crupi v. Crupi, 784 So. 2d 611,614 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
177. Id.
178. Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 674 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
179. See Petracca, 706 So. 2d at 904. The parties reached a settlement agreement in their
dissolution of marriage action after engaging in discovery for two years with each continu-
ously represented by counsel, and the wife having hired an accountant to determine the fam-
ily finances. Id. Although the Petracca parties did not reach their agreement through media-
tion, the factors the court considers (distinguishing pre- and post-litigation) are factors usually
present in court-ordered mediation cases. Id. at 905-06. See also Macar, 803 So. 2d at 707.
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tionally, courts will consider that the parties voluntarily entered into a media-
tion agreement.i18
B. Intent to be Bound by the Mediation Agreement
To display the parties' intent to reach a final settlement, mediated
agreements must be in writing, although they may be handwritten. 8 ' Fur-
ther, the agreements need to bind the parties as to the essential terms,8 2 but
may be "bare bones" agreements.8 3 When parties disagree, courts determine
whether or not they meant to be bound by the terms of their agreements. In a
dependency matter, parents who were represented by counsel entered into a
mediation agreement with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices ("HRS"), consenting to the withholding of adjudication of dependency
for the children provided the parents complied with specific tasks.' 4 Shortly
thereafter, HRS filed an affidavit alleging parents' noncompliance, and
moved for an adjudication of dependency.'8 5 The trial court, following a
hearing on the matter, issued an order declaring the children dependent. 6
While acknowledging that the mediation agreement was not a model of clar-
ity, the appellate court denied parents' motion for rehearing, having deter-
mined that the parents had agreed to forgo procedures they would otherwise
have been entitled to for the dependency proceedings, and had also agreed
that should they fail to comply with the mediation agreement their children
would be adjudicated dependent.'
Nonetheless, mediated agreements may not be used to deny parents
substantive due process rights in termination of parental rights cases."'
180. In re BB., 820 So. 2d 409, 413 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 2002). The court expressed
great distress "by the ease with which the father [was] permitted to needlessly expend the
scant resources of the DCF and the dependency court... with insufficient evidence in an
effort to renege on a mediated settlement agreement he voluntarily entered into with the
child's mother." Id.
181. Singer v. Singer, 652 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing
handwritten agreements); Wilson v. Forte Hotels, Inc., 632 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (reversing trial court's order enforcing alleged mediation agreement that was not in
writing); Cohen v. Cohen, 609 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring mediated
agreements to be written).
182. Bowen v. Larry Gross Constr., 781 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
183. Stempel v. Stempel, 633 So. 2d 26, 26-27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
184. A.G. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 716 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
185. Id. at 793.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 794.
188. In re S.S., 723 So. 2d 344, 347 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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"Substantive due process requires that grounds for termination of parental
rights be shown by clear and convincing evidence before the State may sever
the rights of a parent in their natural child."' 89 Construing a mediation agree-
ment in a termination of parental rights case, the district court of appeal ex-
pressed concern with the mediated consent-to-termination clause.' 90 The
court was troubled by the judge's decision to terminate parental rights based
on three weeks of noncompliance with a portion of the agreement, when the
mediation agreement provided a ninety day period within which to satisfy the
agreement's requirements, and the hearing was held less than ninety days
from the date of the agreement.' 9' Despite the mediation agreement with its
consent-to-termination of parental rights clause, the trial court had the obli-
gation to consider the best interests of the children, and the state retained the
burden to establish the elements required for termination of parental rights
cases.'92 As the record did not support the termination of parental rights, the
case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 93
In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the court was called upon to
determine if a provision in a handwritten mediated agreement was an agree-
ment between the parties or merely their agreement to agree in the future.'94
The mediation agreement read: 'The parties agree to a ninety day per year
cumulative cohabitation clause the exact language of which shall be agreed
upon by counsel and the parties."" 95 Finding reversible error by the trial
court, the court of appeal concluded that the provision, located in a mediated
agreement that was admitted into evidence at trial and incorporated into the
final judgment, was an agreement that had gone into effect.'96 Furthermore,
by virtue of its incorporation, the mediation "agreement was elevated to the
status of judgment to be interpreted, rather than a contract to be enforced."' 97
C. Finality of Mediation Agreements
Settlements are highly favored, and courts will seek to enforce them
whenever possible. 198 "With the parties' execution of an agreement, media-
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 346.
193. In re S.S., 723 So. 2d at 347.
194. Singer v. Singer, 652 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla.1985); Treasure Coast v. Lud-
lum Constr. Co., 760 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Murchinson v.
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tion contemplates a prompt and final resolution of the case." ' "The fact
that one party to the agreement apparently made a bad bargain is not suffi-
cient ground, by itself, to vacate or modify a settlement agreement. ' '200 "Nor
is the fact that the complaining party has received incompetent legal advice a
basis for vacating an agreement in a dissolution proceeding. '20' In Tubbs v.
Tubbs, the court of appeal instructed the trial court to enforce the parties'
handwritten mediation agreement, signed by the parties, their attorneys, and
the mediator, despite the fact the agreement appeared to be slanted in favor
of the husband. 2
"[C]ases settled in mediation are especially unsuited for the liberal ap-
plication of a rule allowing recission of a settlement agreement based on
unilateral mistake. °20 3  In Sponga v. Warro, during mediation, the parties
settled a negligence suit arising from a car accident for $12,500.204 Alleging
mistake or "newly discovered evidence," Ms. Warro sought relief from
judgment based on her doctor's serious error regarding her injuries, and her
reliance on his erroneous report.05 Following mediation, her doctor cor-
Grand Cypress Hotel, 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11 th Cir. 1994); see also Metro. Dade County v.
Fonte, 683 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
199. Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 674 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1996).
200. Tubbs v. Tubbs, 648 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Casto v.
Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1987)); Micale v. Micale, 542 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989), rev. dismissed, 548 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1989); Cladis v. Cladis, 512 So. 2d 271,
274 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
201. Tubbs, 648 So. 2d. at 818 (citing Casto, 508 So. 2d at 334; Cladis, 512 So. 2d at
274)).
202. Id. The Tubbs court used the Casto test in determining whether to set aside the par-
ties' settlement agreement. Id. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Florida in Macar v.
Macar, 803 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2001) addressed the issue of whether final judgments which
incorporate marital settlement agreements achieved after commencement of litigation should
be subject to challenges based on Casto v. Casto, 608 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987). Macar, 803 So.
2d at 708-09. The court concluded that they were not, and should be controlled by Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. Id. at 709. See also Casto, 508 So. 2d at 330, for two grounds
established by the Supreme Court to set aside or invalidate a postnuptial agreement:
(I )"fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching" by a party in reaching
the agreement, and (2) "unfair or unreasonable provision for [a] spouse" given the parties'
circumstances. Casto, 508 So. 2d at 333. Once the spouse establishes that the agreement is
unreasonable, a presumption exists that either (a) the defending spouse concealed information,
or (b) the challenging spouse lacked knowledge. The defending spouse then has the burden to
rebut the presumption by showing (a) full, frank disclosure of marital property and income of
parties to challenging spouse prior to signing agreement, or (b) general knowledge by the
challenging spouse of the parties' income and general and approximate knowledge of the
marital property. Id.
203. Sponga v. Warro, 698 So. 2d 621, 625 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1997).
204. Id. at 623.
205. id.
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rected his report, finding (for the first time) a preexisting condition aggra-
vated by the accident for which he anticipated future treatment.2" The court
of appeal declined to apply the concept of newly discovered evidence, and
determined that Ms. Warro entered into the mediated settlement agreement
based on unilateral mistake.0 7 As a matter of law, the court concluded that
she was not entitled to withdraw her settlement agreement based on errors in
her doctor's report.2"8 "The decision to engage in mediation and to settle at
mediation means that remedies and options otherwise available through the
judicial system are foregone."20 9 "The finality of it once the parties have set
down their agreement in writing is critical."
' 10
"Mediation, like arbitration, is an alternative dispute resolution device.
It is not to be engaged in casually or carelessly."2 ' A heightened standard of
review applies when courts consider vacating a final judgment that followed
a mediated settlement agreement. 2 2 When a trial court sets aside a judgment
based on a settlement agreement, it is also setting aside the agreement en-
tered into by the parties. "[M]ore stringent principles of law apply in setting
aside a contract than in setting aside a judgment."2"3
As parties rely on the finality of their mediation agreements, third par-
ties may also rely on the agreements to seek court determination of their
rights. 2I4 In Robbins v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co., the insurance
company brought an action for declaratory judgment to establish its right to
continue to sell insurance to the former wife who was insuring her former
husband's life.215 Based on the parties' mediation agreement, the former
wife had an insurable interest in the life of her former husband.1 6 She was,
therefore, allowed to purchase policies insuring his life totaling $200,000.2,7
In another dissolution of marriage matter, parties stipulated during "media-
tion that the husband would maintain a life insurance policy in the amount of
$200,000 naming the minor children as beneficiaries. 2' 8 The trial court's
206. Id.
207. Id. at 624.
208. Sponga, 698 So. 2d at 625.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Tilden Groves Holding Corp. v. Orlando/Orange County Expressway, 816 So. 2d
658, 660 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Sponga, 698 So. 2d at 625 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998)).
212. Id.
213. Id. (referencing Smiles v. Young, 271 So. 2d 798, 799 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
214. Robbins v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 802 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
215. Id. at 477.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Burton v. Burton, 697 So. 2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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decision to require the husband to maintain only $100,000 in insurance was
reversible error.219
D. Enforcement of Mediation Agreements
When enforcing settlement agreements, courts may not fashion their
own remedies.2 In Treasure Coast v. Ludlum Construction, the parties fol-
lowing mediation reached a settlement, which provided in relevant part: "If
any payment is more than ten days late then the Plaintiff will be entitled to a
judgment upon Affidavit against the Defendant for $65,000.00 less payments
made. '22 Subsequent to Ludlum making payment seven days beyond the ten
day grace period, Treasure Coast moved for final judgment.222 Finding that
entry of an order for the full amount shocked its conscience, the trial court
ordered Ludlum to pay interest on its late payment.223 Consequently, the
court of appeal held that the trial court erred in failing to enforce the unam-
biguous terms of the agreement, and in substituting its own remedy.224
Similarly, the trial court cannot "interfere with the parties' agreement
by finding it unconscionable and refusing to enforce it. ' 25 In Wells v. Wells,
the parties, both of whom were represented by counsel, entered into a media-
226tion agreement. Pursuant to the agreement:
the husband was to have the exclusive use and possession of the
marital home but, . . . in the event he were ever thirty days late in
any child support payment, the husband would forfeit his interest
in the home and quit-claim it to the wife (unless the lateness were
due to injury or disability, in which case the home would be sold
and the proceeds divided equally between the parties).227
The mediation agreement also provided that the husband would transfer
to the wife the $15,863.54 balance in an annuity fund, and if the annuity de-
creased in value, the husband would pay the difference in value to the
wife. 228 The agreement specifically stated that the transfer of the annuity
219. Id.
220. Treasure Coast v. Ludlum Constr. Co., 760 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
221. Id. at 233.
222. Id. at 233-34.
223. Id. at 234.
224. Id.
225. Wells v. Wells, 832 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
226. Id. at 268.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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balance was "in full and complete payment of any child support arrearage"
through the execution date of the mediation agreement.
2 29
The trial court found that the former husband owed the former wife
$696 (the decrease in value of the annuity).2 3' The trial court characterized
the $696 payment as a property settlement, and determined that a judgment
in that amount could be entered against the husband, but he could not be held
in contempt.2 3' The court of appeal disagreed, reasoning that since the obli-
gation was "made to discharge the husband's child support arrearage, it was
enforceable by contempt. "232
"Despite the trial court's determination that the husband was more than
thirty days late in paying child support, the court refused to enforce that por-
tion of the mediation agreement, sua sponte finding it unconscionable. 2 33
The court of appeal found no justification for the trial court's invalidation of
the mediation agreement.234
In sum, the former husband agreed to the marital settlement provi-
sion requiring him to transfer his interest in the marital home if he
made a child support payment thirty days or more late. He did not
challenge this provision either before or after it was incorporated
into the final judgment.235
"Bad domestic bargains-meaning unfair or unreasonable property and
monetary settlement agreements-are nevertheless enforceable so long as
they are knowing, voluntary, and not otherwise against public policy.
'
"236
Additionally, only when a term in a marital settlement agreement is am-
biguous may the trial court consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the lan-
guage in the agreement.237 In Levitt v. Levitt, the parties entered into a hand-
written mediation agreement, superseded by a marital settlement agreement
specifically stating that it was the entire agreement of the parties. 238 The
229. Id.
230. Wells, 832 So. 2d at 268.
231. Id.
232. Id.; see also Kea v. Kea, 839 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing
trial court's finding of contempt because contempt is only proper if the unpaid debt is for
alimony or child support, and husband's debt, as defined in the mediation agreement, was
neither).
233. Wells, 832 So. 2d at 268.
234. Id. at 269.
235. Id.
236. Id. (quoting Petracca v. Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(discussing Castro v. Castro, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1987)).
237. Levitt v. Levitt, 699 So. 2d. 755, 757 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
238. Id. at 756.
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agreement provided "that the former husband [would] pay the balance of...
wife's attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed $12,500, and that 'payment
of this amount is subject to the [h]usband's review of and consent to the
[w]ife's attorney's billing records, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld.' '23 9 Finding the attorney's fee provision ambiguous, the trial court
reviewed extrinsic evidence, and determined that the parties intended to have
a flat fee arrangement. 24' The court of appeal, construing the marital settle-
ment agreement as a matter of law, was "on equal footing with the trial court
as interpreter of the written document., 24' As the terms of the agreement
were clear and unambiguous, "the parties' intent must be gleaned from the
four comers of the document." 242 Accordingly, the case was reversed and
remanded for the trial court's determination of whether the former husband
reasonably or unreasonably withheld his consent to pay attorney's fees of the
former wife.243
Trial courts must enforce valid mediated settlement agreements in strict
accordance with their terms.2" It is error for a trial court to require a restric-
tive covenant in a deed when the mediation agreement only provided for
"immediate erection of a hog wire fence and the future erection of a chain
,,241link fence, or to require signing an easement which contained terms and
conditions parties had not agreed to in their mediated settlement agree-
ment.246 Courts of appeal similarly reverse family courts that do not follow
the plain language of the mediation agreements or go beyond the agreed-
upon language. When the mediation agreement provided that the husband
could claim tax deductions for the children as long as he was current in his
child support and alimony payments, the general master erred by ruling that
the husband was not entitled to take the tax deduction for his failure to pay
private school tuition.24 7 Similarly, when issues of child custody had been
satisfactorily resolved by the parties in their mediation agreement, and
adopted by the court recognizing the provisions were in the children's best
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Levitt, 699 So. 2d at 756.
243. Id. at 757.
244. M & C Assocs. v. State, 682 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
245. Boozer v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Fla., 641 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
246. Sinclair v. Clay Elec. Coop., Inc., 584 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
247. Layman v. Layman, 738 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). "The agree-
ment provided that the husband could claim the tax deductions if he was current in child sup-
port and alimony payments." Id. "The plain language of the agreement does not label the
husband's portion of the private school tuition as child support." Id.
[Vol. 28: 1:87
120
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/1
FLORIDA MEDIA TION CASE LAW
interests, the court went beyond the agreement when it designated primary
and secondary residential parents.148 Nonetheless, the court of appeal de-
clined to disturb the judge's findings, reasoning that the designation of pri-
mary residential parent had no significance in the context of the final judg-
ment.249
E. Interpretation of Mediation Agreements
As with other settlement agreements, parties seek court intervention
when they disagree on the interpretation or implementation of their media-
tion agreements. In Broward County v. LaPointe, the parties settled their
eminent domain case in mediation, and their settlement terms were incorpo-
rated into a stipulated final judgment. 250 "The parties' settlement agreement
provided that the court was to reserve jurisdiction over the 'amount of all
reasonable costs and attorney's fees, including all costs of environmental
contamination issues.""'251 The court of appeal, construing the contract as a
matter of law, determined that since there was no facial ambiguity, the por-
tion of the agreement at issue must be afforded its plain meaning.252 Finding
the omission of 'attorney's fees' in the modifying clause (which only re-
ferred to 'costs') significant, the court of appeal construed the parties'
agreement to allow reimbursement for costs dealing with environmental con-
tamination issues, but not for attorney's fees for the "administrative and
regulatory process. '
In Dows v. Nike, Inc., "[b]oth [parties] contended that there was no am-
biguity in the settlement agreement and it should be enforced., 254 Further,
each side argued that their interpretation, based on the plain meaning of the
settlement agreement, should prevail.2 55
The parties had entered into a pre-suit mediation agreement that estab-
lished a three-tiered settlement structure dependent on an independent exam-
ining physician's opinions. 56 They subsequently entered into a final agree-
ment, superseding the original handwritten conceptual agreement, in which
they chose a physician who would answer specific questions that would de-
248. Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
249. Id. at 1052.
250. 685 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
251. ld. at 892.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 892-93.
254. Dows v. Nike, Inc. 846 So. 2d 595, 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 597.
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termine the minor's compensation. 257 The parties agreed to ask the physician
(1) whether the minor ever suffered from osteomyelitis as a result of the in-
cident, and (2) if he suffered from osteomyelitis, whether he will require any
treatment to the injured area? 258 In the event the physician answered no to
the second question, the minor claimant and his guardian agreed to accept
$100,000.259 If however, the physician answered yes, they agreed to accept
$300,000.260
Nike argued that they were only responsible for paying $100,000 be-
cause the physician responded the child would not require further treatment
for osteomyelitis. 26' The Dows argued that Nike was required to pay
$300,000 because the physician answered that their son would require further
treatment to the injured area.262 The court of appeal did not read the question
as limiting future treatment for osteomyelitis only, reversed the trial court's
order compelling the $100,000 settlement, and directed the court to enter an
order directing Nike to pay the Dows $300,000.263
Courts may define terms in mediation agreements when parties have
failed to do so.2 6 They may also require renegotiation of settlement agree-
ments.265 A marital settlement agreement reached during mediation provided
that the husband would use his "best efforts" to complete a real estate pur-
chase within a specified period of time. 266 Further, "[tihe agreement pro-
vided that '[i]f despite all his best efforts and through no fault of his own, the
transaction shall not be closed, then the parties' marital settlement agreement
shall be subject to renegotiation."'2 67 Finding the husband was not obligated
to complete the transaction based on the circumstances, the court of appeal
concluded that the contingency in the agreement had occurred, necessitating
renegotiation of the marital settlement agreement.268
When parties use an undefined term in their mediation agreement, they
are bound by the interpretation which the court gives the term.269 In a medi-
257. Id. at 598.
258. Dows, 846 So. 2d at 598.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Jd. at 600.
262. Id.
263. Dows, 846 So. 2d at 601.
264. See Bowen v. Larry Gross Constr., Inc. 781 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
265. Faith v. Faith, 709 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
266. Id. at 600.
267. Jd. at 601.
268. Id.
269. See Bowen, 781 So. 2d at 466.
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ated agreement between a "homeowner" and a general contractor, the parties
entered into an agreement to "repair cracks in plaster., 27' The homeowner
wanted replacement of the drywall and plaster, while the contractor main-
tained that his repair would not be noticeable and would be permanent.27'
Although the parties did not agree on the definition of the term "repair" as
used in the mediation agreement, the court held them to their agreement.
2 72
Even though the details are not definitely fixed, an agreement may
be binding if the parties agree on the essential terms and seriously
understand and intend the agreement to be binding on them. A
subsequent difference as to the construction of the contract does
not affect the validity of the contract or indicate the minds of the
parties did not meet with respect thereto.
273
Parties to mediation agreements do not always agree on issues having to
do with breach or default, and resultant consequences or damages. Courts
determining whether mediation agreements have been materially breached
will look to the parties' agreement and the applicable established body of
law. In a landlord-tenant case, the appellate body (circuit court) found no
breach of the mediation agreement and no basis at law to uphold the default
judgment for eviction.274 Prior to the court hearing the landlord's complaint
for tenant eviction, the parties reached agreement at mediation and the case
was dismissed. 75 Pursuant to the mediation agreement, a breach of the
agreement provided for a reopening of the case, placing the parties in the
position they were prior to mediation.276 Therefore, as the landlord had not
given the notice required by statute prior to the suit, the defects could not be
corrected on remand, and even if the tenant had breached the agreement, the
court was not justified in automatically entering a default judgment.277 Con-
sequently, the appellate court ordered entry of judgment in favor of the ten-
ant.
278
In Spanish Broadcasting Systems of Florida, Inc. v. Grillone, the trial
court found that Spanish Broadcasting was "'in wilful breach of the terms of
the settlement agreement it entered into with [Grillone] at mediation and has
270. Id. at 465.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 466.
273. Id.
274. Hodgson v. Jones, 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 758, 758-59 (17th Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 1999)
275. Id. at 758.
276. Id. at 759.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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indicated to the Court that it will not honor the terms of the mediation
agreement."'279 Consequently, the court of appeal found the trial court had
not abused its discretion in imposing sanctions and in declining to reduce the
amount of sanctions it had imposed against Spanish Broadcasting. 20 How-
ever, in another case involving the media, notwithstanding the fact that late
payment by an advertiser to a television station was in violation of their me-
diation agreement, the court found the advertiser was not in default.28 ' The
court reasoned that the-television station accepted payment and allowed the
advertisement, from which the advertiser could have concluded it was not in
default.28 2 Additionally, the court determined that at a minimum, the televi-
sion station had a duty to provide notice before seeking an ex parte final
judgment283 The court of appeal vacated the final judgment after default,
and notably, ordered the parties to comply with their mediation agreement.2s'
Similarly, in a family law matter, the court did not find the former hus-
band's two-day delay in making the first payment pursuant to the parties'
settlement agreement to be a material breach. 285  Distinguishing this case
from Treasure Coast v. Ludlum Construction Co.,286 the court noted that the
case at bar was not a commercial transaction, and further that the mediation
agreement did not specify that time was of the essence, and did not provide a
grace period to put the party on notice that a short delay would accelerate
payments or trigger default.287 Interestingly, in a circuit civil case between a
college and a former employee, the court of appeal considered the same fac-
tors and reached the same result, deciding the case consistent with the fam-
ily, rather than the commercial case.28 The parties' settlement agreement
reached at mediation provided that Edward Waters College would pay John-
son's back salary and wages in full by March 31, 1997.289 When the college
tendered payment one day late, Johnson invoked the default provision of the
agreement permitting entry of judgment in the amount of $250,000.290 De-
279. 731 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting the trial court).
280. Id.
281. WFTV, Inc. v. BA Sys. Co., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 130, 130 (15th Cir. Ct. Jan. 31,
2002).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Rose v. Ditto, 804 So. 2d 351, 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing Treasure
Coast v. Ludlum Constr. Co., 760 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
286. 760 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
287. Rose, 804 So. 2d at 353.
288. See Edward Waters Coll., Inc. v. Johnson, 707 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
289. Id. at 802.
290. Id.
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termining 1) that the settlement agreement contained no recital that time was
of the essence; 2) the College's failure caused no hardship; and 3) Johnson
made no post-default demand for payment, the court of appeal concluded any
breach which may have occurred was not material to the performance of the
contract.29'
F. Parties Decide Mediation Agreement Coverage and Terms
In mediation, parties may agree to resolve matters beyond those cogni-
zable in the underlying litigation. 92 In M & C Associates, Inc. v Florida
Department of Transportation, the parties resolved an eminent domain pro-
ceeding through mediation.293 The stipulated final judgment incorporated
their mediation agreement, in which they agreed that the court would "re-
serve jurisdiction to assess any damage to pool caused by construction., 294
The trial court struck M & C Associates' motion to enforce this provision
determining that construction costs were not recoverable in eminent domain
proceedings.295 Finding that the trial court and the parties were bound by the
agreement, the court of appeal reversed and remanded to the trial court with
instructions to address the pool damage claim.
296
The fact that construction damages are not generally recoverable
as severance damages is not a defense to enforcement of the set-
tlement agreement. There is no requirement that the terms of a set-
tlement agreement be confined to issues cognizable in the litiga-
tion giving rise to the dispute. In fact, cases are often settled pre-
cisely because the parties agree to assume obligations or confer
rights that a jury or the trial court would be unable to reach.297
This is particularly important in dissolution of marriage matters when
parties may wish to address issues such as children's higher education or
grandparents' visitation rights:
The bench and bar have for years now encouraged divorcing par-
ents to resolve their differences through mediation. In effect, par-
ents have been urged to make their own law, in the hope that they
291. Id.
292. M & C Assoc. v. State, 682 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 641.
297. M & C Assoc., 682 So. 2d at 640-41 (internal citations omitted).
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can better live with a decision that is their own, rather than a deci-
sion that is externally imposed.298
V. COURTS OVERTURN MEDIATION AGREEMENTS AS REQUIRED BY LAW
A. Mediator Misconduct
During settlement, the mediation process offers safeguards to the parties
that should decrease the occurrence of coercion and increase the likelihood
courts will enforce the agreements.2 99 The primary safeguard is the trained
neutral known as the mediator. Ironically, now courts which inject a media-
tor into the settlement process may provide a basis for overturning the me-
diation agreement. Courts may consider mediator misconduct during court-
ordered mediation as possible grounds for setting aside mediation agree-
ments.30 0 In Vitakis- Valchine v. Valchine, the wife sought to set aside a me-
diated settlement agreement reached after seven hours of mediation at which
both parties were represented by counsel. 30 ' The mediation resulted in a
302 wfcomprehensive twenty-three page agreement. The wife alleged, among
other things, that coercion and duress on the part of the mediator caused her
to enter into the mediation agreement.30 3 Correctly construing Florida law at
the time of the case, the trial judge found no basis for setting aside the set-
tlement due to alleged duress or coercion by a third party.3°4 In a thoughtful
well-reasoned opinion, Judge Stevenson, writing for the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, held a court may set aside an agreement reached through
court-ordered mediation if it finds that the agreement was reached as a direct
result of substantial mediator misconduct.
305
"During a court-ordered mediation, the mediator is no ordinary third
party, but is, for all intent and purposes, an agent of the court carrying out an
official court-ordered function. '3 6 "Comprehensive procedures for conduct-
298. Card v. Card, 706 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
299. See infra Section IV.A; see also FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.300,
10.310, 10.400, 10.410, 10.420.
300. Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001), reh 'g
granted No. 4D00-2013, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 19262 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 25,
2001).
301. Id. at 1096.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Valchine, 793 So. 2d at 1099. The court would determine whether the mediator
substantially violated the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, and
whether the agreement was reached as a direct result of the mediator misconduct. Id.
306. Id. at 1090.
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ing the mediation session and minimum standards for qualification, training,
certification, professional conduct, and discipline of mediators have been set
forth by the Florida Supreme Court in the Florida Rules for Certified and
Court Appointed Mediators ..... .30 Accordingly, the court of appeal con-
sidered it unconscionable to enforce a settlement agreement reached through
coercion by a court-appointed mediator, and held "that the court may invoke
its inherent power to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and its
processes by invalidating a court-ordered mediation settlement agreement
obtained through violation and abuse of the judicially-prescribed mediation
procedures. '"308
B. Extortion, Fraud, and Misrepresentation
Party wrongdoing also provides a basis for setting aside mediation
agreements. In Cooper v. Austin, during a lengthy mediation the wife sent
her husband a note which read: "If you can't agree to this, the kids will take
what information they have to whomever to have you arrested, etc.309 Al-
though I would get no money if you were in jail-you wouldn't also be living
freely as if you did nothing wrong."31 Shortly thereafter during the media-
tion session, the parties settled their property matters. 31' Following the
court's adoption of the mediation agreement, the husband sought relief from
the agreement alleging it was procured by extortion.1 2 Although the trial
court recognized the extortionate nature of the note, it declined to grant relief
determining that the agreement did not result from the wife's demands." 3
The court of appeal reversed and remanded, finding:
In this case, the wife's "wake-up call", which demanded the hus-
band either give in to her demands or go to jail, was clearly extor-
tionate and her presentation of the extorted agreement to the court
was a fraud on the court making the trial court an instrument of her
extortion. Mrs. Cooper should not profit from her actions. Nor
should this Court, or any court, ignore them.
314
307. Id. at 1098.
308. Id. at 1099.
309. 750 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 712.
313. Id. at 711.
314. Cooper, 750 So. 2d at 713.
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Neither will courts ignore parties' alleged fraudulent actions.3" 5 In
Gostyla v. Gostyla, the wife alleged that the former husband lied under oath
during the final hearing about matters not covered in the mediation agree-
ment, which the court approved and incorporated into its final judgment.316
The court of appeal found the trial court erred in denying the wife's motion
to set aside the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, and remanded for
an evidentiary hearing.3"7 A party who sufficiently alleges intrinsic fraud in a
motion to set aside a dissolution of marriage is entitled to a hearing on the
merits.318
Courts may also vacate mediation agreements and grant hearings for re-
lief from judgment based on parties' misrepresentation." 9 The court prop-
erly vacated the mediation settlement agreement when the evidence demon-
strated the former wife made false statements concerning a material fact,
knew the representation was false, intended the representation to induce reli-
ance by her former husband, and the former husband was injured by his reli-
ance on her representation."2 Similarly, a judgment debtor was entitled to a
hearing on his motion for relief from judgment when the creditor represented
the debtor defaulted on an obligation in their mediation agreement, but mis-
represented the true state of affairs to the court.321
C. Mediation Agreements May Not Violate the Law
Although parties may decide matters that judges and juries would not,
and may be creative in crafting resolutions unique to their needs, there are
some decisions they are not authorized to make. "The right to claim federal
income tax exemptions under provisions of the parties' marital settlement
agreement is one of law, not of fact." '322 Congress delegates to the Internal
Revenue Service the authority to interpret tax law and to prescribe rules and
regulations for that purpose.323 Congress specifically permits affected tax-
payers, through the exercise of private contract rights, to claim the depend-
315. Johnson v. Johnson, 738 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (granting the
wife leave to amend her motion to set aside the final judgment of dissolution of marriage to
allege fraud with greater particularity or have an evidentiary hearing on the merits).
316. 708 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
317. d. at 676.
318. Id. at 675.
319. Still v. Still, 835 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
320. Id.
321. Maresca v. Olivio, 819 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
322. Hoelzle v. Shapiro, 736 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
323. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2003).
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ency exemption.324 However, federal law prohibits the parties from agreeing
on head of household,3 25 dependent care credit,3 26 or earned income credit.327
Federal law does allow the parties to designate "that separate maintenance
payments are nondeductible by the payor and excludible from the gross in-
come of the payee., 328 Construing the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury
Regulations, the Supreme Court of Florida recently held that state courts may
order "that alimony payments... [be] excluded from the gross income of the
payee and not deducted by the payor.
'3 29
Bankruptcy matters, also governed by federal law, may not be decided
by parties or adjudicated by state judges based on state contract law. Bank-
ruptcy judges are not bound by parties' or state judges' characterizations of
obligations for purposes of determining dischargeability and exemptions.330
Nonetheless, bankruptcy judges may consider parties' unmet obligations in
state cases when determining bankruptcy matters.33 ' A party's failure to
comply with provisions in a mediation agreement incorporated into a final
judgment may evince fraud denying the debtor a general discharge in bank-
ruptcy.
332
State law also limits parties in the decisions they may make regarding
their children. Courts are the final authority on child custody and child sup-
port, considering the best interests of the child as the overriding factor.333 A
trial court may set an agreement aside if it is not in the best interests of the
children, and must admit evidence relevant to the best interests standard.334
Therefore, mediation agreement provisions having to do with child support
324. Hoelzle, 736 So. 2d at 1209 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 152 (e)(2)(A) (2000)). To claim the
dependency exemption, one must qualify. See I.R.C. §§ 151, 152 (2003) (listing the basic
rules for qualifying for the dependency exemption).
325. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2003) (listing head of household status which is based on principal
place of abode).
326. See I.R.C. § 21(e)(5) (2003) (listing the rules as to which parent qualifies for taking
the dependent care credit).
327. Hoelzle, 736 So. 2d at 1209; see I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A) (2003) (listing the rules as to
which parent qualifies for taking the earned income tax credit). There is also a child tax
credit. See I.R.C. § 24(c)(1)(A) (2003) (listing the rules as to which parent qualifies for taking
the child tax credit).
328. Rykiel v. Rykiel, 838 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Rykiel v. Rykiel, 795 So.
2d 90, 93 n.l (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-1T, A-8)); see also I.R.C.
§ 71(b)(1)(B) (2003).
329. Rykiel, 838 So. 2d at 511-12.
330. In re Ellertson, 252 B.R. 831, 833 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
331. Rykiel, 838 So. 2d at 511-12.
332. See Shingledecker v. Shingledecker, 242 B.R. 80 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
333. See Wayno v. Wayno, 756 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
334. See Feliciano v. Feliciano, 674 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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and visitation are not subject to the same enforceability as alimony and mari-
tal property provisions.335 Further, the court has an obligation to consider the
availability and propriety of health insurance for the parties' minor children
even if the parties did not include such a provision in their mediation agree-
ment.336 Additionally, courts are not bound by parents' mediation agree-
ments as to reunification with their children. 337 "The ultimate determination
on reunification would be for the trial court.
33 8
Courts must also follow the strict procedural requirements and findings
set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida before permitting Human Leuko-
cyte Antigen ("HLA") testing even when the parties have agreed to the test-
ing in their mediation agreement. 339 "Once children are born legitimate, they
have a right to maintain that status both factually and legally if doing so is in
their best interests. '340 Additionally, the child's father has an "unmistakable
interest in maintaining the unimpugned relationship with his child., 34' The
courts' obligation to protect children extends to non-domestic relations cases.
In Hernandez v. United Contractors Corp., the children's mother settled a
wrongful death action on their behalf with the workers' compensation carrier
at mediation.3 42 "No guardian was appointed to represent the children in the
workers' compensation proceeding. Absent a determination that the settle-
ment was in the minor children's best interests, the settlement was inva-
lid. 34
3
D. Mutual Mistake and Lack of Consideration
In a recent case of first impression, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
addressed the issue of "whether the [mediation] privilege applies where there
335. Id.
336. See Butler v. Butler, 622 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
337. L.F. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 837 So. 2d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
338. Id.
339. Ownby v. Ownby, 639 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The husband
brought a dissolution of marriage action which by order of the court went to mediation. Id. at
136. During mediation, the parties entered into an agreement stipulating to HLA blood testing
to determine the paternity of the youngest of their six children. Id. The husband contends he
is the biological father of the six children, and further contends that even if he is not the bio-
logical father of the youngest child, he is the legal father because the parties considered him to
be the father. Id.
340. Id. at 137 (quoting Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 307
(Fla. 1993)).
341. Ownby,639So.2dat 137.
342. 766 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
343. Id. at 1252.
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has been a mutual mistake in a settlement agreement., 344 Following media-
tion, the parties settled a suit for specific performance. 34 5 The seller sought
relief from the settlement agreement claiming it contained a $600,000 cleri-
cal error.346 Accordingly, the seller appealed the trial court's decision "that
the statutory mediation privilege of confidentiality precluded evidence as to
what occurred in mediation, leaving seller without the means to prove that
there had been such an error." 317 Acknowledging that confidentiality is nec-
essary to the mediation process, the court of appeal found that once the par-
ties in mediation have signed an agreement, the reasons to retain confidenti-
ality are not as compelling.348 Addressing the constitutional right to go to
court to resolve disputes, the court said,
We cannot imagine that the legislature intended that a party to a
contract reached after mediation should not have the same access
to the courts to correct a $600,000 mutual mistake, as a party en-
tering into the same contract outside of mediation. We therefore
hold that the privilege does not bar evidence as to what occurred at
mediation under the facts in this case.349
Within two months of deciding its first case using mutual mistake as a
basis for correcting a mediation agreement, the same court decided a second
case involving the same issue. In Feldman v. Kritch, the parties reached
settlement at their second mediation.35" The agreement provided: "State
Farm to pay plaintiff $75,000 by 2:00 p.m. on 7/20/01. Plaintiff to execute
full release and file dismissal with prejudice."35' State Farm filed a motion to
set aside the settlement agreement claiming that the $75,000 was to be offset
by the $40,000 State Farm had already paid to Feldman; Feldman filed a
motion to enforce the settlement.352 The court of appeal concluded:
344. D.R. Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A. of W. Palm Beach, 819 So. 2d. 971, 973 (Fla
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
345. ld
346. ld at 972.
347. Id.
348. Interestingly, section 61.183(3) of the Florida Statutes, providing the confidentiality
privilege for dissolution of marriage matters, reads: "Each party to a mediation proceeding
has a privilege during and after the proceeding to refuse to disclose and to prevent another
from disclosing communications made during the proceeding, whether or not the contested
issues are successfully resolved." FLA. STAT. § 61.183(3) (2002). Perhaps mutual mistake
will be differently interpreted in dissolution of marriage cases.
349. D.R. Lakes, Inc., 819 So. 2d at 974.
350. 824 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
351. Id.
352. Id.
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"[b]ecause State Farm claimed that there was a mutual mistake, the statutory
privilege protecting the confidentiality of all oral and written communica-
tions, other than the executed settlement agreement, should not apply. 353
Further, the court determined that the plain language of the agreement was
unambiguous and evidence adduced at hearing showed no offset of $40,000
was discussed during the mediation.354 Therefore, the court found that any
mistake was a unilateral mistake made by State Farm.35 5 "It is never the role
of the trial court to rewrite a contract to make it more reasonable for one of
the parties or to relieve a party from what turns out to be a bad bargain."35 6
D.R. Lakes and Feldman represent a new line of cases which may sig-
nificantly and negatively impact the future of mediation. Mere allegation of
mutual mistake should not be sufficient to eviscerate the mediation privilege.
When applicable, scrivener's error should be utilized to allow for limited
inquiry focusing exclusively on the alleged error.357 If both parties agreed
there had been mutual mistake, court determination would likely be unneces-
sary. When only one party claims the mutual mistake, difficulty of proof
exists, along with the potential for abuse.358 Parties to mediation share in-
formation with each other to allow for better understanding of their respec-
tive positions and goals. They do not share the information with the expecta-
tion that an allegation of mutual mistake will eradicate the privilege and al-
low third parties to subsequently gain access to communications meant to
remain between the mediating parties.
If participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of every-
thing that transpires during [mediation] sessions then counsel of
necessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious,
tightlipped, non-committal manner more suitable to poker players
353. Id. at 276 (citing FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2000); D.R. Lakes, Inc., 819 So. 2d at
971)).
354. Feldman, 824 So. 2d at 277.
355. Id.
356. Id. (quoting Barakat v. Broward County Hous. Auth., 771 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
357. In Haffa v. Haffa, discussed supra Section lI.D., the court directed the mediator to
testify, but limited inquiry to the alleged scrivener's error-the number of shares of stock to
be transferred from the husband to the wife. Case No. 93-3422-FL12 (Fla. I Ith Cir. Ct.
1994).
358. See generally Deason, supra note 17. A party may easily destroy the other parties'
confidentiality privilege by merely alleging mutual mistake if the court then admits evidence
and allows testimony that would otherwise be confidential. Bad faith allegations of mutual
mistake to get the court to hear such testimony will undermine parties' faith in the confidenti-
ality of the process.
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in a high-stakes game than to adversaries attempting to arrive at a
just resolution of a civil dispute.35 9
While it is not possible to guarantee that everything will be confidential,
it is reasonable and necessary for parties and their attorneys to "know" what
will and will not be considered confidential. Increased uncertainty as to the
application of the mediation privilege will likely have a chilling effect on
communications during the mediation process.
Twelve years prior to the decisions addressing mutual mistake, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal used nudum pactum (lack of consideration)
as a basis for setting aside a mediation agreement.3 16 In Leseke v. Nutaro, the
parties attended court-ordered mediation, and reached an agreement which
provided: "If Dr. Kramer indicates the Plaintiff has a herniation of C5-6 and
C6-7 the Defendants agree to re-evaluate the case. If Dr. Kramer indicates
no problems at C5-6 and C6-7 the Plaintiff will accept $40,000.00., '36' The
District Court of Appeal found the trial court erred in enforcing the settle-
ment based on Dr. Kramer's report, as the report did not indicate "no prob-
lems" at the specified cervical region.3 62 Further, it found the agreement to
be wholly lacking in consideration, for while Leseke was obligated to a term
of the agreement, Nutaro could take whatever evaluative action it chose.363
The facts of the Leseke decision do not support the finding of nudum pactum.
Having found that the doctor's report did not indicate what was required to
enforce the agreement, the court need not have reached the consideration
issue. Here, the parties were involved in litigation, had access to discovery,
were represented by counsel, and participated in a mediation session with a
neutral, trained mediator. The agreement may have been ill-advised for Le-
seke, but it was the deal she made with the advice of counsel. Nutaro agreed
to reevaluate under specific circumstances. This agreement constituted con-
sideration. If Leseke wanted more than a mere obligation to reevaluate, the
agreement needed to be written with greater specificity. Parties and attor-
neys drafting mediation agreements must remember to dot their "i's" and
cross their "t's.
' 364
359. Deason, supra note 17, at 36 (quoting Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Contain-
ers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979)).
360. Leseke v. Nutaro, 567 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
361. Id. at 949-50.
362. Id. at 950.
363. Id.
364. In City of Delray Beach v. Keiser, 699 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
Judge May wrote, "This appeal highlights the necessity of dotting 'i's' and crossing 't's' or, in
other words, 'details-details."' Id.
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VI. PROCEDURAL AND RELATED MATTERS
A. Access to the Courts
A trial court's referral of a case to mediation neither denies parties their
constitutional right to be heard in court, nor illegally delegates judicial au-
thority to a nonjudicial entity.365 In Kurtz v. Kurtz, a petition for writ of cer-
tiorari, the former husband challenged "a post-dissolution order which, by
application of local administrative order, defers judicial consideration of his
motion for contempt and a visitation schedule, pending family mediation."3
The court of appeal found the order withstood the husband's challenge for it
merely deferred ruling on his motion until after family mediation, and
"[s]urely [did] not rise to the level of a denial of a constitutional right con-
templated by article I, section 21 [of the Florida Constitution]. 367
Similarly, the trial court's order did not violate Article V of the Florida
Constitution as an illegal delegation of judicial responsibility, for the issues
remain for hearing before the trial court should the parties decide not to reach
agreement at mediation.3 68 "Mediation is not a binding court proceeding. If
it is unsuccessful, the parties return to the court for further proceedings. 369
In determining whether a matter is appropriate for mediation, courts will
look to the issues raised by the parties, not the title of the pleading. The for-
mer husband's issues involved visitation rights, identified by the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure and two applicable administrative orders, as appro-
priate for referral to mediation.37
365. Kurtz v. Kurtz, 538 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
366. Id. at 893.
367. Id. at 894; see also FLA. CONST. Art. 1, § 21 (2002).
368. Kurtz, 538 So. 2d at 894.
369. Id. at 894-95.
370. Kurtz, 538 So. 2d at 894.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.740 expressly authorizes the trial court to refer parental re-
sponsibility issues to family mediators. Mediation under this rule is intended to expedite mat-
ters involving issues of parental responsibility. Rule 2.050 of the Florida Rules of Judicial
Administration authorizes local rules and administrative orders on matters of court concern. In
accordance with these rules, the chief judge of the Broward Circuit Court entered two adminis-
trative orders on family mediation which are involved here.
Id. at 894. Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure were adopted in 1995 after the Supreme
Court of Florida determined that separate procedural rules were appropriate for family court.
See generally In re Fla. Rules of Family Court Procedure, 607 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1992). Rule
12.740 of the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure now governs the referral of family law
matters to mediation. It is similar to its predecessor, rule 1.740 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, which was deleted in 1995. Id.
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Alternative dispute resolution processes should be crafted "without cre-
ating an unreasonable barrier to the traditional court system. 37' In Jackson
v. Jackson, parties in a dissolution of marriage action entered into a media-
tion/arbitration agreement.312 "That agreement provided that the controversy
between the parties was to be resolved exclusively by means of mediation or
arbitration and that the parties waived any right to litigate their claim." '373
The parties mediated and their matters were ostensibly concluded.3 74 None-
theless, eight months later the wife filed a petition for dissolution of mar-
riage. 375 The husband did not timely respond to the summons and complaint,
relying on the parties' agreement and the drafting attorneys' statements that
the agreement precluded them from pursuing civil action.376 Additionally,
the husband stated that the wife advised him she intended to withdraw the
lawsuit and proceed with arbitration.377 The court of appeal found excusable
neglect on the husband's part, reversed the trial court's denial of the motion
to set aside the default, and remanded to the trial court for proceedings con-
sistent with their opinion.378
Mediation parties must be given appropriate notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to court approval of mediation agreements. In Vance v.
Thomas, an incarcerated individual (Vance) participated in mediation by
phone.379 He denied agreeing to a settlement and no settlement papers were
executed. 38" Although there was no finding by the judge or representation by
Vance's counsel that Vance agreed to the settlement, the only hearing notice
sent to him regarded payment of fees and costs to his attorney. 381' The court
of appeal found the notice of hearing for attorney's fees inadequate notice for
the trial court to have conducted a hearing to enforce the alleged settlement
agreement.382
Similarly, an insurer was denied due process by not having an opportu-
nity to be heard prior to the court approving a mediation settlement agree-
371. Committee Notes 1994 Amendment, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710. ("The Supreme Court
Committee on Mediation and Arbitration Rules encourages crafting a combination of dispute
resolution processes without creating an unreasonable barrier to the traditional court system.")
372. 542 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
373. id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 482.
376. Id.
377. Jackson, 542 So. 2d at 482.
378. Id. at 482-83.
379. Vance v. Thomas, 829 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 320.
2003]
135
: Nova Law Review 28, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
NOVA LAWREVIEW
ment for the benefit of an insured." 3 A health insurance company sought to
intervene in a products liability lawsuit, which had been settled by mediation
before the court approved the settlement and dismissed the case.3" The dis-
trict court of appeal vacated the denial of the motion to intervene and the
order approving the settlement, finding: "Humana has demonstrated a right
to intervene and to at least be heard before distribution of the judgment or
settlement proceeds.385 Perhaps Humana's intervention will not change the
outcome, but at least Humana will have had the opportunity to be
heard .... 386 However, an insurance company which was present at media-
tion and had actual notice of the settlement was not entitled to summary
judgment in its favor based on insured's failure to provide written notice of
and obtain consent to the proposed settlement.387 Genuine issues of material
fact as to whether State Farm waived the settlement provisions and was
prejudiced by the failure to obtain its consent precluded summary judg-
ment.388
Appellate courts have been kind to petitioners who request the wrong
relief. "[I]f a party seeks an improper remedy 'the cause shall be treated as if
the proper remedy had been sought."' '3 9 In Croteau v. Operator Service
Company of South Florida, petitioners sought a writ of common law certio-
rari from the trial court's order denying their motion to enforce a mediated
agreement. 39' The court of appeal concluded that certiorari was not the
proper remedy.39' However, determining that the order denying the motion
to enforce the settlement agreement was a partial final judgment, the court
found it had jurisdiction to review the judgment.392
Parties seeking to appeal enforcement of mediation agreements must
provide the appellate court with either a trial transcript or proper substitute to
allow the court to evaluate allegations that the trial court erred.393 In Bartel
v. J & A Balboa Enterprises, Inc., Bartel appealed the trial court's order to
383. Humana Health Plans v. Lawton, 675 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
384. Id. at 1383.
385. Id. at 1385.
386. Id.
387. Gray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 734 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
388. Id.
389. Croteau v. Operator Serv. Co. of S. Fla., 721 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (citing FLA. R. App. P. 9.040(c)).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Bartel v. J & A Balboa Enters., Inc., 703 So. 2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
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enforce a mediation settlement agreement.394 The court of appeal elected to
treat the appeal as a writ of certiorari, and denied the writ.395 Bartel then
filed an appeal alleging that the attorney who represented her in the media-
tion that led to the settlement agreement was guilty of misconduct and mis-
representation.396 Since Bartel raised factual allegations, and failed to pro-
vide the court with a transcript or an appropriate substitute, she was unable to
establish error and her appeal necessarily failed.397
B. Use of and Access to Alternative Dispute Resolution
Parties must mediate when ordered by the court to do SO, 39 8 and may
also mediate on their own initiative prior to, during, or subsequent to litiga-
tion.39 When parties reach a mediation agreement, one may not later claim it
was void ab initio because the agreement was entered into while litigation
was pending in a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce
terms in the agreement.4 °° In Patel v. Ashco Enterprises, Inc., the parties
entered into a mediation agreement while the case was pending in county
court. 40 ' The agreement provided that, "if Patel breached the agreement, the
case would be transferred to the circuit court and a judgment would be en-
tered against Patel ... ."" Following Patel's failure to make the first pay-
ment, the case was transferred to circuit court, and the court enforced the
agreement.4 3 The court of appeal found that the trial court properly enforced
the mediation agreement even though it was executed while litigation was
pending in county court and the county court's jurisdiction was subject to
challenge. 41 "While a settlement agreement may be the basis upon which a
judgment may be entered, it is also a contract between the parties, the en-
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700(a) (2003). A judge "may enter an order referring all or any part
of a contested civil matter to mediation .. " Id. A party may move to dispense with or defer
mediation. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700(b) (c). For matters excluded from mediation, see FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1.710(b).
399. Parties may file a written stipulation to mediate, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700(a), or one party
may request the court to refer the case to mediation. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(2)(a) (2002). Par-
ties may also mediate without court orders.
400. See Patel v. Ashco Enters., Inc., 711 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 241.
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forceability of which is governed by the laws of contract."'"0 5 Parties seeking
to enforce mediation agreements may bring independent enforcement ac-
tions."'
The laws of contract also govern the parties' obligation to submit to ar-
bitration, and may include the condition precedent that the parties first medi-
ate.4°7 In Kemiron Atlantic, Inc. v. Aguakem International, Inc., the parties'
agreement read: "In the event that a dispute cannot be settled between the
parties, the matter shall be mediated within fifteen (15) days after receipt of
notice by either party that the other party requests the mediation of a dispute
pursuant to this paragraph."''48 The agreement also provided: "[I]n the event
that [a] dispute cannot be settled through mediation, the parties shall submit
the matter to arbitration within ten (10) days after receipt of notice by either
party."' ° Under the plain language of the agreement, a party had to request
mediation and provide notice of the request to the other party."' If the dis-
putes were not resolved in mediation, a party must then provide notice of
intent to pursue arbitration to trigger the arbitration clause.4 1'
Mediation may be required to move a case forward. It is not meant as a
dilatory tactic. In Paz v. Fidelity National Ins. Co., Paz appealed a circuit
court's decision entering summary judgment in favor of Fidelity.4 2 Paz had
submitted medical bills for injuries sustained in an automobile accident to
Fidelity, her insurer for personal injury protection benefits, demanding pay-
ment pursuant to statute within thirty days. 413 Following Fidelity's decision
to question the submitted charges and to demand arbitration or mediation,
Paz filed a bad faith action alleging her insurer breached its duty to act fairly
and honestly, and sought to delay or avoid payment by demanding mediation
and arbitration although neither was available. 4" The court of appeal found
the trial court erred as a matter of law, for Fidelity did not pay the damages
due within the required time frame. 415 "Additionally, summary judgment
was improper where review of the record shows that there are genuine issues
of [material] fact remaining as to the allegations that Fidelity routinely de-
405. Patel, 711 So. 2d at 240.
406. T.K.M. v. E.H., 844 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
407. Kemiron Atlantic, Inc. v. Aguakem Int'l, Inc., 290 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir.
2002).
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1291
411. Id.
412. 712 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
413. Id. at 807-08.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 809.
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mands mediation and arbitration, as a means of delaying or avoiding pay-
ment.41
6
As some parties may seek to misuse mediation to delay legal obliga-
tions, some non-parties seek access to mediation proceedings to gain infor-
mation about governmental entities. In a case involving Lee County, the
City of Fort Myers, and the City of Cape Coral, a reporter "filed a motion for
limited intervention and to compel the mediation hearings to be open to the
public and the media."4"' The trial court granted the motion to intervene, but
denied the motion to open the mediation proceedings. 4 8 Further, the judge
amended the mediation order to allow the parties to send representatives to
mediation who did not have full authority to settle.4 '9 The court of appeal did
not decide the significant issue of whether the "Sunshine Law"42 applies to
mediation proceedings when public bodies are the parties.42' The court held
"that the narrow scope of the mediation proceedings in this case does not
give rise to a substantial delegation affecting the decision-making function of
any board, commission, agency, or authority sufficient to require that this
mediation proceeding be open to the public.4 22
C. Obligations of Judges, Attorneys, and Paralegals
Mediators should do the mediating, and judges the judging.423 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal offered this caveat in a case involving the former
baseball player Ted Williams.424 During a case management conference, the
judge offered to mediate the case, "provided ... all of the parties and their
attorneys agreed that they would not use the trial judge's attempt to mediate
the case as basis for disqualification., 425 During the mediation, the judge
said to the defendant, "there'll always be people like [you] around, but let's
face it, there's only one Ted Williams. 4 26 The defendant believed that the
416. Id.
417. News-Press Publ'g Co. v. Lee County, 570 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (2002).
421. News-Press Publ'g Co., 570 So. 2d. at 1327.
422. Id.
423. Evans v. State, 603 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
424. Id. at 16.
425. Id.
426. Id. Additionally, when the defendant, Antonucci, presented his settlement figure, the
judge advised him to "get real." Idat 16 n.3.
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judge was prejudiced against him.42 7 Consequently, the defendant's attorney
filed a motion to disqualify the judge based on statements made by the judge
during mediation.428 Shortly thereafter, the judge adjudicated him guilty of
criminal contempt, finding the attorney lied when he agreed not to move to
disqualify the judge for mediating the case.4 29 Reversing the attorney's con-
viction of direct criminal contempt, the court of appeal directed that a judg-
ment of not guilty be entered.4 30 Additionally, the court advised:
If a judge decides to mediate a case with the consent of all con-
cerned parties, the judge should act only as a settlement judge for
another judge who will hear and try the matter in the event [the]
mediation fails, such as in the situation where a retired judge me-
diates a case but does not try the case.
Knowing a "mediator will not be deciding the case,.., the parties are
free to discuss ...the ramifications of settling a particular dispute as op-
posed to litigating it."' 32 "In contrast, the judge's role is to decide the con-
troversy fairly and impartially, consistent with the established rule of law. In
this regard, to paraphrase Socrates: Four things belong to a judge; to hear
courteously; to consider soberly; to decide impartially; and to answer
wisely. 43
3
Mediation does not displace judges' statutory obligation to rule on
claims. 434 In a dissolution of marriage action involving equitable distribution
of marital assets and debts, as well as attorney's fees, the judge dissolved the
marriage without ruling on the parties' claims.435 The court order, in relevant
part read: "The Husband/Petitioner and Wife/Respondent shall divide all of
their marital assets and liabilities equally. If the parties are unable to reach
agreement on their own as to a fair division then this matter shall be submit-
ted to mediation which shall be binding." 36 The court of appeal found that
the judge failed to carry out the statutory duties imposed on judges hearing
427. Evans, 603 So. 2d at 16 n.3.
428. Id. at 17.
429. Id. at 16.
430. Id. at 18. The court found the evidence did not support the judge's finding that appel-
lant had lied. Id. "The agreement not to seek recusal was limited to the trial judge acting as
mediator and not to the nature of any comments that the trial judge would make during the
mediation proceedings." Evans, 603 So. 2d at 17.
431. Id.,603 So. 2dat 17-18.
432. Id. at 17.
433. Id.
434. Chabotte v. Chabotte, 707 So. 2d 923, 924 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
435. Id.
436. Id.
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dissolution of marriage cases.4 37 The court was required to distribute both
marital and non-marital assets. 438 Furthermore, mediation allows the parties
self-determination. 43 If they choose not to reach agreement, there is no me-
diation agreement to be binding.4
The Code of Judicial Conduct limits the mediation functions judges
may ethically perform. The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, charged
with rendering advisory opinions interpreting the Code of Judicial Conduct
as applied to specific circumstances facing judges, stated that a judge may
not privately mediate the dissolution of his friends' marriage. 44' "Unless
there is an expressed law or court rule authorizing the judge's service as a
private mediator, a judge may not ethically mediate the dissolution of his/her
friends' marriage. 442
Attorneys must also know their obligations to the court and the parties
regarding mediation. Foremost, an attorney should be aware that merely
filing a motion for mediation will not defeat case dismissal for lack of prose-
cution. "[A] motion for mediation conference, standing alone and without
any follow-up activity during the subsequent six-month period, is not record
activity implemented to advance the case forward to a conclusion on the
merits. ' 443 To avoid having a case dismissed for failure to prosecute, an at-
torney must proceed with the mediation following a notice, and if a motion
to dismiss hearing is set, must show good cause why the case should remain
pending.4 44
With virtually every civil case going to mediation prior to trial, media-
tors and attorneys are increasingly facing conflict of interest issues. Attorney
mediators and their law partners confront ethical directives of both profes-
sions when making difficult decisions regarding disqualification. A recent
case addresses "the standard to be applied in determining disqualification of
a law firm when a member of the firm previously acted as a mediator in the
pending dissolution proceedings."" 5 In Matluck v. Matuck, the former wife
filed a petition of certiorari to quash the trial court's order denying her mo-
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.230.
440. "Decision-Making. Decisions made during a mediation are to be made by the parties.
A mediator shall not make substantive decisions for any party. A mediator is responsible for
assisting the parties in reaching informed and voluntary decisions while protecting their right
of self-determination." FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.310(a).
441. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2002-01.
442. Id.
443. Heinz v. Watson, 615 So. 2d 750, 753 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
444. Id.
445. Matluck v. Matluck, 825 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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tion to disqualify her former husband's attorney.446 The parties had mediated
during post-dissolution proceedings, and the mediator had received highly
confidential information from the former wife and her counsel during the
mediation.447 The mediator, subsequently, formed a law firm with the attor-
ney who was representing the former husband on the same post-dissolution
448matters.
The former wife urged the court of appeal "to extend Rule 4-1.10(b) to
the law firm of a mediator who received confidential information during the
mediation process. 49 The court agreed: "Considering the broad scope of
information protected by Rule 4-1.10(b), the values inherent in preserving
the confidences of parties in mediation, and maintaining the integrity of the
mediation process itself, we can see no reason not to apply this rule to a me-
diator and the mediator's law firm.''45° Other courts and the Florida Mediator
Qualifications Panel are in accord. 451 "[I]t is inappropriate for the mediator to
represent either party in any dissolution proceeding or in any matter arising
out of the subject mediation." 452Additionally, a law firm will be subject to
disqualification from representing a client when following unsuccessful me-
diation, the firm hired the mediator.453
However, attorneys who seek to withdraw as counsel of record due to
conflicts of interest, will not necessarily gain court approval to do so. In
Billings, Cunningham, Morgan & Boatwright, P.A v. Isom, the law firm
moved to withdraw from representing a client who sought to set aside the
agreement reached during mediation, alleging mis-advice by the firm.454 The
client, Isom, asserted, "that a former associate of the law firm had advised
him to sign the settlement and release, but assured Isom the documents were
446. Id.
447. Id. at 1073.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 1073.
Rule 4-1.10(b) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct provides: When a lawyer be-
comes associated with a firm, [the] firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm of which the lawyer was associated,
had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and
about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) that is
material to the matter.
Matluck, 825 So. 2d at 1072.
450. Id. at 1073.
451. See id.
452. Id. (quoting Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 94-003). The Mediator
Qualifications Advisory Panel (MQAP) has been renamed the Mediator Ethics Advisory
Committee (MEAC).
453. Id. at 1073-74.
454. 701 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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not final and would not bar further settlement discussions." 4" The trial court
denied the firm's motion to withdraw, considering the client's allegation of
mis-advice, duration of representation, and the client's inability to obtain
new counsel.4 56 "[A] trial court has the authority to order continued repre-
sentation, even when potential ethical conflicts are presented. 457 Its decision
to deny a motion to withdraw will not be disturbed, absent a clear abuse of
discretion."458
A trial court also has the authority to award attorney's fees to enforce a
mediation agreement reached in a court-ordered mediation.459 "Rule 1.730(c)
[of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure] provides that a court may impose
sanctions, including attorney's fees, against a party who fails to perform un-
der a settlement agreement reached in court-ordered mediation."" Signifi-
cantly, even though a written mediation order is customary, Rule 1.730 does
not require a written order.46' "A court's oral order is valid and binds the
parties even though a written order has not been entered. 462 The trial court
has discretion to determine whether an attorney should be awarded fees un-
der this rule.463
Non-attorneys attending mediation sessions may not hold themselves
out as attorneys or engage in the unauthorized practice of law. 4 In Florida
Bar v. Neiman, the Florida Bar alleged that Neiman had "repeatedly engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law over a period of approximately seven
years.,4 65 The referee's detailed findings included that Neiman actively par-
ticipated in presenting clients' cases at mediation sessions. "The referee
further found that Neiman engaged in the unlicensed practice of law based
upon the referee's finding that no attorney had an'y meaningful role in the
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Lazy Flamingo, USA, Inc. v. Greenfield, 834 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2003). The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's decision rejecting appellant's claim for
attorney's fees based on the original contract that gave rise to the underlying litigation and
section 57.105 of the 2001 Florida Statutes. Id. at 414. It reversed the trial court's decision
not to award fees based on rule 1.730(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and re-
manded the case to allow consideration of its ruling. Id. at 415.
460. Id. at 414.
461. Jd. at415.
462. Greenfield, 834 So. 2d at 415 (citing Knott v. Knott, 395 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
463. Id. (citing Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 674 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
464. See Florida Bar v. Neiman, 816 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2002).
465. Id. at 588.
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development or settlement of several of the cases."466 Having determined
that Neiman engaged in the unlicensed practice of law, the referee recom-
mended, and the court approved, that Neiman be enjoined from numerous
activities, including speaking on behalf of third parties at mediation even
with an attorney present, and appearing on behalf of third parties at media-
tion without the attorney present for whom he was employed.467
VII. CONCLUSION
Mediation has come of age and taken a place in Florida's legal system.
Our extensive body of case law over a relatively brief period of time high-
lights mediation's significant role in the resolution of disputes. Florida's
comprehensive mediation law necessarily includes ethical rules for media-
tors, rules of procedure, and statutory law. As the law further develops, me-
diators and lawyers will need to stay abreast of developments in the field.
This article is offered as a beginning in the discussion of mediation case law.
The Dispute Resolution Center in Tallahassee remains an excellent source of
continuing information and education. The Center holds annual conferences,
and publishes the Resolution Report to keep interested individuals apprized
of developments in the mediation field.46
Mediation's incorporation into the legal system should not signal its as-
similation. Mediation has more to offer than the mere resolution of disputes.
Mediating parties are in the unique position of making their own decisions
and structuring their own agreement with the assistance of a trained media-
tor. They rely on the confidentiality of the process to allow them to share the
information they need to understand each other and identify and evaluate
settlement options. They are also in the unique position of holding a privi-
lege to maintain the confidentiality of the process. The extent of the confi-
dentiality privileges should be clarified, and the courts should continue their
role in maintaining the shield of confidentiality. As we rightfully utilize me-
diation as a dispute resolution process, we must continue to recognize its
uniqueness and seek to preserve its process. After all, it has just come of
age. With a nourishing environment and some benign neglect, it may yet
flourish and increasingly serve not only the legal system, but society at large.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 594, 599.
468. Case and Comment, a regular feature in The Resolution Report written by Perry Itkin,
provides information about new significant mediation cases. The Resolution Report is the
newsletter published by the Dispute Resolution Center, a joint program of the Supreme Court
of Florida and the Florida State University College of Law. Perry Itkin, The Resolution re-
port, available at http://www.tfapm.org/Dreldrc-newsletter.shtml (last visited Oct. 1I, 2003).
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JURY (DIS)SERVICE: WHY PEOPLE AVOID JURY
DUTY AND WHAT FLORIDA CAN DO ABOUT IT
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A JUROR'S PRAYER
Dear God, please give me an excuse in a hurry,
Something good to keep me off this stupid jury.
My job! My kids! My sick Aunt Bea!
Who could survive even a day without me?
And you should know, by the way, I'm deaf in one ear,
So when a witness testifies, I won't be able to hear.
Here comes the defense lawyer, eyes right on me.
"Just because my client's been charged, do you think he's guilty?"
"Actually, I do," I say, trying hard not to smirk.
"If not of this crime, then because he's a jerk!"
But be warned, Mr. State Attorney, don't think I'll help you,
You see, I hate the police, informants, and prosecutors, too!
Now is the time, the voir dire estfini,
Please, God, don't let them pick me.
Did I mention I'm scheduled for brain surgery?
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I. INTRODUCTION
Unfortunately, the sentiments expressed in the Juror's Prayer seem
prevalent among jurors in Florida. Many citizens do not want to serve on
juries and will do almost anything to get out of it. How many times has a
friend, family member, or client called you with the question: "I just received
a jury summons, what do I need to say to get out of it?"
Others take a different approach: they just blow it off. Take former
baseball star Pete Rose, for example. Twice Rose failed to respond to a jury
summons in Palm Beach County.' Did he think nobody would notice? But
before you judge Mr. Rose too harshly, consider this fact: only one in four
jurors was showing up in Palm Beach County at the time Mr. Rose was a no-
show.2 Given this pitiful response, who can blame Mr. Rose for thinking
jury service was optional?3
I. Nicole Sterghos Brochu, Thinking of Ignoring Jury Duty? Think Again, FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Sept. 18, 2000, at lB.
2. Id.
3. Id. Juror response rates have reached crisis levels in many courts throughout the
nation. According to the American Judicature Society, in some urban jurisdictions, fewer than
ten percent of all summoned citizens show up in court. See ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT,
IMPROVING CITIZEN RESPONSE TO JURY SUMMONSES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS vii
(Am. Judicature Soc'y 1998). Others have estimated that as many as two-thirds of the ap-
proximately fifteen million Americans summoned annually do not report for jury service. See
David Schneider, Jury Deliberations and the Need for Jury Reform: An Outsider's View, 36
JUDGES J. 23, 25 (1997). While a portion of this non-response rate is attributable to out-of-
date records and summonses that are mailed to the wrong addresses, many citizens simply
ignore their civic obligation and opportunity to serve. See Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury
System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas County, 54 SMU L. REV. 1813, 1815
(2001). For example, a recent joint study conducted by the Dallas Morning News and South-
em Methodist University found that in Dallas County, Texas, "at least 80% of the people
summoned each week for jury duty disregard their summonses and refuse to participate in the
system." Id.
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Why do so many people recoil at the mere mention of juror duty? It is
not, as one might expect, that there has been a decline in respect for the jury
system. To the contrary, according to an American Bar Association (ABA)
opinion poll, seventy-eight percent of the public rate our jury system as the
fairest method of determining guilt or innocence; sixty-nine percent consider
juries to be the most important part of the justice system.' Given this appar-
ent conflict, it is important to consider why so many Floridians seek to avoid
jury service, and to find ways to address their concerns.
This article examines some of the reasons behind the problem and of-
fers practical solutions. The bottom line is that Florida's jury service laws
need to be made more "user-friendly." Otherwise, Floridians will continue
to try to avoid jury service. When this happens, the rights of civil and crimi-
nal litigants are thwarted because they are not tried by a jury truly made up
of "their peers." Their peers are not on the jury. They are back at work.
II. IMPROVING JURY SERVICE
There are many ways to make jury service a more pleasant experience
for Florida's citizens. Some courts have focused on improving jury services
and facilities.' Other efforts have aimed at making jury service a more inter-
esting and active process.6 A Jury Innovations Committee convened by the
Supreme Court of Florida examined some of these issues.7 That Committee
was composed of appellate and circuit court judges, court administrators,
attorneys, and former jurors.8 In May of 2001, the Committee submitted a
final report to the Supreme Court of Florida, recommending forty-eight jury
service improvements in Florida.9
4. A.B.A., PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 6-7 (1998), available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/perceptions.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
5. See, e.g., James Needham, A Citizen's Suggestions for Minimum Standards for Jury
Facilities and Juror Treatment, 36 JUDGES J. No. 4, at 32-33 (1997) (suggesting ways to
improve treatment of jurors in the courthouse).
6. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Kourlis & John Leopold, Colorado Jury Reform, 29 COLO.
LAW. 21, 23 (2000); Janessa E. Shtabsky, Comment, A More Active Jury: Has Arizona Set
the Standard For Reform With Its New Jury Rules?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1009, 1011 (1996).
7. See generally FLA. JURY INNOVATIONS COMM., FINAL REPORT (2001), available at
http://www.flcourts.org/pubinfo/documents/JurylnnovationsFinalReport.pdf (last visited Apr.
12, 2003).
8. Id. at 2.
9. See generally id. The Supreme Court of Florida issued an Administrative Order on
October 17, 2003 adopting many of these recommendations and referring them to court com-
mittees and the Florida Legislature for action. See In re Final Report of Jury Innovations
Comm., Administrative Order No.AOSC03-41 (Fla. Oct. 17, 2003), available at
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Some jury improvements can and should be implemented by courts.
But, there are also certain measures that the legislature should take to safe-
guard the right to a representative jury. Florida should enact jury service
improvement legislation modeled after a "Jury Patriotism Act" recently de-
veloped by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), the na-
tion's largest bipartisan membership organization of state legislators, with
over 2,400 members nationwide."0 The Jury Patriotism Act would eliminate
certain disqualifications, exemptions, and flimsy hardship excuses that allow
many to avoid jury service." The Act also would lessen the burdens placed
on citizens that render them unable to serve, or discourage their service on
juries."
The Jury Patriotism Act finds support across the political spectrum.
Just a few of its supporters include the AFL-CIO, National Black Chamber
of Commerce, National Federation of Independent Business, and National
Association of Wholesaler-Distributors. Elected officials have responded to
this broad-based support. Within months after its development, laws based
on the model Jury Patriotism Act were enacted in Arizona, Louisiana, and
Utah. 3 In October 2003, legislation based on the Jury Patriotism Act was
endorsed by the Council of State Governments, a nonpartisan, nonprofit or-
ganization that seeks to foster excellence in state government.
A. Address the Loss of Income
One significant reason that people avoid jury duty is the financial bur-
den service may impose. Under current Florida law, people who do not re-
ceive compensation from their employers during jury duty receive fifteen
dollars per day during the first three days of service from the court." Any-
http://www.flcourts.org/pubinfo/summaries/briefs/03/03-41/Filed_10-17-2003_Administrative
Order.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
10. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., The Jury Patriotism Act: Making Jury Service More
Appealing and Rewarding to Citizens, at http://www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf0309.pdf (Apr.
2003).
11. AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, JURY PATRIOTISM ACT § 4(a)-(b), at
http://www.alec.org/viewpage.cfm?pgname=2.1 cc43 (last visited Sept. 4, 2003).
12. See id. at § 5-6.
13. See H.B. 2520, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2003) (signed by Gov. Janet Napoli-
tano on May 12, 2003); H.B. 324, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2003) (signed by Gov. Michael Leavitt on
Mar. 17, 2003); H.B. 2008 (La. 2003) (signed by Gov. Mike Foster on June 27, 2003). In the
2003 session, Representative Christopher Smith (D-Dist. 93) introduced a bill (H.B. 1441) in
the Florida Legislature based on the model Jury Patriotism Act.
14. See FLA. STAT. § 40.24(3)(b) (2002). Miami-Dade County currently requires em-
ployers located or residing in the county, and having over ten full-time employees, to pay their
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one who serves for more than three days is paid thirty dollars per day upon
the fourth day of jury service and thereafter.' 5 These amounts may barely
cover the daily cost of transportation, parking, and lunch, let alone support
the family of a juror who is not receiving other compensation during jury
service. The ABA has recognized that "[flew persons making more than
minimum wage can afford [the]... sudden and involuntary cut in pay im-
posed by jury service.' 16
The lack of available compensation may be particularly troublesome for
jurors selected to serve on lengthy civil trials. Although somewhere between
one-half and three-quarters of all trials conclude within three days, and very
few cases extend beyond ten days, jurors who find themselves called to serve
on the rare, lengthy trial may be subject to extreme financial hardship. 7
Lack of adequate compensation for jurors has several unfortunate re-
sults. Some jurors may opt to simply not show up in court. Those with jobs
who will lose their salary during jury service are likely to plead with the
court to be excused, particularly when the trial is expected to last several
days, weeks, or months. Many Florida courts must excuse from service
many laborers, salespersons, parents with childcare expenses, and profes-
sionals because of the economic hardship that they may suffer. 8 Those who
employees during the entire period ofjury service. See MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE §§
11-31, 11-32 (1998).
15. See FLA. STAT. § 40.24(4). Florida's juror compensation is about average when com-
pared to other states. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS 89 (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2002 Files/
2002_MainPage.html (stating that, in 1999, the average daily juror fee in state courts for less
than five days of service was just eighteen dollars and fifty three cents per day, and, after five
days, the average amount increased to twenty four dollars and twenty six cents per day). Id. at
90. Generally, juror compensation ranges from absolutely nothing on the first day of service
to forty dollars per day. Id. at 89; see, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 215 (Supp. 2003) (com-
pensating jurors fifteen dollars per day after the first day of service); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §§
521, 521-a (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2003) (requiring employers to pay up to forty dollars of
an employee's compensation for the first three days of jury service, with the state paying the
juror fee only to those jurors not receiving employer compensation, and increasing the fee by
six dollars when a trial extends more than thirty days). Federal courts throughout the country
pay jurors a forty dollar fee per day for their service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (b)(1) (1994).
16. A.B.A., STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE & MANAGEMENT 133 (1993).
17. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 165,
tbl. C-8 (2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/contents.html (finding that
seventy-five percent of all civil and criminal trials in the federal courts were completed within
three days and four percent extended beyond nine days during the twelve month period ending
September 30, 2002); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL TRIAL
CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, at 13 (1999), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf (finding that the median number of days in
jury trials in the nation's seventy-five largest counties was four days).
18. See STANDARDS RELATED TO JUROR USE & MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 133-34.
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remain in the jury pool are primarily those "who are not employed or whose
employer[s] will continue to pay their salary,"'9 and may be forced to make
an inequitable and unfair personal sacrifice. "Consequently, the basic de-
mocratic right to be tried by a jury of one's peers may [be largely illusory in
a system whose juries are] ... disproportionately composed of retired and
unemployed individuals, especially in lengthy trials."2 ° Such juries may be
non-diverse and unrepresentative of the community as a whole. 2' They also
may produce arbitrary results for plaintiffs, defendants, and prosecutors.
Equally important, many people who would like to serve on a jury, and have
both a right and obligation to do so, are not, in practice, able to participate.23
Better compensation of jurors may be the key to obtaining more repre-
sentative juries. As discussed above, loss of income is a primary reason why
some jurors do not appear in court or request an excuse from service. It is
equally clear that although jury participation is indeed a civic duty, jurors
should not bear an extraordinary financial loss for their service, particularly
when called to decide disputes between private parties.
"Ideally, [Florida] would be able to provide greater daily compensation
for jurors. After all, jury service is a civic obligation. In these times of tight
state budgets, however, significantly increasing the juror fee through pay-
ments out of the state treasury may not be a realistic option .... 24 Even as
long ago as 1993, the ABA recognized that "raising juror fees to compensate
citizens for their time at current wage levels would place a nearly impossible
19. See id.
20. Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 4 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528
(1975) (ruling that "the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the
community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial" and strik-
ing down the systematic exclusion of women from jury venires)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 22 ("The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and
remain inviolate."); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528 (1975) (ruling that "the selection of a petit jury
from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial" and striking down the systematic exclusion of women from
jury venires); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (ruling that use of peremptory
challenges to exclude African American jurors from petit juries unconstitutionally denied a
person participation in jury service because of his race under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 469 (1947) (holding that a state may not
deprive a class of citizens the right to serve on a jury, either by statute or by administrative
practices).
24. Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 4-5.
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burden on many financially hard-pressed jurisdictions." 25 "This observation
is no less true today. 26
In order to ensure that all people have the opportunity to serve on a jury,
the Jury Patriotism Act includes an innovative lengthy trial fund that would
make it less likely that working Floridians would be excused from jury ser-
vice when a civil trial is expected to last several days, weeks, or months.27
Although the number of jurors selected to serve on lengthy civil
trials is relatively small, those who find themselves in the jury box
on a long products liability, commercial litigation, or intellectual
property case may suffer severe financial hardship. Absent ex-
treme circumstances warranting the judge's intervention, these ju-
rors are required to serve for the entire trial, which may [be] sev-
eral weeks or months. While jurors indeed have a civic duty to
serve, there is a limit on how much an individual citizen can be
asked to sacrifice for the civil justice system, particularly when the
case involves a dispute between private parties. Adoption of a
Lengthy Trial Fund would lessen the hardship on Floridians who
serve on such trials.
28
The fund, which would be fully financed through a minimal court-filing
fee, would provide wage replacement or supplementation to jurors who serve
on civil trials lasting longer than three days. 29  These individuals would be
eligible to receive supplemental compensation from the fund "if they other-
wise would be excused from service due to financial hardship."3 Any juror
who is not fully compensated by his or her employer would be eligible for
25. STANDARDS RELATED TO JUROR USE & MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 134.
26. Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 5.
27. AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at § 6.
The ALEC model act does not provide wage replacement or supplementation for jurors se-
lected for criminal trials. In most states, citizens are generally summoned for petit jury service
and may then find themselves serving on either a civil or criminal matter. The authors recog-
nize that jurors selected to serve on lengthy criminal trials are subject to the same financial
strain as jurors selected for civil trials. However, the model act recognizes that civil litigants,
through their attorneys' appearance fees, should not be required to fund the criminal justice
system. That is a state obligation. Nor can criminal defendants or prosecutors be asked to
contribute to the lengthy trial fund. For this reason, states might consider providing special
compensation to jurors in lengthy criminal trials, but that reform is beyond the scope of
ALEC's model act.
Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 17 n. 65.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. Recently, the Michigan legislature adopted its own "Juror Compensation Reim-
bursement Fund." Like the Jury Patriotism Act, the Michigan Fund relies, in part, on a small
increase in court filing fees to increase compensation to jurors serving on lengthy trials. See
H.B. 4551, 4552 and S.B. 1448, 1452, 2001-2002 Leg. Sess. (Mich. 2002).
30. Id. (citing AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note I I at § 6(c)(2)).
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additional wage replacement or supplementation after the tenth day of ser-
vice on a civil jury. 3' This system would lend considerable support to jurors
serving on lengthy trials.32
B. Eliminate Free Passes From Jury Service
Some people get out of jury duty because Florida law gives them a free
pass. For example, Florida disqualifies several government officials, judges,
and court clerks from jury service. 33 Law enforcement officers and investi-
gative personnel are excused by the court upon request.34 Practicing attor-
neys and physicians are treated slightly differently; they are excused from
service at the discretion of the judge.35
When some groups of people are regularly dismissed from jury service,
others bear more than their fair share of the burden. 36 "The privileged should
not be allowed to escape jury duty, as some escaped military service in Viet-
nam, and leave those with less political or financial clout with the burden of
service. 37 Furthermore, the absence of certain individuals from jury pools
eliminates many important perspectives. 38 When members of certain occupa-
tions do not serve on a jury, the judicial system does not benefit from their
life experiences, values, or education.39
On the other hand, a jury that lacks professionals, or is disproportion-
ately composed of unemployed or retired individuals, may lack the collective
knowledge of a more representative jury.4 ° It is also possible that this small
slice of our society may not have the background to properly evaluate or
weigh complex technical, scientific, or other evidence.4' Such jurors may
even believe that their role is to transfer wealth and not render justice on the
31. Id.
32. Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 5.
33. See FLA. STAT. § 40.013(2)(a) (2002).
34. See § 40.013(2)(b).
35. See § 40.013(5). Florida law also excuses expectant mothers, parents who are not
employed full time with custody of children under six years of age or upon request, and per-
sons who are responsible for the care of persons with physical or mental disability upon re-
quest. See §§ 40.013(4), (9).
36. See STANDARDS RELATED TO JUROR USE & MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 51.
37. Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 5.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id. at 5.
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merits of the case.42 Plaintiffs and defendants would all benefit from the
diverse experience, values, and education of a truly representative jury.43
The first step to a more representative jury is the elimination of unnec-
essary or antiquated exemptions from service." Approximately two-thirds of
the states have recognized that occupational exemptions to jury service are
elitist and unnecessary, and have taken the positive step of repealing such
privileges.45
Evidence [from these states] suggests that... those who [cur-
rently] receive special exemptions from jury service [in Florida] do
not believe they are too valuable to take time off to sit on a jury, or
too biased or influential to serve. For example, when New York
doctors were asked whether they should be exempt from jury ser-
vice following New York's [elimination of all of the state's
twenty-six occupational exemptions], only [twelve] percent said
that physicians should be exempt from service. New York lawyers
had a similar reaction.46
For example, according to one study in New York, "only [three] percent
and [ten] percent of Manhattan and Brooklyn attorneys, respectively, thought
they should be exempt from jury service. '47 Even state executive officers
and sitting judges in other states make time for jury service.48 For example,
"Rudolph Giuliani, despite being a sitting mayor, lawyer, and former prose-
cutor, also made headlines when he was summoned and selected to serve on
a jury hearing a [seven] million [dollar] civil suit in 1999.''49 Most recently,
summoned Juror No. 142 revealed on an "anonymous" qualification form for
federal jury duty in New York that his former occupation was "President of
the United States" and that he felt that he could be fair and impartial "despite
42. Schwartz et a]., supra note 10, at 5.
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. (citing Julia Vitullo-Martin et al., Five Years of Jury Reform: Final Report on
Juror Concerns to the Unified Court System 2, 10-Il (Citizens Jury Project, Vera Inst. Of
Justice 2000), available at http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/juryfinal.pdf.
47. Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 6.
48. See Governor Excused from Jury Duty, YORK NEWS TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, available
at http://yorknewstimes.com/stories/083002/nat_0830020037.shtml (reporting that Texas
Governor Rick Perry appeared in court for jury service and was designated "Juror No. I" on a
challenge to a speeding ticket); Linda P. Campbell, Three Judges Summoned for Duty on
Other Side of Bench; One of Them State District Judge Bob McCoy, is on a Jury Hearing a
Medical Malpractice Case, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 4, 2000, at 3.
49. Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 6.
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his 'unusual experience with the O.I.C.,' otherwise known as the Office of
Independent Counsel. '50 "If ... ex-presidents are not beyond jury service,
no one should expect that their profession puts them above this civic duty."'"
Florida's Jury Innovations Committee has also recommended elimina-
tion of occupational exemptions.52 Consistent with the Committee's recom-
mendation, the Jury Patriotism Act would eliminate the current disqualifica-
tions from jury service and automatic exemptions that apply to various
groups.53 Rather than grant automatic or discretionary exemptions from jury
service, the Act would permit members of these groups to request a hardship
excuse. 4 It would more fairly distribute the burden of jury duty and provide
for a jury pool that better reflects the experience and values of the entire
community.
C. Limit Excuses to True Hardship
Those who do not qualify for a complete exemption from service under
existing Florida law can request to be excused from jury service upon a
showing of "hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public necessity."55 Some
people who are called for jury service, particularly professionals, small busi-
ness owners, and wage earners, may abuse this provision to avoid their civic
responsibility. For this reason, the Jury Patriotism Act would repeal Flor-
ida's current vague standard, and provide further guidance to the courts on
acceptable grounds for hardship excuses. The Act would permit an excuse
from jury service only for "undue or extreme physical or financial hardship,"
which would arise in three circumstances.
50. See Benjamin Weiser, Civic Duty, Sure, But Wasn't the White House Enough?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at Bi. Ultimately, the judge excused William Jefferson Clinton due to
concern that having the former president sit on the jury might sensationalize the trial. Id.
51. Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 6.
52. See FLA. JURY INNOVATIONS REPORT, supra note 7, at 22 (recommending that Flor-
ida's list of statutory exemptions "should be greatly reduced to include only felons who have
not completed their entire sentence" and that all others not be excused unless "they show in a
particularized manner justification for the inability to serve"). Id. For reasons no explained in
its administrative order, the Supreme Court of Florida declined to approve this recommenda-
tion. See In re Final Report of Jury Innovations Comm., supra note 9, at 6.
53. Compare FLA. STAT § 40.013(5) (2002), with AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note
11.
54. See FLA. JURY INNOVATIONS COMM., supra note 7, at 22. The Jury Innovations Com-
mittee recommended that the statutory exemptions from service (other than for "felons who
have not completed their entire sentence, including probation, parole, and community con-
trol") should be eliminated. Id.
55. § 40.013(6).
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The Act would permit an excuse from jury service only for "undue or
extreme physical or financial hardship," which would arise in three circum-
stances: (1) when a person who is responsible for the care of a child, or an
elderly or disabled person, would be unable to find alternative care or super-
vision during jury service; (2) when the prospective juror would incur costs
or a loss of income that would have a "substantial adverse impact" on his or
her ability to pay daily living expenses; or (3) if the prospective juror would
suffer physical illness or disease by serving. 6 Under the Act's hardship
standard, the loss of income from employment or other activities would not
automatically permit one to avoid jury service. 7 These grounds would more
closely reflect true hardship and limit the opportunity for abuse.58
In addition to limiting the available grounds for a hardship excuse, the
legislation would establish a procedure to make it more likely that the ex-
cuses will be faithfully applied.59 Jurors would be required to provide the
court with documentation supporting their request for an excuse.6" This
minimal requirement would ensure that jurors are not inventing or exaggerat-
56. See AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note II, at § 4(b)(3).
57. Id. at § 4(b)(4).
58. Id. at 8. The ALEC model act is not the first to restrict permissible hardship excuses.
A similar provision in Mississippi provides that all qualified persons must serve as jurors
unless excused by the court for one of the following causes:
(a) when the juror is ill, or when on account of serious illness in the juror's family, the pres-
ence of the juror is required at home, (b) when the juror's attendance would cause a serious fi-
nancial loss to the juror or to the juror's business, or (c) when the juror is under an emergency,
fairly equivalent to those mentioned in the foregoing clauses (a) and (b).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23 (2002). In fact, the Mississippi statute goes even further in defin-
ing the standard for granting the above excuses:
An excuse of illness under clause (a) may be made to the clerk of [the] court outside of open
court by providing the clerk with either a certificate of a licensed physician or an affidavit of
the juror, stating that the juror is ill or that there is a serious illness in the juror's family. The
test of an excuse under clause (b) shall be whether, if the juror were incapacitated by illness or
otherwise for a week, some other persons would be available or could reasonably be procured
to carry on the business for the week, and the test of an excuse under clause (c) shall be such as
to be the fair equivalent, under the circumstances of that prescribed under clause (b). In cases
under clauses (b) and (c) the excuse must be made by the juror, in open court, under oath.
Id
59. See STANDARDS RELATED TO JUROR USE & MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 53-54.
Standard 6 of the ABA's Standards Related to Juror Use and Management also emphasizes
the need for procedural safeguards in the administration of excuses from jury service. Id. The
standard recommends that courts require individuals to present excuses in writing and that
they present their excuses to a judge or senior court official (such as the jury commissioner or
a senior court manager), and that courts adopt and apply a strict uniform policy for the grant-
ing of excuses. Id.
60. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23 (2002) (text provided supra note 58) (requiring
documentation of a medical excuse and a statement under oath in open court to support other
hardship excuses).
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ing claimed hardships. For instance, a person claiming a medical condition
could provide a statement from a physician. One who claims financial hard-
ship might submit a copy of his or her tax return or pay stub. Potential jurors
who are caring for a young child or other family member might provide the
court with a sworn statement providing the reason that he or she cannot ob-
tain alternative care. The model act also places the responsibility for making
hardship determinations with a judge, rather than with a clerk of the court or
an administrative staff member.6 This requirement demonstrates the seri-
ousness of the jury service obligation within the judicial system. It also
would have an important practical effect. People may think twice about ar-
ticulating a bogus hardship excuse when in a courtroom, before a judge, and
faced with the threat of a sanction.
D. Protect Employment Rights
Florida law prohibits employers from discharging or threatening to dis-
miss employees who are called for jury service. 62 The Jury Patriotism Act
provides even more protection for employees. 63 First, it protects employees
from any adverse action taken as a result of their responding to a juror sum-
mons.64 The Act also explicitly states that a business may not require its
61. AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note I1, at § 4(b)(I).
62. FLA. STAT. § 40.271(2) (2002).
63. AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 11.
64. id. at § 95. Several states provide employees with such protection. See, e.g., D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-1913(a) (2001) (prohibiting an employer from depriving an employee of
employment, threatening, or otherwise coercing an employee because the employee serves as
a juror); IOWA CODE ANN. § 607A.45 (2003) (prohibiting an employer from depriving an
employee of employment or threatening or otherwise coercing an employee because he or she
is called for jury service); MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23 (2002) (prohibiting an employer or
other person from persuading or attempting to persuade any juror to avoid jury service, or
intimidating or threatening any juror in that respect); Mo. REV. STAT. § 494.460(1) (West
1996) (prohibiting an employer from terminating, disciplining, or threatening to take adverse
action against an employee because he or she is called for jury service); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 22-4-108(F)(1) (1994) (prohibiting an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminat-
ing against an employee because he or she is called for jury service); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
46-21(1) (1953) (prohibiting an employer from depriving an employee of employment or
threatening or otherwise coercing an employee because the employee responds to a juror
summons); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.36.165(2) (West 2003) (prohibiting an employer from
depriving an employee of employment or threatening, coercing, harassing, or denying promo-
tional opportunities to an employee who takes time off for jury service); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 52-3-1(d) (Michie 2000) (requiring an employer to excuse an employee from work in order
to respond to a juror summons and prohibiting an employer from discriminating against an
employee because he or she is summoned to jury service).
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employees to use their annual, vacation, or sick leave time for jury service.65
Employees should not fear that by responding to a juror summons, they
might be required to sacrifice their annual vacation. This provision is one
reason why the AFL-CIO supports the ALEC model act.
E. Small Business Protections
The Jury Patriotism Act also seeks to protect small businesses from
problems that may arise when their employees are called to jury service.66
For example, the Act addresses the potential that a small business may lose
two or more employees to jury service at the same time. Such a situation
may be particularly hard on small businesses.67 For this reason, the Act re-
quires courts to postpone and reschedule the jury service of a summoned
juror if another employee of his or her business is already serving jury duty.68
Employer groups, including the National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB), support this provision of the Act.69
F. Provide an Appropriate Penalty for No-Shows
Research shows that a significant number of those who do not respond
to juror summonses fail to do so because they have little fear of receiving a
penalty, or believe that the penalty will be a mere "slap on the wrist."7° In
Florida, those who do not respond to a jury summons face a fine of not more
than $100 and may be held in contempt of court.7 When the penalty for not
showing up for jury service is comparable to a speeding ticket, it is no won-
der that so many people disregard their jury summons with impunity. Fur-
thermore, courts have little resources to follow up and penalize those who do
not show. It is no secret that what is already a minimal fine rarely is im-
posed.
In light of the added flexibility, shorter term, and better protection of
compensation during jury service, those who still chose to discard their civic
65. AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at § 5(b). Colorado is one of the few states
that provides similar protection of employee benefits during jury service. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-71-134 (2002).
66. AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at § 5(e).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Schwartz et al., supra note 10, at 2.
70. See, e.g., BOATRIGHT, supra note 3, at 136 (indicating that 56.3% of nonrespondents
believed that the penalty for failing to appear for jury service would be light and only 29.2%
believed the penalty would be strictly enforced).
71. See FLA. STAT § 40.23(3) (2001).
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duty should be punished appropriately. Jury service is an important obliga-
tion of citizenship. Criminal defendants rely on a representative jury to re-
ceive a fair trial. Parties in civil litigation also have a right to a representa-
tive jury. A person's failure to appear in court not only damages the judicial
system, it may also impair the rights of litigants. Ignoring a jury summons is
an offense more serious than driving a few miles over the posted speed limit.
It should be dealt with accordingly.
The Jury Patriotism Act would punish a summoned juror's failure to
appear in court as a misdemeanor.72 This penalty would communicate to
jurors the importance of jury service and notify them that avoiding one's
civic responsibility will be criminally punished. Under this provision, citi-
zens who fail to appear for jury service will have a criminal record, a threat
sufficient to cause them to pause before simply ignoring a jury summons.
Alternatively, the Florida Legislature might consider raising the maxi-
mum fine for nonrespondents from $100 to $500, while continuing enforce-
ment through contempt of court proceedings. It might also provide judges
with the discretion to require no-shows to complete community service, in
addition to, or in lieu of, paying a fine. In any case, these penalties should be
applied more consistently in order to encourage citizens to appear for jury
service.73
III. CONCLUSION
Floridians continue to overwhelmingly support the jury system. Yet,
many people fail to appear for jury duty when summoned or strive to get out
of jury duty once they enter the courthouse. Few of these individuals lack a
sense of civil duty. Rather, they are discouraged from jury service by the
hardship and headache imposed by a system that does not provide adequate
financial compensation, leaves little or no flexibility, and may place a severe
inconvenience on their life. Moreover, the current occupational exemptions
and standard for an excuse from service provide many people with an easy
means of escape from jury service.
Florida should enact legislation based on ALEC's model Jury Patriot-
ism Act to break down the barriers that frustrate jury service in Florida. Flo-
ridians, regardless of income or occupation, would then be more willing and
better able to fulfill their patriotic duty to serve on a jury.
72. AM. LEG. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at § 3(d).
73. "The point is not to punish people, but to encourage people to answer the summons
and make arrangements to do their jury service." Troy Anderson, Show Up or Else; Courts
Get Tough: Ignore Another Jury Summons and Get $1,500 Fine, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19,
2003, available at 2002 WL 5528920 (quoting Pomona, California Supervising Judge).
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JAMES D. CAMP, JR.*
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court in Tulsa Professional Collec-
tion Services, Inc., v. Pope,' significantly changed the procedure of how per-
sonal representatives must notify creditors in probate proceedings.2 As all
experienced probate lawyers know, as a result of Pope, Florida's current
notice to creditors section 733.2121 of the Florida Statutes requires personal
representatives not only to publish a notice to creditors, but also serve a copy
on the decedent's creditors who are "reasonably ascertainable, 3 after making
a "diligent search 4 to determine their names and addresses. The statute goes
on to state that "[i]mpracticable and extended searches are not required." 5
Creditors then have the later of three months after the "first publication of the
notice to creditors, or as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of
the notice to creditors, thirty days after the date of service on the credi-
tor . . .,,
Section 733.2121 of the Florida Statutes, effective January 1, 2002, is a
spin off of the prior section 733.212, which incorporated a notice to benefici-
aries and notice to creditors. The language in section 733.2121 of the Flor-
ida Statutes is substantially the same as the former section 733.212, except
that section 733.212 of the Florida Statutes did not contain any reference to
creditors whose "[c]laims are unmatured, contingent, or unliquidated ....
The abstract and cryptic phrases in the Florida Statutes, requiring a "diligent
search" to determine creditors "who are reasonably ascertainable," '8 have
spawned many appellate decisions, but none, however, have given the practi-
tioner much guidance in defining those phrases, or for that matter, the phrase
"impracticable and extended searches," which the statute says are not re-
* Mr. Camp, a shareholder in Camp & Camp, P.A., received his undergraduate and law
degrees from the University of Florida. He concentrates his practice in the estate planning
area and in probate and trust administration. Mr. Camp is a former member of the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners, a past chairman of the Florida Probate Rules Committee, and cur-
rently serves as a member of that Committee.
1. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
2. Id. at 491.
3. FLA. STAT. § 733.2121(3)(a) (2002).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. § 733.702(1).
7. § 7 33 .2 121(3)(a).
8. Id.
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quired.9 Nor have the Florida Probate Rules spelled out any express mini-
mum guidelines to satisfy the search requirements.
The case of In re Estate of Vickery,"° one of the early opinions constru-
ing the former section 733.212 of the Florida Statutes, which required the
service of a notice of administration on creditors, involved beneficiaries as-
serting that the decedent had breached a contract allegedly established under
a "joint and mutual will" executed by the decedent's husband prior to the
will of the decedent." The will of the decedent's predeceased husband set
forth a plan that the survivor of them would, by will, distribute their uncon-
sumed assets available at the survivor's death to the same beneficiaries.
2
The three-month publication period expired on November 11, 1987."3 Only
two claimants were served personally with notice in May of 1988."4 The
various claimants filed identical claims beginning June 7, 1988, and ending
on August 1, 1988."5 Seven months after the first claimant received notice of
the decedent's death, the disgruntled would-be beneficiaries filed a motion to
extend time to file their claims. 6 The trial court granted the personal repre-
sentative's motion to strike.17 The Fourth District affirmed, ruling that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion.18
The appellate court noted that the personal representative for the wife's
estate, an attorney, had represented her husband in real estate matters and
had "handled some of his estate work, but had never discussed wills or estate
planning with him."' 9 There was no explanation of what "some of his estate
work" meant.20 The court further stated that though the attorney, as personal
representative, had prepared the surviving wife's will (which made no men-
tion of a mutual will arrangement), "he had no knowledge of any other
document disposing of her property. ' '21 The court explained that the dece-
dent's sisters cleaned her apartment and threw away "many items" (appar-
ently without description), but gave her financial papers to the personal rep-
9. Id.
10. 564 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
11. Id. at 557.
12. Id. at 556.
13. Id. at 557.
14. Id.
15. Estate of Vickery, 564 So. 2d at 557.
16. Id. at 558.
17. Id. at 557.
18. Id. at 558.
19. Id.
20. Estate of Vickery, 564 So. 2d at 558.
21. Id.
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resentative,22 and then went on to say that the personal representative "made
a cursory search" of the wife's apartment and took possession of the contents
of the decedent's safe deposit box.
23
In Jones v. Sunbank Miami, N.A., 24 another case decided under the ae-
gis of the Pope doctrine, 25 a party who had purchased real property from the
decedent several years before the seller's death was not served with actual
notice of administration.2 6 Almost six months after the claim bar date ex-
pired, the buyer filed a claim against the deceased seller's estate based on
land contamination.27 The trial court made exhaustive findings and con-
cluded that the claimant was not a "known or reasonably ascertainable credi-
tor." 8 The Third District affirmed, deciding, as is so often the case in these
settings, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.29 While the opinion
is well written, it does not enlighten the probate bar as to what would equate
to a "diligent search" or define "[i]mpracticable and extended
searches . "..."30
In In re Estate of Gleason,3 an alleged creditor of Jackie Gleason, not
served with a notice of administration, had been litigating with Gleason in
New York for over a year prior to his death.32 The creditor sought to reopen
Gleason's estate fourteen months after it had been closed.33 The Fourth Dis-
trict affirmed the lower court's refusal to reopen the estate.34 Again, no
guidelines were outlined with respect to what steps a personal representative
should take to effectuate a "diligent search" for creditors.35
The claimant in the case of In re Estate of Danese,36 who had not been
served with a notice of administration, sought to reopen the estate several
years after it had been closed. 37 The claimant, who had filed a civil action
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 609 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
25. Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
26. Jones, 609 So. 2d at 99-100.
27. Id.
28. Id. at I01.
29. Id. at 103.
30. § 733.2121(3)(a).
31. 631 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
32. Id. at 322.
33. Id. at 323.
34. Id.
35. See FLA. STAT. § 733.2121(3)(a) (2002).
36. 641 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
37. Id. at 425.
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against the decedent's estate prior to the expiration of the three months credi-
tors' period, argued that the Pope requirements were not met.38
The trial court entered an order reopening the estate.3 9 However, the
First District reversed on the ground that the claimant had actual knowledge
of the probate proceeding, having filed a civil action against the estate within
the three month creditors' period, and thus did not come within the purview
of Pope.40 Because of the factual circumstances in Estate of Danese, it was
not relevant for the court to give any clues as to what constitutes a "diligent
search.'
Section 733.2121 of the Florida Statutes contains a reference to credi-
tors whose "[c]laims are unmatured, contingent or unliquidated," which was
not in the predecessor section 733.212 of the Florida Statutes, and was ap-
parently added to overcome the Fourth District decision of U.S. Trust Co. of
Florida Savings v. Haig.42 There, the buyers of a residence who gave the
seller a purchase money mortgage received from the seller a five-year guar-
anty, allowing the buyers to offset against the mortgage debt the cost of re-
pairs due to "leaks and cracks caused by structural defects. 43 The seller died
within the five-year period "and the claims period expired on February 8,
1995." 44 No actual notice was served on the buyers.45
However, the personal representative, by a letter to the buyers dated
January 30, 1995, sought to verify the existence of the purchase money note
as an estate asset.46 At the same time, the buyers, unaware of the seller's
death, tried to reach him by mail.47 The personal representative did not re-
ceive the buyer's letter until eight days after the creditors period expired.48
Because the claim was filed late, the appellate court overruled the trial
court's order granting the buyers' petition to extend time to file a claim, find-
ing that the buyers were not entitled to actual notice since their claim was
contingent and not quantified.49 Furthermore, the Fourth District ruled that
there was no showing of fraud or estoppel as required by section 733.702(3)
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 424.
41. § 733.2121(3)(a).
42. 694 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
43. Id. at 770.
44. Id.
45. id.
46. Id.
47. Haig, 694 So. 2d at 770.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 771.
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of the Florida Statutes.50 However, it is not clear from the opinion, though it
may be presumed, that the buyers were seeking reimbursement for actual
repairs made to the residence under the guaranty. The court made no ruling
regarding the buyers' rights under the mortgage set-off provision.'
In In re Estate of Ortolano,52 the Fourth District ruled that "the trial
court abused its discretion" in granting the personal representatives' motion
to strike a claim filed one month after the three month creditor's period ex-
pired 3.5  The claimant, who was not served with a notice of administration,
had a lawsuit pending against the decedent at the time of death. 4 The Fourth
District determined that, because the personal representative had actual
knowledge of the claim, the claimant should have been served with notice. 5
Furthermore, the personal representative failed to file a suggestion of death
in the civil action, as required by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, until
after the creditors period expired.16 The facts in Ortolano made it unneces-
sary for the appellate court to discuss what steps should or need not be taken
to conduct a diligent search. 7
In Miller v. Estate of Baer,58 the decedent passed away on September
23, 1996, and the personal representative first published a notice of admini-
stration on December 4, 1996.' 9 The claimant, a bank, was not served with
the notice and did not file its claim within the three-month period.6 °
On August 24, 1998, almost two years after the decedent's death, the
bank filed a petition for extension of time, which the trial court granted.6'
The Fourth District affirmed, citing the key issue to be whether the lower
court abused its discretion vel non.62 The decedent was "a general partner of
a partnership" and had signed as a guarantor on loans to the partnership by
the bank. 63 By the terms of the debt arrangement with the bank, the death of
the decedent triggered a default on the note for which the decedent was a
guarantor.' The trial court found, and the court of appeal agreed, that the
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. 766 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
53. Id. at 332.
54. Id. at 331.
55. Id. at 332 (citing Davis v. Evans, 132 So. 2d 476, 481 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961)).
56. Id.
57. See Estate of Ortolano, 766 So. 2d at 332.
58. 837 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
59. Id. at 449.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. ld. at 450.
63. Miller, 837 So. 2d at 450.
64. Id.
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facts were distinguishable from those in Haig,6 5 thereby requiring actual no-
tice to the claimant.66 Again, it was unnecessary for the appellate court to
recite a litany of steps that should have been taken to accomplish a "diligent
search" regarding the existence of the claimant.
The result in that case was disastrous for the personal representative.
Distributions had been made to such an extent that there were insufficient
assets available to satisfy the claim by the bank, by casting a burden on the
personal representative personally.67
The latest case as of this writing, Strulowitz v. Cadle Co., If, Inc.,68
seems to raise the bar for personal representatives to comply with the "dili-
gent search" standard. Once again, however, the case turned on what seems
to be the fundamental issue in these types of cases: whether the trial court
abused its discretion. 69 The Fourth District, in Strulowitz, quoting from Ca-
nakaris v. Canakaris,7° stated, "discretion is abused only where no reason-
able man would take the view adopted by the trial court.",
7
'
In Strulowitz, the decedent died on May 17, 2000, and the statutory
claim period ended November 20, 2000.72 The personal representative first
became aware of the debt owed to The Cadle Company II, Inc. ("Cadle") as
a result of a telephone call he received on January 18, 2001.73 The debt arose
by virtue of an unrecorded joint stipulation of settlement entered into by the
decedent and his wife, who predeceased the decedent in 1994, that resolved a
lawsuit filed by Cadle to collect on a promissory note. 74 Under the settle-
ment, the Strulowitzes were to pay quarterly payments over a period of six
years, and on June 1, 2000, the balance became due.75 After the personal
representative advised Cadle's agent that he had no record of the debt, he
requested documentation and payment history.76 In early February of 2001,
the personal representative's attorney advised Cadle that the claim was time-
barred, whereupon Cadle on February 16, 2001, filed a petition for leave to
65. U.S. Trust Co. of Fla. Sav. Bank v. Haig, 694 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
66. Miller, 837 So. 2d at 450 (citing Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S.
478, 485 (1988)).
67. Id. at 449.
68. 839 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
69. Id. at 879.
70. 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980).
71. Strulowitz, 839 So. 2d at 881 (quoting Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203 (citing Delno v.
Market St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942))).
72. Id. at 877.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Strulowitz, 839 So. 2d at 877.
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file a claim." The personal representative responded with a motion to strike,
along with a supporting affidavit which, in summary, related that his "dili-
gent search" included going through all of the decedent's personal and busi-
ness files and check book for the year 2000, indicating that the checkbooks
were handwritten and for the most part illegible.78
The trial court in Strulowitz declined to rule on the evidence presented.79
Rather, an attorney ad litem was appointed, who acknowledged that he had
difficulty locating the Cadle Company and the debt because Cadle had not
sent a payment book to the decedent, even though, as the appellate court
noted, the attorney ad litem had the benefit of hindsight and was aware of the
creditor at that point in time. ° Moreover, Cadle failed to send a delinquent
notice when the June 2000 payment was not made.8' The attorney ad litem
did find an illegible check dated March 11, 2000 for $1500 to "'The Cadle
Co.?? II"' and a December 14, 1999 check in the same amount to "'Cadle II
Company,"' along with four legible checks for $1500 made during 1999,
each payable to Cadle.8 2
The attorney ad litem, armed with the name of the claimant, was unable
to find a listing for that company in the Broward County, Florida phone
book, and upon calling information he learned that there was no listing for
Cadle in the State of Florida. 3 On inquiring about a Cadle phone number in
other states, he was told that he would have to call every state in the union,
which he concluded was impractical.8 4 The attorney ad litem finally learned
from the telephone operator that Cadle did have a toll free number.8 On
reaching the company, the employee could not locate the account.8 6 Only
after being asked by the Cadle contact to furnish the decedent's social secu-
rity number was the account located.87 Even though the statute provides that
"[i]mpracticable and extended searches are not required, 88 the attorney ad
litem concluded that the personal representative could have conducted a
more "diligent search., 89 A "diligent search" would have recalled Cadle as a
77. Id.
78. Id. at 878.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Strulowitz, 839 So. 2d at 878.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Strulowitz, 839 So. 2d at 878.
87. Id. at 878-89.
88. FLA. STAT. § 733.2121(3)(a) (2002).
89. Strulowitz v. Cadle Co., 11, Inc., 839 So. 2d 876, 879 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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creditor, and a more extensive review of the decedent's bank statements or
checkbook would have led him to Cadle.9° The lower court adopted the at-
torney ad litem's conclusion and denied the motion to strike. 9' The Fourth
District, relying on the nebulous doctrine of "abuse of discretion" affirmed,
stating that:
Applying this standard, we cannot say that no reasonable person
could take the trial court's view. Reasonable people could differ
as to what constitutes a reasonable search and what entails imprac-
tical or extraordinary effort. Certainly, as the attorney ad litem ac-
knowledges, his success in locating Cadle and the decedent's ac-
count came only after several phone calls. Moreover, it came in
hindsight, after Cadle had filed its claim and its name was known
to the attorney ad litem.
92
It appears from the Fourth District's decision that had the trial court
ruled the other way, which it could have done facilely, the appellate court
would have also affirmed, on the basis that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.93
After scanning the progeny of Pope,94 and looking through the judicial
camera lens, the picture is anything but clear as to what constitutes a "dili-
gent search" or "impracticable searches." 95 We know more about what does
not satisfy those vague terms than what fulfills the requirements. By way of
a footnote in Strulowitz, the Fourth District, having recognized the problem,
has issued a summons of responsibility to the Probate Rules Committee of
the Florida Bar, requesting that the body suggest guidelines for personal rep-
resentatives to aid them in performing their "diligent searches."96 Hopefully,
the rules committee will not allow a default to be entered against it. To be
sure, there will be naysayers who will pontificate to the effect that promul-
gating guidelines for construing that abstract phrase is fools' play, and that
each estate is unique and will have to stand on its own peculiar facts. That,
of course, is the easy way out. The rules committee should not, however, turn
a blind eye toward the mantle placed on it by the court. Indeed, the rules
committee has a moral, if not an ethical, responsibility to assist the personal
representatives, probate practitioners, as well as the trial judges, in carrying
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 881 (emphasis supplied).
93. Id
94. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
95. Strulowitz, 839 So. 2d at 879.
96. Id. at n.3.
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out the statutory mandate. This is an opportunity for the Bar to supply the
legal yeast that will leaven the definition of "diligent search."
In the meantime, lawyers laboring in the vineyard of probate law would
be well advised to review an excellent article by David T. Smith, a Univer-
sity of Florida law professor, and Robert Winick, an experienced probate
practitioner,97 which constructively sets forth numerous cogent steps a per-
sonal representative should consider in ferreting out "reasonably ascertain-
able" creditors.98 How extensively the list should be followed will of course
depend on how knowledgeable the personal representative is with the dece-
dent's personal and financial affairs. As section 733.2121 of the Florida
Statutes says, "[i]mpracticable and extended searches are not required."99
The well-written article by Smith and Winick, inter alia, recommends that
the first step should be to have the postal service direct all of the decedent's
mail to the personal representative."' Next, after inspecting the decedent's
wallet/purse, personal and financial files, letters should be sent to credit card
companies and department stores, requesting account balance information.' O'
Also, one should review tax returns for three years prior to date of death and
bank statements, canceled checks or check stubs for at least one year prior to
death. 0 2 Making inquiries of relatives, friends and business associates is also
advised. 0
3
Personal representatives and probate practitioners should keep the
Smith and Winick article handy for easy reference because it is still timely.
The only thing missing-as a result of expanded technology-as suggested
by William Platt,"° a prominent probate lawyer in Tampa, Florida, is that it
is also a good idea to search the decedent's personal computer and maybe
even the internet-a phenomenon not extant when Smith and Winick au-
thored their article.
Unless the Probate Rules Committee acts upon the charge given to it by
the Fourth District, to paraphrase Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty, "diligent
search" and "impractical searches" will be what each probate judge says it is!
97. David T. Smith & Robert M. Winick, Known or Ascertainable Estate Creditors: The
Pope Decision, 62 FLA. B.J. 66 (Oct. 1988).
98. Id. at 67.
99. FLA. STAT. § 733.2121(3)(a) (2002).
100. Smith & Winick, supra note 97, at 67.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Platt is a former chairman of the Florida Probate Rules Committee.
2003]
167
: Nova Law Review 28, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
THE VALIDITY OF BINDING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS AND CHILDREN'S PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMS IN FLORIDA AFTER SHEA v.
GLOBAL TRAVEL MARKETING, INC.
DOUGLAS P. GERBER*
I. IN TRO D UCTIO N ............................................................................... 167
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CASE LAW INVOLVING THE BINDING OF
CHILDREN'S PERSONAL INJURY, NEGLIGENCE, OR TORT CLAIMS
TO A RBITRATION ............................................................................ 170
A. Children Cannot be Bound to Arbitrate Claims ......................... 171
B. Children Can be Bound to Arbitrate Claims ............................... 174
III. A FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF SHEA ................ 177
IV. THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL'S ANALYSIS IN SHEA:
PUBLIC POLICY AND PARENS PATRIAE ........................................... 180
V. THE SHEA COURT'S RULING WAS PROPER UNDER PUBLIC
POLICY AND PARENS PA TRIAE ........................................................ 182
VI. INADEQUACIES OF THE COURT'S RULING IN SHEA ........................ 185
A. The Court's Silence on an Arbitration Standard ........................ 186
B. The Court's Ambiguity Concerning Children's "Commonplace
Child Oriented or School Supported Activities "........................ 189
V II. C O NCLUSION .................................................................................. 190
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts in Florida and across the nation favor arbitration' as a mecha-
nism of resolving disputes,2 which has made arbitration the most popular
* J.D. Candidate, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, 2005;
M.S., University of Florida, 1996; B.S., University of Florida, 1992. The author would like to
thank his wife Dori, his daughter Jacqueline, and his family for all of their love and support
during the writing of this Note. The author would also like to recognize the following parties
for their assistance: The Honorable Thomas M. Lynch, IV and his judicial assistant Bonnie
Sandier; The Honorable Charles Greene; the Coral Springs City Attorney's Office; the Clerks
of Court at the Fourth District Court of Appeal; the staff of NOVA LAW REVIEW; his professors
at the Shepard Broad Law Center; and the other three members of the Four Horsemen.
1. Arbitration is the process of resolving disputes by a neutral third party after the arbi-
trator hears from both parties. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (7th ed. 1999). The character-
istics of arbitration include written agreements to resolve controversies through arbitration,
non-formal methods, neutral arbiters, and binding awards that can be enforced in court. Jef-
168
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/1
NOVA LA WREVIEW
method of alternative dispute resolution.3 The rise in the popularity of arbi-
tration has resulted from the view that arbitration allows parties to settle con-
troversies in a time and cost-efficient manner without the formalities of tradi-
tional litigation.4 Commercial enterprises have traditionally chosen to use
arbitration to settle the disagreements that arise in an array of commercial
settings. 5 A primary reason for the recent popularity of commercial arbitra-
tion is because arbitrators often have the same background and working
knowledge in the specific area of business as the parties involved in a dis-
pute.6 Some businesses-including tour operators and recreation-based or-
ganizations, for example-are beginning to use arbitration provisions in their
agreements not only to resolve any disputes that may arise over the perform-
ance of contracts, but to reduce any potential liability from personal injury
claims submitted by participants.7
The future of commercial arbitration in Florida as it relates to the per-
sonal injury claims of children will change8 in the aftermath of Shea v.
Global Travel Marketing, Inc.9 In a case of first impression in Florida,' ° the
Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that parents cannot bind their minor
children to arbitrate personal injury claims." The court also certified the
frey M. Schalley, Article, Eliminate Violence from Sports Through Arbitration, Not the Civil
Courts, 8 SPORTS LAW. J. 181, 196 (2001).
2. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Martha A. Gottfried, Inc. v.
Paulette Koch Real Estate, Inc., 778 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Info.
Tech. & Eng'g Corp. v. Reno, 813 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); 1
THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5:1 (3d ed. 2003); Michael A. Bagot, Jr. &
Dana A. Henderson, Not Party, Not Bound? Not Necessarily: Binding Third Parties to Mari-
time Arbitration, 26 TUL. MAR. L.J. 413, 418 (2002).
3. 1 OEHMKE, supra note 2.
4. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473,473-75 (1987); Schalley, supra note 1, at 195.
5. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitra-
tion, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. I (1997).
6. See id.; see also 1 OEHMKE, supra note 2 (discussing the variety of commercial dis-
putes that are resolved through arbitration).
7. Laurie Cunningham, Parents Can't Waive Children's Rights, DAILY Bus. REV., May
22, 2003, at Al.
8. See id.; Amicus Brief of the Acad. of Fla. Trial Lawyers at 1, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L.
Weekly at D2004 (No. 4D02-910). For purposes of this Note, the term child(ren) will be used
interchangeably and has the same definition as the word minor. A minor is an "infant or per-
son who is under the age of legal competence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (6th ed.
1990).
9. 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2004 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Shea I].
10. Id.atD2005.
It. Id.; see Cunningham, supra note 7. The court originally reversed the trial court's
arbitration order and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claims brought forth by
the decedent's father in a ruling issued on April 23, 2003. Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., Inc.,
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issue to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of great public impor-
tance. 2 This Note will discuss the court's reasoning in Shea and assert that
the court's primary holding was a proper public policy decision in accord
with similar cases in other jurisdictions under parens patriae, which is the
ability of the state to protect persons of legal disability who cannot ade-
quately protect their legal interests, including children. 3 However, portions
of the court's reasoning and analysis were ambiguous. By not clearly articu-
lating significant issues affecting state and federal law, the court does not
provide any closure to the issues raised in Shea;4 on the contrary, the court's
approach casts doubt on the validity and practicality of the ruling.'5 "In order
to eliminate any uncertainty or confusion as to the applicability of the result
in this case statewide"' 6 as it relates to parental discretion, 7 the state's econ-
omy,' 8 judicial administration, 9 and other aspects of society in the state, the
Supreme Court of Florida needs to resolve the ambiguities of the Shea
panel's rationale.
Part I will survey similar cases involving arbitration clauses and chil-
dren's personal injury claims in other jurisdictions to illustrate the novelty of
this issue. Although cases like Shea are rare, this section will show that there
is already a split among and within jurisdictions concerning the validity of
binding arbitration provisions and the personal injury claims of minors. Part
II will provide the factual and procedural background of Shea that begins
with the tragic and gruesome death of an eleven-year-old boy. Part III will
discuss the court's rationale and its emphasis on the public policy concerns
28 Fla. L. Weekly D1009, DI0 11 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Shea 11].
The court withdrew its prior opinion and substituted a new opinion on August 27, 2003.
Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
12. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006. Article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Consti-
tution gives the Supreme Court of Florida the discretion to review the ruling of a district court
of appeal that presents a question certified by the supreme court as being of "great public
importance." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4); e.g., FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(B)(i). The issue
the Shea panel has certified to the Supreme Court of Florida states: "Whether a parent's
agreement in a commercial travel contract to binding arbitration on behalf of a minor child
with respect to prospective tort claims arising in the course of such travel is enforceable as to
the minor." Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006. No information was available on the status
of the certification action at the time of this Note.
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990); see Cunningham, supra note 7.
14. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
15. See id.
16. Appellee's Motion for Certification to the Fla. Sup. Ct. of a Question of Great Public
Importance at 3, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2004 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003) (No. 4D02-
910).
17. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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of parents entering into contracts on behalf of their children in the form of
parental waivers and other exculpatory agreements that contain arbitration
provisions.
Although some critics believe the Shea court has improperly interfered
with a parent's ability to raise his or her children,20 Part IV will assert that the
ruling made by the panel was proper under public policy and parens patriae,
including the decision to validate parental waivers for school-sponsored or
community oriented activities for minors. Part V will assess the weaknesses
of the court's rationale, specifically the court's silence on whether the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act2' or Florida Arbitration Code22 should have been applied.
Another inadequacy of the Shea court's rationale is its ambiguity concerning
the activities where parental waivers that include arbitration agreements
would be permissible under public policy.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CASE LAW INVOLVING THE BINDING OF CHILDREN'S
PERSONAL INJURY, NEGLIGENCE, OR TORT CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION
With some exceptions,2 3 agreements that generally bind minors to arbi-
tration involve insurance contracts24 or separation agreements that concern
child custody, support, and visitation rights.25 However, cases on point con-
cerning the issue of whether parents can compel their children to resolve
personal injury claims through binding arbitration are rare.26  Despite the
20. See id.
21. 9U.S.C.§§ 1-16(2000).
22. FLA. STAT. § 682.01-.22 (2002).
23. 1 MICHAEL DOMKE & GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
§ 10:10 (rev. ed. 1999). The exceptions include controversies where the claims of a child are
not submitted to arbitration unless there is a court order issued. Id. The court order can be
issued after a parent or personal representative of the minor files an application with the court,
unless the controversy is an insurance claim. Id.
24. ld.; see also Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Cal. 1965) (holding that a child can
be bound to arbitrate claims under health care contract because parent has the right and duty to
care for child). Although this Note will not focus on the legality of arbitration agreements and
medical insurance claims or health care for minors, it should be noted that the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Shea found that the trial court erroneously relied on Doyle in its analysis.
Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
25. I DOMKE & WILNER, supra note 23.
26. See Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1076 (5th Cir. 2002); Troshak
v. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401693, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 2,
1998); Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 836 (Ohio I 1th Ct. App. 1998); Shannon P. Duffy,
Parents Can't Sign Away Child's Potential Claim, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 7, 1998, at I
(discussing Troshak). Cross was a case of first impression in Ohio, and in Troshak and
Fleetwood, the federal courts had to determine how the supreme courts of Pennsylvania and
[Vol. 28:1:167
171
: Nova Law Review 28, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
BINDING A RBITRA TION A GREEMENTS
infrequency of these cases, there is a split among and within jurisdictions
regarding the validity of a child being bound by a parent to settle claims
through an arbitrator rather than by a jury.27
A. Children Cannot be Bound to Arbitrate Claims
In Troshak v. Terminix International Corp. ,28 a minor was rendered un-
conscious by toxic fumes produced by a pesticide treatment of the minor's
house. 29 When the minor's parents filed personal injury claims against Ter-
minix,3° the company removed the case to federal court and moved to stay
litigation pending arbitration-including the child's claims-because the
child's father had agreed to arbitrate any controversies arising under the
company's service agreement.3" The district court found that the father and
mother's claims were bound by the arbitration agreement.32 Since there were
no Pennsylvania cases that directly dealt with binding minors to arbitration
clauses, 33 the district court had to determine how the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania would rule on the matter.34  The court turned to relevant federal
cases that held parents could not waive the legal claims of their children sim-
ply because of the parental relationship.35 Based on these cases, the district
Texas, respectively, would rule on the issue. See Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1076; Troshak, 1998
WL 401963, at *4; Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836.
27. See Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1077; Costanza v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 02-1492,
2002 WL 31528447, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2002); Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *4; Ac-
comazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs. Inc., 15 P.3d 1153, 1156 (Idaho 2000); Cross, 724 N.E.2d at
836.
28. No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401693, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998).
29. See Duffy, supra note 26. The minor's name was Richard Troshak, Ill. His father,
Richard Troshak, 11 was not knocked out by the fumes of the termite control treatment, but
was found "stumbling in an incoherent state." Id.
30. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *3. The Troshaks also filed suit for property damages
to their house, and Susan Troshak-the mother and wife of the victims, respectively-sought
recovery for a loss of consortium. Id.
3 I. Id. at * 1-2. The father assented to the terms of the contract when he signed the com-
pany's "Termite Service Plan" agreement. Id. at *2.
32. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *2-3; Duffy, supra note 26, at 6. Although Susan
Troshak did not sign the Terminix contract, the court still found that she was bound to the
agreement under Pennsylvania law that presumes that one spouse has the power to act for the
other spouse in respect to the properties that are jointly held. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at
*3; Duffy, supra note 26, at 6.
33. Troshak v. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401693, at *3
(E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998); Duffy, supra note 26, at 6.
34. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *4.
35. Id. at *3-4; see also Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. & Junior Coll., 630 F.
Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that Pennsylvania law prevents parents from releasing
claims of minors); Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 143
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court found that a child could not be bound by his parents to arbitrate per-
sonal injury claims when the minor had the right to file claims in court.36
The court stated:
If a parent cannot prospectively release the potential [tort] claims
of a minor child, then a parent does not have authority to bind a
minor child to an arbitration provision that requires the minor to
waive their right to have potential claims for personal injury filed
in a court of law.37
In Accomazzo v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc.,38 a child was en-
rolled in a private educational program for juveniles with emotional, behav-
ioral, and academic difficulties. 39  The enrollment contract signed by the
child's parents included an arbitration provision that required all disputes
arising from the agreement to be submitted to binding arbitration."n When
the child was injured in a physical confrontation with one of the school's
counselors during a counseling session,4 the minor's parents brought claims
of battery, negligence, and violation of state laws protecting children.42 The
school moved to stay litigation and bind the child to the arbitration provision
signed by his parents, but the motion was denied by the district court.43 In
affirming the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court of Idaho ruled that
the minor was not bound to the arbitration provision based on the language in
the contract.
44
In Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Gaskamp,45 a child living in her fam-
ily's new mobile home began to suffer from breathing difficulties and had to
be hospitalized because of a respiratory disease caused by exposure to for-
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that a release signed by parent does not protect defendant from mi-
nor's cause of action).
36. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *4.
37. Id.
38. 15 P.3d 1153 (Idaho 2000).
39. Id. at 1154.
40. Id. at 1155.
41. Id. at 1156.
42. Id. at 1155. The Accomazzos also brought causes of action for breach of contract,
common law fraud, violation of Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, and negligence. Acco-
mazzo, 15 P.3d at 1155.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1156. Although the court held that the child was not compelled to arbitrate, the
Accomazzo parents were bound to arbitrate the battery, negligence, and state children's pro-
tection claims because the waiver was considered and consented to by the parents and CEDU
Educational Services when the contract was signed. Id.
45. 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002).
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maldehyde.46 The parents brought personal injury claims on behalf of their
children against the manufacturer of the home, the home seller, the manufac-
turer of particles in the home, and the financing company.47 Two defendants
responded by moving to compel arbitration against the entire Gaskamp fam-
ily because the parents had signed a contract containing an arbitration provi-
sion that "knowingly and voluntarily" waived the family's right to a jury
trial.48 Although the children did not sign the agreement, and the Gaskamp
parents did not expressly agree to submit their children's claims to arbitra-
tion,49 the district court ruled that the children were bound to settle their
claims out of court because the children's use of the mobile home derived
from the parents' use of the property.5° The Gaskamps appealed."
Like the federal court in Troshak, the appellate court in Fleetwood had
to determine how the state's supreme court would rule on the issue since the
matter had never been heard before in Texas. 2 The court applied Texas con-
tract law relating to third-party beneficiaries and non-signatories.5 3 Before
Fleetwood, Texas case law held that non-signatories were bound to arbitrate
when the non-signatory party brings suit on the contract and the non-
signatory was a third-party beneficiary. 54 After its analysis, however, the
Fleetwood panel reversed the district court's ruling and found that the chil-
46. Id. at 1071-72. All of the members of the Gaskamp family-including two other
Gaskamp children-suffered health problems from the formaldehyde exposure. Id. at 1071.
47. Id. at 1072. The Gaskamps filed suit in Mississippi state court against, respectively,
Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., Manufactured Bargains, Georgia-Pacific Corporation (Georgia-
Pacific), and Bombadier Capital. Id.
48. Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1071-72. Fleetwood and Georgia-Pacific filed their motions
in the Southern District of Texas. Id. The arbitration agreement was part of a financing
agreement for the home. Id. at 1071.
49. Id. at 1074 n.2.
50. Id. at 1072-73. The district court did not cite any authority for its rationale and hold-
ing. Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1072-73.
51. Id. at 1071. In addition to arguing that their children were not bound to arbitrate, the
Gaskamps also asserted that the arbitration agreement should be declared void because of
procedural unconscionability. Id.
52. Id. at 1076.
53. Id. at 1074; Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 432. Third-party beneficiaries are
not parties to contracts, but still benefit from the promises made in the contracts. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1480 (6th ed. 1990). A non-signatory is a party who does not personally
sign a contract or agree to the document through an agent. Contra id. at 1381. Nevertheless,
a non-signatory becomes a party to the contract. Id.
54. Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 2002). Under the
common law of contracts and agency-which the appellate court considered in its analysis-
there are seven general exceptions providing a basis to bind non-signatories to arbitration
agreements: agency, assumption/implied conduct, alter ego/veil piercing, assumption, estop-
pel, incorporation by references, successor in interest, and third-party beneficiaries. Id. at
1076; 1 DoMKE & WILNER, supra note 23; Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 436.
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dren were not compelled to arbitrate their causes of action "simply because
they are minors and their claims are related to those of their parents. 55 In
addition, because the children did not sign and were not bound to the agree-
ment, they were incidental-not third-party--beneficiaries, and their cause
of action was based in tort, not on the contract.56
B. Children Can be Bound to Arbitrate Claims
There is a split within the Fifth Circuit regarding a parent's ability to
bind children to arbitration to settle their personal injury claims. 17 The par-
ents in Costanza v. Allstate Insurance Co.58 brought claims against various
businesses and organizations for the personal injuries their children suffered
when water leaked into their home. 9 In response, two defendants moved to
compel arbitration for the family's claims based on the arbitration agreement
signed by the parents.6" Relying on Fleetwood, the parents claimed that their
children should not have their claims settled by arbitration because the mi-
nors were not third party beneficiaries or bringing a cause of action on the
contract.6' The district court held that the children could seek personal injury
claims as it related to the homebuilder's contract and the other contracts at
bar because the children were not enforcing the provisions of these agree-
ments nor were they third-party beneficiaries.62 However, the Costanza
panel held that the children were bound to arbitrate their claims pursuant to
the arbitration clause of the limited warranty agreement because the court
reasoned that the children were pursuing claims under the contract, not in
55. Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1076.
56. Id. at 1077; e.g., 1 DOMKE, supra note 23; 1 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 12:9 (rev. ed. 2003); see Children not Bound by Parents' Agreement to Arbi-
trate, 13 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 207, 208 (2002). The Gaskamp parents, however,
were still bound to arbitrate their claims because, as contract signatories, they did not raise any
valid defenses against the arbitration provisions. Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1077.
57. See Doug Uloth & Hamilton Rial, Enforcing Arbitration Against Nonsignatories, 65
TEX. B.J. 802, 806-07 (2002).
58. No. CIV.A.02-1492, 2002 WL 31528447, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2002).
59. Id. The Costanzas filed claims against the manufacturer who designed the exterior
insulation and finish system for their house, the homebuilder, the installer of the system,
Allstate Insurance, the Residential Warranty Corporation (RWC), the Western Pacific Mutual
Insurance Company (WPIC), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Id.
60. Id. at * 1-2. RWC and WPIC moved to stay the proceedings after the Costanza par-
ents had signed an application for a limited warranty that included a binding arbitration clause.
Id.
61. Costanza, 2002 WL 31528447, at *6 (relying on Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1073).
62. Id. at *7.
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tort.63 In staying the children's proceedings, the court stated that the children
"cannot avail themselves of the benefits of the contract and not be bound by
its restrictions. 64
Although a personal injury claim was not involved, the issue of whether
a child was bound to an arbitration agreement over other tortious acts was
raised in Cross v. Carnes.65 In Cross, the minor first brought defamation and
fraudulent concealment claims against the "Sally Jessy Raphael" television
program.66 The show moved to stay proceedings pending arbitration based
on a release and consent form containing an arbitration provision the mother
had signed on her daughter's behalf.6 The arbitration clause stated that the
minor would arbitrate any controversy arising from the show's consent and
release form or her appearance on the program. 68 The trial court stayed the
proceedings, and Cross appealed. 69 Ohio's Eleventh District Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the ruling, basing its rationale on cases in other jurisdictions
where parents could bind their children's claims to arbitration.7 ° The court
also relied on a ruling made by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 724 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 11 th Ct. App. 1998).
66. Id. at 830. Heather Cross's (Heather) claim was brought in Ohio by and through her
mother Karen Cross (Cross) after Heather appeared on an episode entitled "Teen Girl Bul-
lies." Id. at 830-31. The Crosses allege that the theme of the program was fraudulently con-
cealed from them. Id. As part of the episode, Patti and Corinna Carnes falsely portrayed
Heather as a bully on national television. Id. at 831. Cross amended the complaint to rescind
the release and the arbitration clause for a lack of assent. Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 831.
67. Id.
68. See id. The provision read in part: "Any dispute arising out of this RELEASE,
and/or of my appearance on SALLY JESSY RAPHAELTM will be resolved by binding arbi-
tration ... in New York City and will be governed by the procedural and substantive law of
New York." Id. In general, tort claims like the one brought in Cross are not subject to arbi-
tration because torts typically do not arise out of contract but occur between parties who are
not familiar with each other, e.g., automobile accidents. Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability:
Current Trends in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 931 (1996). However, Cross ap-
pears to be an exception to the rule. See id. at 932. It also appears that the producers of
"Sally Jesse Raphael" anticipated tortious conduct in Cross and included the arbitration
agreement in the contract in order to reduce any potential liability. See id. Although the lan-
guage of the arbitration provision in Cross .was broad, Cross's tort claim was arbitrable be-
cause the claim was related to the subject matter of the show contract. See Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD
A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 57:31 (4th ed. 2001).
69. Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio I th Ct. App. 1998).
70. Id. at 836; see also Doyle v. Giulucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965).
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parents could bind their children to exculpatory agreements to participate in
nonprofit sports activities.7" In its holding, the court stated:
The parent's consent and release to arbitration only specifies the
forum for resolution of the child's claim; it does not extinguish the
claim. Logically, if a parent has the authority to bring and conduct
a lawsuit on behalf of the child, he or she has the same authority to
choose arbitration as the litigation forum.
72
The analyses applied and conclusions reached by the respective courts
in the previous cases further illustrate the split involving binding arbitration
and children's personal injury claims. In determining if parents can bind
children to arbitration provisions, the courts will either apply a strict contract
analysis or a public policy analysis based on the parent-child relationship.73
The courts' rationales in Accomazzo, Fleetwood, and Costanza predomi-
nantly focused on the application of ordinary principles of state contract law,
instead of the ability of a parent to waive a minor's right to bring a cause of
action when that child suffers a personal injury.74 Despite applying like
analyses, the courts reached different conclusions.
75
In assessing the validity of the arbitration agreements in their respective
cases, the courts in Troshak and Cross both focused on the authority of par-
ents to release the potential claims of their children.76 However, the respec-
tive holdings in these cases stand in sharp contrast and reveal differing views
concerning arbitration agreements. The Troshak court viewed the arbitration
provision as a substantive release of liability, while the court in Cross rea-
soned that the arbitration agreement was merely a procedural matter.77 In
validating the arbitration provision for possible tortious conduct, the court's
holding in Cross implies that minors still have an opportunity to seek relief if
71. Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836 (citing Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201,
205 (Ohio 1998)).
72. Id.
73. See Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 2002); Co-
stanza v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.02-1492, 2002 WL 31528447, at *6-7 (E.D. La. Nov.
12, 2002); Troshak v. Terminix Int'l Corp., No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401963, at *4
(E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998); Accomazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs., 15 P.3d 1153, 1156 (Idaho 2000);
Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836.
74. See Accomazzo, 15 P.3d at 1156; Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1074; Costanza, 2002 WL
31528447, at *6-7.
75. See Accomazzo, 15 P.3d at 1156; Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1074; Costanza, 2002 WL
31528447, at *7.
76. See Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *4; Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836.
77. Troshak, 1998 WL 401963, at *5-6; Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836; Appellee's Answer
Brief at 8, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910).
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they are injured.78 Until additional cases that directly address this issue be-
come commonplace, other forums will have to determine what analyses to
apply and conclusions to reach on a case-by-case basis.
79
1II. A FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF SHEA
Before falling asleep on the night of July 19, 2000, Garrit Shea ("Gar-
rit") thanked his mother Molly Bruce Jacobs ("Jacobs") for taking him on an
African safari to Botswana and Zimbabwe.80 The expedition was organized
by Global Marketing Travel ("Global"), a Fort Lauderdale-based corporation
conducting business and offering tours for more than fifteen years as the
Africa Adventure Company.8' "I can't wait until tomorrow," Garrit said. 2
Tomorrow would be a day that was supposed to be the highlight of Gar-
rit's twenty-five day safari, which was Garrit's second African expedition. 3
The eleven-year-old boy from the Baltimore suburbs with a keen interest in
the animal kingdom was back in the African bush and coming into contact
with the wildlife he had grown to know, love, and respect.84 The straight-A
student, aspiring hockey goalie, and "gentle spirit"s also grew to appreciate
the diverse cultures of the bushmen, who he had traveled with on hunting
outings and danced with in their villages.86
Tomorrow never came for Garrit. While he slept alone in his tent on
the perimeter of the Xakanaxa Campsite in Botswana's Okavango Delta on
that fateful night, a pack of hyenas entered Garrit's tent, mauled him, and
78. See Schalley, supra note 1, at 202.
79. See Fleetwood Enter., Inc., 280 F.3d at 1076.
80. Brucie Jacobs, My Son Garrit, 'Little Bum' Tribute, BALT. SUN, Sept. 17, 2000, at
I H, available at http://www.sunspot.net.
81. Noah Bierman & Scott Hutchinson, Broward Firm Faces Suit in Safari Death of Boy,
11, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 24, 2003, at 2B; Rafael A. Olmeda, Court Lets Suit Against Travel
Firm Go Ahead, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 24, 2003, at 4B; Cunningham, supra note 7.
82. Jacobs, supra note 80.
83. See Lynn Anderson & Tom Bowman, Brooklandville Boy Killed in Hyena Attack in
Botswana, BALT. SUN, July 20, 2000, at 24B, available at http://www.sunspot.net; Jacobs,
supra note 80; Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81. Garrit had made his first safari to Bot-
swana with Jacobs and his older brother in 1999. Id. Garrit's father, Mark Shea, who is di-
vorced from Jacobs, did not go on the expeditions in 1999 or 2000. id.
84. See Jacobs, supra note 80; Ann LoLordo, Mark Garrity Shea, 11, Loved Science,
Sports, BALT. SUN, July 24, 2000, at 4B, available at http://www.sunspot.net. Garrit was from
Brooklandville, Maryland, and owned dogs, cats, birds, a rooster, hens, lizards, and emus. Id.;
Anderson & Bowman, supra note 83. He collected an elephant tusk, a whale tooth, and a bear
claw during the family's various trips across the United States and to Africa, Australia, the
Caribbean, and Mexico. Id.
85. LoLordo, supra note 84 (quoting Garrit's great aunt Rachel Garrity).
86. See Jacobs, supra note 80.
2003]
178
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
dragged him into the bush.87 Garrit's mother and the tour guides heard his
screams, but they were too late to stop the attack and were not able to search
out Garrit in the darkness.8 His mother and the guides did not find Garrit
until they discovered his body near the tour campsite the following day.89
Garrit had been decapitated. 90
Prior to their departure to Africa, Jacobs agreed to all of the terms of
Global's tour contract so she and Garrit could participate in the safari. 9' The
tour contract included a waiver that released Global for any liability that may
have occurred during the tour.92 The release stated in part:
I HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, INDEMNIFY, and AGREE
NOT TO SUE THE AFRICA ADVENTURE COMPANY ... for
any and all losses, damages, or injuries or any claim or demand on
account of injury or emotional trauma ... or on account of death
resulting from any cause.. .while the undersigned is participating
in a tour or any travel or other arrangements by THE AFRICA
ADVENTURE COMPANY ....
Pursuant to a provision in the contract, Jacobs also assented that any
dispute arising from the agreement would be settled in the following manner:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agree-
ment, or the making, performance or interpretation thereof, shall
be settled by binding arbitration in Fort Lauderdale, FL, in accor-
dance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association then
existing, and judgment on the arbitration award may be entered in
any court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the contro-
versy.
94
87. Id.; Cunningham, supra note 7; Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81.
88. Cunningham, supra note 7. Jacobs was in a nearby tent recapping the day's events
into a tape recorder when the attack occurred. 1d.
89. Id.
90. Id. The legal counsel for Global Travel Marketing/The African Adventure Company
said that Garrit's death marked the first time that there had been a fatality on one of the com-
pany's tours. Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81.
91. Shea I, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004. The applicable provision of the contract reads:
"1, as parent or legal guardian of the below named minor, hereby give my permission for this
child or legal ward to participate in the trip and further agree, individually and on behalf of my
child or ward, to the terms of the above." Id. at D2005.
92. Id. at D2004.
93. Id.
94. Appellant's Brief at 5, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910).
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In 2001, Mark Shea ("Shea")-Garrit's father-brought suit against
Global as the personal representative of Garrit's estate, alleging that the
company's negligence led to his son's death.95 He attempted to recover
damages for pain and suffering under the Florida Wrongful Death Act,
96
which is intended to shift the losses resulting from an individual's untimely
demise from the decedent's survivors to the liable party.97 Global moved to
stay proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to the tour contract. 98 Shea
countered Global's motion on grounds that Jacobs did not have the legal
authority to waive her son's right to a jury trial via the arbitration provision,
and that Garrit and Shea were not parties to the agreement.99 The trial court
ruled that Garrit could be bound to the arbitration clause because parents
have the right to choose the forum for their children's claims, and Florida
and federal law favor arbitration.' Since Shea brought suit on behalf of
Garrit's estate, he was also bound to the provision.' Shea appealed.0 2
95. Cunningham, supra note 7; Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81. Shea alleged that
Garrit should not have been allowed to sleep alone in the tent, the tent was not properly se-
cured, the tour guides did not check to see if the tent was made safe by the tent's dual zipper
mechanism, and that a buildup of garbage on the perimeter of the camp attracted the hyenas.
See id.; Cunningham, supra note 7. Shea argued that the failure to take these precautions led
to Garrit's death. E.g., Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
96. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004; FLA. STAT. § 768.16-.27 (2002). A parent or
parents of a deceased child can recover for mental pain and suffering when the minor's injury
occurs. § 768.21(4). Jacobs also attempted to file a wrongful death suit against Global, but
the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling holding that Jacobs had to
arbitrate her claims against Global. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004; Jacobs v. Global
Travel Mktg., Inc., 796 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Cunningham, supra note 7.
Jacobs is currently in arbitration with Global. Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81.
97. § 768.17.
98. Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., Inc., No. 01-10128, 2002 WL 215330, at *1 (Fla. 17th
Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Shea III]. Global made an alternative motion to dismiss the
case pursuant to the arbitration agreement. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at *4.
101. Id. at *5. Shea argued that he should not have been bound to the agreement because
he did not sign the release. Shea 11, 2002 WL 215330, at *5. The trial court agreed. See id.
However, the court reasoned that since Shea did not bring a cause of action in an individual
capacity, the trial court found that Shea "stood" in Garrit's shoes by bringing suit on behalf of
Garrit's estate. Id. Therefore, since Garrit was bound to the arbitration provision, the estate's
personal representative was also bound. Id.
102. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
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IV. THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL'S ANALYSIS IN SHEA:
PUBLIC POLICY AND PARENS PA TR1AE
Since arbitration is strictly a creature of contract, °3 the Shea court ap-
plied Florida contract law to assess the arbitration agreement."° The court
addressed the validity of the provision in Shea by focusing its analysis on the
public policy concerns of parents contracting for their children. 5 Under
Florida law, a contract that violates public policy runs counter to the "public
right or the public welfare"'0 6 or an established societal interest.'0 7 The court
believed that the ability of parents to contract away the potential legal claims
of their children under circumstances not supported by public policy-
including commercial travel-was not acceptable under Florida law.' Per-
103. 1 OEHMKE, supra note 2, at § 5:2; McLaughlin, supra note 68, at 931; see also Acco-
mazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs., Inc., 15 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Idaho 2000) ("The question of arbi-
trability is a question of law properly decided by the court.").
104. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005. Global attempted to persuade the court that
Maryland contract law should have been used in the case under the doctrine of lex loci con-
tractus. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 19-21, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No.
4D02-910). Lex loci contractus denotes the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was
made and also signifies what law governs the contract. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (6th
ed. 1990). Global asserted that since Jacobs and Shea were residents of Maryland and all of
the material events concerning the tour contract took place in Maryland, that state's law
should govern the agreement. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 20-21, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L.
Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910). The appellate court rejected Global's claims because
Global never made the argument at trial. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004; see Appellant's
Reply Brief at 1, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910).
105. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005. The substantive definition of public policy was
first outlined in City of Leesburg v. Ware, 153 So. 87, 89 (Fla. 1934) (adopting the opinion of
Wannamaker, J., in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E.
505, 506-07 (Ohio 1916)). Under Florida law, public policy is the common sensibility and
conscience of communities across the state as it pertains to matters of health, safety, welfare,
and morals. Ware, 153 So. at 89 (adopting Kinney, 115 N.E. at 507).
106. At. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Beazley, 45 So. 761, 774 (Fla. 1907). Ironically, the
court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. held that contracts that are violative of public policy
"encourages negligence ... it would have a tendency to induce the employment of men less
prudent and careful, which would tend to endanger the lives of travelers." Id.
107. Ware, 153 So. at 89 (adopting Kinney, 1 5 N.E. at 507).
108. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006. The court recognized that health care, health
insurance, and "commonplace" or "school supported" activities as the types of functions
where parental waivers would be supported by public policy. Id. The court ruled that "[w]e
need not decide, here, what additional circumstances would support such a waiver." Id.
However, the Shea panel, basing its reasoning on Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696
N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1998), also found that "non-profit entities, their employees and volunteers
do not fall within the ambit of this opinion" because of the benefits those organizations and
individuals provide to children. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004. In Zivich, the Supreme
Court of Ohio validated the use of exculpatory agreements for "community recreational activi-
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mitting parental waivers in these circumstances, the court reasoned, would
defy public policy because minors would not have an opportunity to seek
legal relief. 9
In reaching its conclusion, the Shea court's public policy analysis of the
arbitration provision and application of parens patriae relied on holdings
from other jurisdictions assessing the validity of parental waivers binding
children to exculpatory agreements." 0 The panel followed the reasoning of
Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co.,"' where the Supreme Court of Colorado held
that the state's public policy prevented parents from releasing their children's
potential claims either before or after suffering a personal injury via an ex-
culpatory agreement." 2 The court in Cooper stated: "children still must be
protected against parental actions-perhaps rash and imprudent ones-that
foreclose all of the minor's potential claims for injuries caused by another's
negligence."" 3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal was persuaded by the
Supreme Court of Colorado's "overarching policy"1 4 that protected minors
regardless of the actions of their parents." 
5
Adopting the reasoning in Cooper, the panel then relied on Florida
statutory law and state case law." 6 The statutory basis for the court's ruling
focused on state law that prohibited parents, as the natural guardians of their
children," 7 from binding their children to settle claims over $15,000."' The
ties" since they "serve an important function" for children and the community. Zivich, 696
N.E.2d at 205.
109. See Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 12 (Wash. 1992) (stating that "the
child would have no recourse against a negligent party to acquire resources needed for care
and this is true regardless of when relinquishment of the child's rights might occur."); Shea 1,
28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005.
110. See id. at D2005-06.
111. 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002).
112. Id.; accord Scott, 48 P.3d at 11-12; Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah
2001). In Cooper, a minor lost vision in both eyes when he was injured in a skiing accident.
Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1232. Before the Supreme Court of Colorado's ruling in the case, the trial
and appellate courts both held that the teenager could not bring action against his coach and
the Aspen Ski club for his injuries because of a release signed by the child's mother. Id. at
1231-32.
113. Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1234.
114. Id.
115. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005.
116. Id.
117. Id. Section 744.301(1) of the 2002 Florida Statutes states, "[t]he mother and father
jointly are natural guardians of their own children and of their natural guardians of their own
children and of their adopted children, during minority." FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (2002).
118. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004. Section 744.387(2) of the Florida Statutes re-
quires the court to appoint a legal guardian to a minor when the child's settlement claim will
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panel also based their rationale on Florida cases holding that parents could
not release their child's ability to file compulsory counterclaims,' 9 waive
their child's privilege concerning patient-psychotherapist confidentiality,120
and enter into private agreements for child support and custody absent court
approval.' 2' Interestingly, the panel did not provide great explanation or
analysis on another Florida case that it relied upon that shared similarities
with Shea.22 In Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc., 23 the court held that a child
who had been injured while horseback riding could file a cause of action
against the defendant for its negligence although the minor had signed a re-
lease of liability.2 4 Public policy, the Dilallo court reasoned, prevented chil-
dren from being bound to contractual pre-injury waivers signed by minors
and also allowed children to pursue legal claims.
25
V. THE SHEA COURT'S RULING WAS PROPER UNDER PUBLIC POLICY AND
PARENS PA TRIAE
The ruling in Shea has drawn criticism on some fronts as being inap-
propriate, impractical-and unconstitutional 126 -- intermeddling into parents'
decision-making and authority.2 7 Detractors may assert that the verdict re-
flects the court's distrust for parental discretion. 2  However, "[p]ublic pol-
exceed $15,000. § 744.301(2)-(3). If the settlement amount is less than $15,000, then the
child is bound to the settlement amount negotiated by the child's parents. Id.
119. See Romish v. Albo, 291 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
120. See Attorney ad Litem for D.K. v. Parents of D.K., 780 So. 2d 301, 308 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a seventeen-year-old girl had patient-psychotherapist privi-
lege that could not be waived or asserted by parents).
121. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005; see also Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 267
(Fla. 1976) (holding that an illegitimate minor's right to child support cannot be released by
mother's contract because the child's rights and benefits are affected).
122. Like Shea, the case of Dilallo v. Riding Sqfely, Inc., 687 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) was also a case of first impression in Florida and was heard by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 357.
125. See id.
126. Appellee's Answer Brief at 24, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004 (No. 4D02-910).
On appeal, Global argued that the "fundamental due process rights to raise and control their
children" were at issue in Shea. Id. Global asserted that a parent's right included the ability
to choose the activities for their children, "whether it be participating on a soccer team or
traveling on an African safari." Id. at 26. Agreeing to arbitrate or release a minor's claims,
Global claimed, were the rights parents "must have" to raise their children. See id.
127. Cunningham, supra note 7.
128. See Brian A. Dominic, Note, The Children [and the Timorous May] Stay At Home:
Hawkins v. Peart, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 601, 618.
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icy is the cornerstone-the foundation-of all constitutions, statutes, and
judicial decisions; and its latitude and longitude, its height and its depth,
greater than any or all of them."' 29 The primary principle of public policy is
justice. 130
When a parent agrees to arbitrate the personal injury claims suffered by
their children and deprive the minor of the right to a jury trial-or in Shea,
the estate of a child to seek legal relief-when the child is injured as a result
of another party's tortious act or negligence, there is an injustice.' 3 ' The par-
ents are allowing a liable party to escape any harsh repercussions from their
tortious or negligent actions.'32 Regardless of their intentions and motiva-
tions,'33 when a parent forecloses his or her child's right to recover'34 "carte
blanche,"' 35 the need for commercial enterprises to adhere to the reasonable
standard of care loses its significance. 36 After the court's ruling in Shea,
however, businesses in Florida will not be able to use arbitration agreements
to prevent juries from hearing the personal injury claims brought by mi-
nors.' 37 Commercial enterprises will also be more vigilant to prevent chil-
dren from being injured as a result of the company's negligence.' 38
Parents often have to decide whether to release their child's claims
against potential tortfeasors and other negligent parties.'39 However, parents
may not fully understand the significance or the legal repercussions for their
children when parents-including parents who are also attorneys'a-bind
minors to arbitrate potential causes of action. 4' Parents must address the
129. City of Leesburg v. Ware, 153 So. 87, 89-90 (Fla. 1934) (adopting and quoting opin-
ion from Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 506-
07 (Ohio 1916)).
130. See Ware, 153 So. 87 at 89.
131. See Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2002); Scott v. Pac. W.
Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 9 (Wash. 1992).
132. See Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1237.
133. Angeline Purdy, Note, Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort: Erroneously Invali-
dating Parental Releases of a Minor's Future Claim, 68 WASH. L. REV. 457, 474 (1993)
(criticizing the Supreme Court of Washington's ruling in Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort,
834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992)).
134. Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 200 1).
135. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
136. Hawkins, 37 P.3d at 1066.
137. See Olmeda, supra note 81.
138. See Stephanie Francis Cahill, No Signing Safety Away, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, July 12,
2002, available at 2002 WL I No. 26 ABAJEREP 3.
139. See Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1234; Cahill, supra note 138.
140. See Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81. Garrit's mother Molly Bruce Jacobs is an
attorney. Id.
141. See Cahill, supra note 138; Andrew Murr, Sports Waivers: An Exercise in Futility?,
31 J.L. & EDUC. 114, 120 (2002).
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repercussions of signing parental agreements, conferring arbitration provi-
sions on a daily basis.'42 A parent's decision to release the tortfeasor of li-
ability undermines the parent's responsibility to protect the welfare of his or
her child.'43 Children need to be shielded from the sometimes unsophisti-
cated and naive decisions made by their parents.'" The state has an obliga-
tion to care and protect the interests of minors, 45 and the courts zealously
have to assert their role under parens patriae to ensure the welfare of chil-
dren. 46 As illustrated by its reliance on statutory and case law favoring the
protection of children, 47 the Shea panel properly recognized and invoked its
paramount rights under parens patriae.1
48
Before their children can participate in athletic activities, school clubs,
and community organizations, parents are generally required to waive their
child's legal right to seek relief.149 A majority of jurisdictions hold that pa-
rental waivers for these activities are not valid without prior judicial or statu-
tory approval' 50 and are violative of public policy. 5' However, when the
detriments of parental waivers containing arbitration provisions for com-
monplace children's activities are balanced with the social benefits of par-
ticipation in these functions, "[p]ublic policy does not forbid such an agree-
ment. In fact, public policy supports it.' ' 52 The courts and legislatures may
prohibit exculpatory agreements in common children's activities, but paren-
tal waivers for child-oriented activities promote public policy.'53 There is a
142. Stephanie Levy, Parent Cannot Contract Away Child's Right to Sue, TRIAL, Feb.
2002, at 97 (discussing Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1062 (Utah 2001).
143. Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2002); Hawkins, 37 P.3d at
1067.
144. Contra Robert S. Nelson, Comment, The Theory of the Waiver Scale: An Argument
Why Parents Should Be Able to Waive Their Children's Tort Liability Claims, 36 U.S.F. L.
REV. 535, 568 (2002).
145. See Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. 1992); Cooper, 48 P.3d
at 1234.
146. See McLaughlin, supra note 68, at 930.
147. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005.
148. See Appellant's Brief at 15, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910)
(citing Hancock v. Dupree, 129 So. 822, 823 (Fla. 1930) (holding that "[t]he court, when
asked to restore an infant, is not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian, but is to
give it due weight as a claim founded on human nature, and generally equitable and just")).
149. See Schalley, supra note 1, at 200; Nelson, supra note 144, at 560; Melinda Smith,
Note, Tort Immunity for Volunteers in Ohio: Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 32 AKRON
L. REV. 699, 714 (1999).
150. Id. at 714-15.
151. Murr, supra note 141, at 114.
152. Nelson, supra note 144, at 560 (quoting Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696
N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ohio 1998)).
153. SeeMurr, supranote 141, at 117.
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need for recreational activities for children'54 because minors benefit from
participating in organizations and functions that are conducted by schools,
volunteers, and parents.'55 Although minors voluntarily give up their right to
seek legal relief, community and school oriented activities provide children
with the opportunity to learn life skills and team building skills.'56 In turn,
the community at large benefits because community organizations, athletic
associations, and school-sponsored clubs can continue to operate and provide
opportunities for children.'57
However, there are possible concerns relating to the Shea court's vali-
dation of parental waivers with arbitration provisions for children's commu-
nity activities. Validating parental waivers for school-related functions and
organized sports leagues could cause youth organizations to lower the stan-
dard of care that ensures the safety of minors because these entities can es-
cape potential liability.'58 Allowing these organizations to avoid possible
liability contravenes public policy because children could be subjected to
unnecessary hazards produced by negligent actions and a lack of account-
ability. 59 The issue of parental waivers with arbitration clauses for chil-
dren's activities and the potential drop in the standard of care by youth or-
ganizations is a topic that will have to be monitored by the courts. Until
then, however, "[e]very learning experience involves risk."' 60
VI. INADEQUACIES OF THE COURT'S RULING IN SHEA
Like the panel in Shea, courts routinely apply public policy as the foun-
dation for their holdings when there is not a statutory or constitutional basis
for their decisions.' 6' Since Shea was a case of first impression, the Fourth
154. Purdy, supra note 133, at 475.
155. Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (4th Ct. App. 1990);
Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205. In Hohe, a fifteen-year-old girl was injured when she volunteered
to participate in a hypnotism show sponsored by her school's parent-teacher-student associa-
tion. Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 648. Although the minor and her father had signed a waiver
form as a condition to her participation in the show, the father still attempted to hold the
school, the association, and the school district liable for her injuries. Id. However, the appel-
late court ruled that the release was not void against public policy. Id. at 649. For a summary
of Zivich, see 696 N.E.2d at 205.
156. See Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649; Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205.
157. Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649; Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205.
158. Mark Seiberling, Note, Icing on the Cake: Allowing Amateur Athletic Promoters to
Escape Liability in Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 417,418 (2002).
Contra Purdy, supra note 133, at 475-76.
159. See Seiberling, supra note 158, at 417-18, 448.
160. Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
161. Purdy, supra note 133, at 464.
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District Court of Appeal's public policy decision will now serve as the
source for other similar rulings in the state unless the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida decides to hear the case as a matter of great public importance and render
an opinion. 62  Since the value of public policy is a variable concept, 163 a
court has a duty to clearly assert the principles that underlie its decision to
ensure that future rulings will remain consistent) 64 Verdicts that lack con-
viction or are vague make it difficult to apply and gauge legal standards. 65
The Shea panel articulated its public policy rationale as it related to par-
ents contracting on behalf of their children.'66 However, in applying its pub-
lic policy rationale, the court was ambiguous in some portions of its legal
analysis. Specifically, the court was silent-or was not clear--on the stan-
dard used to gauge the arbitration provision in Shea.6 7 If the Federal Arbi-
tration Act ("FAA") 168 did not apply to the provision, then the Florida Arbi-
tration Code 69 should have governed the agreement. 7° However, the district
court did not provide a governing standard of arbitration.
The court was also correct in its validation of parental waivers for
"commonplace child oriented ...or school supported activities."'' How-
ever, the Fourth District Court of Appeal did not specify what activities
would fall under the ambit of the panel's opinion. 72 The lack of clarity used
by the Shea panel in its rationale has created uncertainty' and casts doubt
on the legality of the court's verdict. 7 4 For the sake of legal consistency, the
court should have engaged and fully articulated the basis for its ruling.'75
A. The Court's Silence on an Arbitration Standard
The irony of the district court's silence on applying an arbitration stan-
dard in Shea is that both the Florida Arbitration Code and the FAA were
162. See id.
163. City of Leesburg v. Ware, 153 So. 87, 89 (Fla. 1934).
164. Purdy, supra note 133, at 465.
165. See id.
166. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
167. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
168. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
169. FLA. STAT. § 682.01-.22 (2002).
170. See Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 427.
171. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
172. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
173. Id.
174. See Purdy, supra note 133, at 465.
175. See id.
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applicable.'76 The Shea panel stated that Florida law would determine which
parties had entered into a valid binding arbitration agreement.' 77 Based on
the court's language, it would appear that the district court was applying the
Florida Arbitration Code 7 to govern the controversy. The Florida Arbitra-
tion Code applies to any written agreement or contractual provision between
two or more parties where the parties agree to arbitrate any dispute that may
arise during their transaction. 79 Agreements under the state's arbitration
laws are "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable"' 8 ° unless the parties stipulate
that the Florida Arbitration Code will not apply to the dispute,' 8' or if the
agreement states that arbitration will take place in another jurisdiction. 8 2
Jacobs and Global agreed to arbitrate any controversy that arose from
the tour contract; the arbitration provision did not expressly state that the
Florida Arbitration Code would not apply to the controversy.'83 The provi-
sion also stated that arbitration would be held in Fort Lauderdale,'84 which
gave the district court jurisdiction under the Florida Arbitration Code. 85 All
of these elements allowed the district court to utilize the Florida Arbitration
Code in its analysis. However, the court refused or was reluctant to do so.
86
The Shea panel's silence on the Florida Arbitration Code indicates that the
court did not believe it was necessary to factor in the state's arbitration laws
into its analysis or to be clear on its application of relevant state law.
The Florida Arbitration Code was not applied in Shea because, ar-
guendo, a court's analysis of an arbitration provision and a motion to compel
arbitration are the same under Florida law and federal law.'8 7 In addition,
176. See also Cross v. Carmes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ohio 11th Ct. App. 1998) (stating
that the Ohio arbitration statute and FAA were referable to arbitration action).
177. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005.
178. FLA. STAT. § 682.01-.22 (2002).
179. § 682.02.
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also Wickes Corp. v. Indus. Fin. Corp., 493 F.2d 1173, 1175 (5th Cir. 1974)
(ruling that the Florida Arbitration Code does not apply to contract when parties expressly
agree that statute will not be applied).
182. See Damora v. Stresscon Int'l, Inc., 324 So. 2d 80, 81-82 (Fla. 1975) (holding that
the provision to arbitrate future controversies in New York City did not apply to and was
outside the authority of the Florida Arbitration Code).
183. See Appellant's Brief at 5, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006 (No. 4D02-9 10).
184. Id.
185. See Damora, 324 So. 2d at 81-82.
186. Shea /, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
187. Benedict v. Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc., 846 So. 2d 1238, 1241-42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (citing the Supreme Court of Florida's analysis in Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750
So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999)). The existence of a valid written arbitration agreement, the exis-
tence of arbitrable issues, and the possible waiver of the right to arbitrate are the three factors
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since section two of the FAA is applicable in state and federal courts, 188 the
FAA preempts Florida law because of the national policy favoring arbitra-
tion. "' The preemptive power of the FAA is limited to maritime transactions
and contracts involving interstate commerce.' 90 The transaction in Shea did
involve interstate commerce-Maryland residents entered into the arbitration
agreement with a Florida corporation' 91 as part of a contract for a safari in
two African countries.192 The elements at bar allowed the district court to
utilize the FAA to govern the dispute in Shea.'93 However, the Shea panel
never addressed nor articulated the issue of the applicability of the FAA.' 94
The court's silence or lack of clarity on an arbitration standard carries
legal significance because it involves the "severability" of Shea's arbitration
provision.' 95 When arbitration clauses are governed by the FAA, state courts
are allowed to sever the arbitration provision "from the contracts in which
they are embedded."' 196 However, state courts are only permitted to deter-
mine the validity of the arbitration clause but cannot consider the validity of
the entire contract.'97 If the district court first decided that the arbitration
Florida courts use in their analyses of a motion to compel arbitration under the Florida Arbi-
tration Code or the FAA. Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636.
188. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984); Bagot & Henderson,
supra note 2, at 427.
189. See Keating, 465 U.S. at 10; Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 427.
190. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 419-20. Under the FAA,
commerce is defined in part as:
Commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United
States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between
any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and
any State or Territory or foreign nation ....
9 U.S.C. § 1.
191. Shea 111, 2002 WL 215330, at *2. The tour contract was signed by Jacobs, who also
signed the agreement on Garrit's behalf. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005. Global is a Fort
Lauderdale-based corporation. See id.
192. Appellee's Answer Brief at 12, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004 (No. 4D02-910).
193. See Shea 111, 2002 WL 215330, at *2. Aside from Accomazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs.,
15 P.3d 1153 (Idaho 2000), all of the other cases involving binding arbitration and the per-
sonal injury/tort claims of minors previously discussed in this Note did utilize the FAA. See
Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 2002); Costanza v. Allstate
Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.02-1492, 2002 WL 31528447, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2002); Troshak v.
Terminix Int'l Corp., L.P., No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401963, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 2,
1998); Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio 1 ith Ct. App. 1998).
194. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
195. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1967).
"[T]he question of 'severability' is one of state law . I..." ld. at 403. The Florida Arbitration
Code does allow issues subject to arbitration to be severed. FLA. STAT. § 682.03(3) (2002).
196. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402.
197. Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 833; see Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404.
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clause in the tour contract was not valid, it would have been proper for the
court to then determine the validity of the entire agreement.'98 The Shea
panel did not clearly articulate if it was severing the arbitration provision
from the rest of the tour contract to determine its validity.'99 Nevertheless,
the district court concluded that the arbitration provision was not valid be-
cause the contract-i.e., the parental waiver-lacked validity."' If the court
did apply the FAA to the dispute, did sever the arbitration provision from the
tour contract, and found that the arbitration clause was not valid because of
the contract's invalidity, then the Shea panel contravened precedent.20 1
B. The Court's Ambiguity Concerning Children's "Commonplace Child
Oriented or School Supported Activities " 202
The ruling in Shea delivers a clear statement that the courts will be vigi-
lant to safeguard the well-being of children. 23 However, aside from parental
waivers for medical services and insurance coverage, the district court did
not clearly specify other circumstances where judicial vigilance will be pre-
sent.2°4 The panel did allow for waivers for school sponsored and commu-
nity activities, but it stopped short of articulating what particular functions
would be permitted under the court's ruling.205 The ambiguity of the deci-
sion adds to the "confusion and inconsistency that currently plagues ' 2 6 pa-
rental waivers and arbitration agreements. 2 7 The ruling does not provide any
guidelines for parental discretion for certain activities, 20 and the legality of
parental consent forms containing arbitration provisions for various activi-
ties-field trips, scuba diving, camping, horseback riding, and theme
parks, 2 9 for example-will consistently be called into question. 210 This un-
198. See Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 835.
199. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004. The district court's only detectable analysis
of the severability issue concerns its acknowledgement of the trial court's decision to sever the
arbitration clause from the parental release. See id. at D2005.
200. See id. at D2004-05.
201. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403; Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 833.
202. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
203. See Sara Hoffman Jurand, Parent Cannot Sign Away Child's Rights, Colorado Court
Rules, TRIAL, Sept. 2002, at 82 (quoting Howard Davidson, director of the ABA Center on
Children and the Law, after the Supreme Court of Colorado's ruling in Cooper v. Aspen Ski-
ing Co., 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002)).
204. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
205. Id.
206. Nelson, supra note 144, at 556.
207. See id.
208. Cunningham, supra note 7 (quoting family law attorney Richard Milstein).
209. Id.; Olmeda, supra note 81.
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certainty will cause other courts to determine what is a commonplace activity
for children,2 ' which will create a backlog in the court system.1 2
The lack of clarity concerning children's community oriented and
school supported functions also places an undue burden on businesses.2 3
Service providers will not be aware or sure of the validity of the waivers and
arbitration provisions they require parents to sign in order to avoid any liabil-
ity.21 4 It is fundamentally unfair for businesses not to know if their parental
waivers will protect them from potential lawsuits.21 5 Some businesses who
are unsure about the legality of their exculpatory agreements and arbitration
clauses may not allow minors to partake in their activities to avoid the risk of
potential litigation.2 6 As a result, children will be deprived of "recreational
and adventuresome activities ' 2 7 and various industries that cater to minors
will suffer.218
VII. CONCLUSION
As long as commercial arbitration continues to be a preferred method of
settling disputes, cases like Shea will undoubtedly become commonplace in
Florida and in other jurisdictions. However, the feasibility and appeal of
arbitration in Florida will have to be reconsidered in light of the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's groundbreaking ruling in Shea.2 9 Regardless of the
enterprise or activity, contracts entered into by parents on behalf of their
children that have arbitration provisions now lack validity if Shea's holding
remains unscathed. 2 0 The willingness of the Florida Legislature and judici-
ary to safeguard the legal interests of the state's children22" ' will override the
benefits arbitration offers litigants. Public policy and parens patriae should
be paramount when minors are deprived of their procedural and substantive
legal rights-often unknowingly-by their parents.
210. Id.; see Cunningham, supra note 7.
211. Id. (quoting Family Law Attorney Richard Milstein).
212. Id. (quoting Rodney Gould, attorney for Global).
213. See Nelson, supra note 144, at 556.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id.; Purdy, supra note 133, at 475; Dominic, supra note 128, at 618.
217. Dominic, supra note 128, at 619.
218. See id.; Cunningham, supra note 7.
219. Olmeda, supra note 81.
220. See discussion supra note 12 (discussing Shea's possible legal future).
221. See Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County Inc.'s Brief as Amicus Curiae at 4,
Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004 (No. 4D02-910) ("Florida state courts have been strong
proponents in establishing and protecting children's rights").
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Until there is legislative action to amend Florida's existing arbitration
laws, public policy and parens patriae should be inherent elements of a
court's legal analysis when a child's potential causes of action are in ques-
tion. However, in conducting their analyses, Florida courts, unlike the Shea
panel, should clearly articulate and assess both the public policy and legal
concerns involved."' Failing to do so will provide little guidance for courts
that will have to address this emerging legal issue. The Supreme Court of
Florida will see the need to resolve the issues raised in Shea, and in doing so,
the court will find that public policy and judicial vigilance for the protection
of the state's children will be the overriding factors in affirming the district
court's ruling.
222. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Termination of parental rights is the 'death penalty' of juvenile law."'
Terminating a parent's rights effectively severs completely and irrevocably
the rights of a parent in his or her natural child.2 The permanency and com-
pleteness of an action to terminate parental rights make it the most severe
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Nova Southeastern Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A. Florida
State University. The author wishes to acknowledge and thank her family and friends for their
endless love and support, Professor Michael Dale for his support and role as mentor and advi-
sor, all former and current professors that have contributed to her legal education, as well as
her fellow industrious colleagues of the NOVA LAW REVIEW for their untiring efforts.
I. Appellant's Initial Brief on the Merits at 3, N.S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family
Servs., 843 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2003) (No. SC02-261).
2. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
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legal intrusion into the sanctity of the family.3 It constitutes a direct interfer-
ence by the state into a parent's "essential" right to conceive and raise one's
child.4 Moreover, permanently severing the parent-child relationship has a
profound influence on the sociological and psychological well-being of the
child involved.5
Yet, despite the severe consequences of a termination of parental rights
suit, a termination of parental rights proceeding is not a criminal proceeding.6
For this reason, the absolute constitutional guarantee to court-appointed
counsel for indigent criminal defendants' is not afforded to indigent parents
in termination of parental rights proceedings.8 Nevertheless, many state
courts have broadened the right to counsel on state law grounds, construing
similar due process clauses requiring the appointment of counsel in their
state constitutions. 9
In Florida, parents have a statutory right to be represented by counsel in
a proceeding dedicated to the termination of parental rights.'" Given that this
right exists, it would naturally follow that a remedy must exist to right viola-
tions of this statutory entitlement." Yet, Florida courts have just recently
begun to address the specific question of whether the statutory right to ap-
pointed counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding carries an im-
plicit requirement that counsel's assistance be competent and effective. Flor-
ida's First District Court of Appeal addressed this precise issue in L. W. v.
Department of Children & Families,2 in which it held parents entitled to
court-appointed counsel in dependency proceedings are also entitled to com-
3. See id. at 759.
4. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). This case was the first in which the
United States Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right to family relations. See id. at
390. In this case the Court struck down a Nebraska law that forbade the teaching of a foreign
language to children under the age of fourteen. See id. The Court held that the law violated a
parent's Fourteenth Amendment right to raise their children. Id.
5. See generally Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of
Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 397 (1996).
6. S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).
8. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
9. Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings: The States'Response to Lassiter, 14 TOuRO L. REV. 247,251 (1997).
10. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2002).
1I. In re Isaac Oghenekevebe, 473 S.E.2d 393, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that if
section 7A-289.23 of the North Carolina General Statutes, guarantees a parent right to coun-
sel in termination of parental rights suit there should be a remedy to cure violations of the
statute).
12. 812 So. 2d 551 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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petent assistance of counsel. 3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal ad-
dressed the same issue in S.B. v Department of Children & Families,'4 in
which it rejected the courts holding in L. W.. 5 The issue of competent counsel
in dependency proceedings remained in an indeterminate state until July 10,
2003, when the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the decision in S.B..
This article will discuss the decisions in L. W. and S.B, as well as the fi-
nal ruling on the issue by the Supreme Court of Florida. Furthermore, this
article will conclude contrary to the Supreme Court of Florida's conclusion
in S.B., as it seeks to substantiate the right of indigent parents to effective
assistance of counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings in Florida.
In order to do that, this paper will begin by briefly discussing the interests at
stake in a termination hearing and the rights that are imperiled as a result of
those hearings. Next, there will be a brief discussion of the Florida Statutes
relating to termination of parental rights proceedings. Subsequently, this
article will address the evolution of the right to counsel in Florida. Follow-
ing, there will be a discussion of the holdings and implications of the appel-
late courts' decisions in L. W. and S.B. and the Supreme Court of Florida's
recent decision pertaining to the issue. Finally, this article will make a case
for competent counsel by addressing the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 6 the implications and
shortcomings of that decision, and the Supreme Court of Florida's decision
in S.B..
II. THE INTERESTS AT STAKE IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
PROCEEDINGS
A parent's interest in his or her child is a basic right of man,'7 more pre-
cious than a property right,' 8 warranting deference and protection.' 9 Tradi-
tionally, the United States Supreme Court has treated issues pertaining to the
family with deep respect and integrity, holding the privacy of the family unit
sacred. 20 A family has an intrinsic human right to be free from unnecessary
13. Id. at 555.
14. 825 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
15. Id. at 1061.
16. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
17. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
18. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
19. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
20. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (constitutional guarantees of personal
privacy extend to family relationships); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968) (parent's role in child bearing is "basic in the structure of our society"); Moore v. City
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state intrusion. 2' A parent's interest in the care and custody of his or her
child is superior to that of the state.22 Yet, a parent's right to raise his or her
child freely is not absolute, as it is subject to limitation by the state.23
Even though the institution of family is constitutionally protected, the
state has the power, under the "parens patriae" doctrine, 24 to interfere in the
parent-child relationship. 25 Parens patriae is founded on the idea that every
child's welfare is the concern of the state.26 Based on this doctrine, the state
cannot only infringe upon a parent's fundamental liberty interest, but can
destroy a family's structure by terminating a parent's rights completely and
irrevocably.2
7
There is often conflict between the constitutional protection of parental
decisions regarding families and the state's legitimate interest in protecting
their citizens, especially children. In light of this conflict, and because a
fundamental right is involved, state termination statutes should be construed
in a light most favorable to the parent.2 However, parental rights are "sub-
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (family is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition").
21. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-500 (finding that unlike the property interests that are also
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, liberty interests in family privacy has its source in
intrinsic human rights as they have been understood in American tradition).
22. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding the right of Amish parents
to provide private education oriented to their religious beliefs in spite of a Wisconsin law that
required minors to attend high school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding
that a law that prohibits instruction of foreign language to children is unconstitutional).
23. See Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to
State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 GEO. L.J. 213, 216 (1979) [hereinafter Right
to Family Integrity].
24. "Parens Patriae" is Latin for "'parent of his or her country"' and refers traditionally
to:
1. The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protec-
tion to those unable to care for themselves.... 2. A doctrine by which a government
has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, esp. on behalf of someone
who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.... The state ordinarily has no
standing to sue on behalf of its citizens, unless a separate, sovereign interest will be
served by the suit. -- Also termed doctrine ofparens patriae.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
25. Id.
26. Right to Family Integrity, supra note 23.
27. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
28. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Under the strict
scrutiny test, a state law impinging on a fundamental right must be justified by a compelling
state interest and must be drawn narrowly to limit state intrusion to situations where a compel-
ling state interest exists. Id; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973) (woman's
right to have abortion limited only at point during pregnancy where state interest became
compelling); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (finding the state interest in compulsory education insuf-
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ject to an overriding principle that it is the ultimate welfare or best interest of
the child that must prevail., 29 Thus, a termination of parental rights statute
should be interpreted so that it affords adequate protection to a parent's con-
stitutional rights while allowing severance of parental rights when the child's
interest in stability is paramount.3"
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN FLORIDA
Termination of parental rights is the modern statutory legal construct
that stems from the common law test that balanced a parent's rights and the
role of the state as parens patriae.31 In Florida, termination of parental rights
is governed by Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes.32 Terminating a parent's
right involves a two-step process.33 First, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that one of the grounds enumerated under section
39.806 of the Florida Statutes has been met,34 and the second step requires a
court determination that termination of parental rights would be in the best
interest of the child. 5
Termination of parental rights cases fall under two categories: those in
which the court has made a finding of dependency but the parents were pro-
vided an opportunity to regain custody through substantial compliance36 with
a case plan,37 and those situations in which there is no case plan or prospect
ficiently compelling to justify statute limiting the right to exercise religion and to raise chil-
dren in a chosen manner). A termination statute was struck down on the ground of vagueness
and substantive due process grounds in Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, 545 F.2d
1137 (8th Cir. 1976). Again strict scrutiny was applied to a termination statute one year later
in Roe v. Connecticut, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Again the statute was found to be
violative of due process because it did not promote a compelling state interest. See id.
29. In re J. L. P., 416 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
30. See Right to Family Integrity, supra note 23.
31. GILBERT PEREZ, FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 16.1, at 16-4(7th ed. 2001).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing § 39.802(4)(a)).
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.810, 39.802(4)(c) (2002); See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982).
36. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-5. A parent is in "substantial compliance" with a case
plan when "the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been signifi-
cantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered
upon the child's... being returned to the child's parent." § 39.01(68).
37. A case plan is an agreement between all parties involved in the dependency proceed-
ing that sets forth the actions to be taken by the parents, the Florida Department of Children
and Families and other professionals with the objective of rehabilitating the family unit. H.
Lila Hubert, In the Best Interests: The Role of the Guardian Ad Litem in Termination of Pa-
rental Rights Proceedings, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531, 546 (1994).
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of family reunification. 38 A petition for termination of parental rights is filed
without a case plan for reunification if: a parent has voluntarily surrendered
the child for adoption, the parents have abandoned the child, 39 a parent's
conduct threatens the life, well-being, safety, or physical, mental, or emo-
tional health of the child, the parent is incarcerated;4° or the parent has en-
gaged in egregious conduct,4' or had the ability and knowledge to prevent the
egregious conduct done to the child.42 To effectuate a petition for termina-
tion of parental rights on this basis, Florida's Department of Children and
Families must show that there are no less restrictive means to protect the
child.43
However, most cases arrive at the termination of parental rights stage
following an adjudication of dependency, where "a case plan has been filed,
and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the par-
ents. 44 A parent has twelve months from the date that the child was placed
into shelter to substantially comply with the case plan.45 If at the twelve-
month judicial review hearing the parents are found not to be within the req-
uisite compliance of the case plan, their parental rights are terminated.46
Because of this consequence, which involves the deprivation of certain
liberties, the United States Supreme Court has held that due process requires
38. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-5.
39. Section 39.01(1) of the Florida Statutes defines abandonment as "a situation in which
the parent . . .while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no
effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection
of parental obligations." § 39.01(1). A finding of abandonment may be made upon a deter-
mination by the court that the parents have only made "marginal efforts that do not evince a
settled purpose to assume all parental duties." Id.
40. See § 39.806(1)(d); L.E. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 783 So. 2d 346 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
41. § 39.806(1)(D. Egregious conduct is defined as "abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any
other conduct of the parent: that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of
conduct." § 39.806(l)(f)(2).
42. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-6-16-7. Other circumstances for termination of parental
rights without a case plan are: "the parent has subjected the child to aggravated child abuse,
sexual battery, or sexual abuse, or chronic abuse; [t]he parent has committed murder, volun-
tary manslaughter, or felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another
child, or has aided abetted, attempted, or conspired or solicited to commit any of these acts;
[t]he parent has had parental rights to a sibling of the child involuntarily terminated." Id.
43. Inre D.W., 793 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
44. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-7.
45. Id. The court can extend the case plan on a finding that the child's situation is "ex-
traordinary" and that the child's best interest will be served in doing so. § 39.703(2). The
Department of Children and Families can also terminate parental rights before the expiration
of the twelve-month period, if they determine that the parent, while able to do so, has not
substantially complied with the case plan. § 39.703(l).
46. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-7.
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states to support their allegations by clear and convincing evidence.47 The
United States Supreme Court arrived at this intermediate burden of proof
after finding that the preponderance of evidence standard that is usually re-
quired in a civil proceeding, fell short of the demands required to meet due
process. 8 This is because a termination of parental rights proceeding does
not fit within the usual parameters of either a civil or a criminal case.49 For
this reason, a parental severance proceeding is "best characterized as 'quasi-
prosecutorial.""'5 The adversarial nature of a termination of parental rights
proceeding, and the due process rights involved, warrant an absolute right to
counsel in Floridaf'
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN FLORIDA
According to chapter thirty-nine of Florida law pertaining to termina-
tion of parental rights, parents have an absolute right to counsel in termina-
tion of parental rights proceedings.5 2  However, according to the United
States Constitution, parents do not have an absolute right to counsel in these
suits. 3 Though courts have long recognized a natural parent's due process
right of notice and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding severing a par-
ents rights to custody of their child, the United States Supreme Court has
traditionally confined the constitutional right to counsel for indigent litigants
to defendants in criminal proceedings. 4 In the case of In re Gault, '5 the
47. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
48. Id.
49. Id. The reason why termination of parental rights proceedings do not fall comforta-
bly within the understood parameters of a civil or criminal proceeding is explained through:
The United States Supreme Court, in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982), [in which
they] stated that 'the fact- finding stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding bears
many of the indicia of a criminal trial' because of the following factors:
The Commissioner of Social Services charges the parents with permanent neglect. They are
served by summons. The factfinding hearing is conducted pursuant to formal rules of evi-
dence. The State, the parents, and the child are all represented by counsel ... the attorneys
submit documentary evidence, and call witnesses who are subject to cross-examination ....
[T]he judge then determines whether the State has proved the statutory elements [by the proper
burden ofprooj]. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Hubert, supra note 37, at 554 n.126.
50. Id. at 554.
51. N.S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 843 So. 2d 898, 904 (Fla. 2003) (stating that
"the right to counsel [in dependency proceedings] may flow from, and have its origins in, the
Sixth Amendment in the criminal context ... [as well as] concepts of due process under the
United States and Florida Constitutions . .
52. § 39.013(1).
53. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
54. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
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United States Supreme Court looked as if it was "paving the way for an ex-
panded right to counsel based on the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
'procedural due process through a fair hearing."' 56  However, the United
States Supreme Court decided contrary to what both state and federal courts
had anticipated,57 holding in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,5s that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not per se re-
quire that counsel be appointed for an indigent parent in a termination of
parental rights proceeding.59 Instead, the decision as to whether the Due
Process Clause requires appointed counsel for an indigent parent is left to the
trial court and subject to appellate review, in light of the private and govern-
ment interests at stake, "and the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions. 6°
Prior to the Lassiter court's holding, that indigent parents did not have
an absolute entitlement to court-appointed counsel, Florida case law recog-
nized the right to counsel for indigent parents in parental severance proceed-
ings. 6' In Florida, an indigent parent has an absolute right to be represented
by counsel, including the right to a state appointed attorney. 62 The Supreme
Court of Florida "has held 'that counsel is necessarily required under the due
process clause of the... Florida Constitution[], in [dependency] proceedings
involving the permanent termination of parental rights to a child, or when the
proceedings, because of their nature, may lead to criminal child abuse
charges."'63 Since October 1, 1998, the legislature has acknowledged that
the interests at stake in all dependency proceedings require representation by
counsel.' The court must advise a parent at every stage of a dependency or
55. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a juvenile in a civil proceeding that had a possibility
of involuntary commitment was constitutionally entitled to state appointed counsel).
56. Young, supra note 9, at 249 (quoting Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Right of Indigent
Parent to Appointed Counsel in Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights,
80 A.L.R. 3d 1141, 1144 (1977)).
57. Id. at 251.
58. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
59. See id. at 32.
60. Id. at 27.
61. See Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 260 (S.D. Fla. 1977); In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83
(Fla. 1980) (holding that the criminal due process requirement of court-appointed counsel at
the critical stages of arraignment, preliminary hearing, or custodial interrogation extends as
well to all stages of dependency procedure).
62. MICHAEL J. DALE, FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.2, § 10.3, at 10-4 (7th
ed. 2001) (citing FLA. STAT § 39.807(1)(a) (1998); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.515 (1998)) [hereinafter
Dale 1].
63. L.W. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 812 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (citing D.B., 385 So. 2d at 90).
64. § 39.013(1), (9)(a).
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parental termination proceeding of his or her right to counsel, and upon a
determination of indigence, he or she is entitled to state appointed counsel.65
If a parent waives the right to counsel in one stage of the dependency
proceeding, the offer must be renewed at each subsequent stage of the case.66
When parents request an attorney and state that they do not understand
the proceedings, the trial court must appoint an attorney to represent the par-
ents.67 Parents are initially advised of their right to counsel at the shelter
hearing and are given reasonable time for which to obtain counsel.68 The
importance of counsel at a dependency hearing is evidenced by Florida law
stating that if parents or legal guardians appear at the shelter hearing without
counsel, the hearing may be continued for up to seventy-two hours, allowing
these parents to consult with their attorney.69 Furthermore, before parents are
permitted to waive their right to counsel, the court must determine that the
parent understands the right to counsel and the parent is knowingly waiving
that right, intelligently, and of their own volition. 70 The court makes the de-
termination based on "the age, education, and experience of the party [in-
volved], the nature or complexity of the case, and other factors.'
Though the right to assistance of counsel is imperative and cannot be re-
linquished without judicial acknowledgement, Florida, until July of 2003,
was irresolute as to whether parents are entitled to competent assistance of
counsel in dependency cases.72
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASES
A. L.W. v. Department of Children & Families
On March 28, 2002, Florida's First District Court of Appeal decided
L. W. v. Department of Children & Families.7 3 In this case, the Department
of Children and Families filed a dependency petition alleging that a father
had sexually abused his stepdaughter and that the mother neglected to protect
65. § 39.013 (9)(a).
66. J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1068 (Fla. 2000).
67. McKenzie v. Dep't of Health Rehabilitative Servs., 663 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
68. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(3) (2002).
69. § 39.402(3).
70. § 39.013(9)(c)(1).
71. Dale 1, supra note 62 § 10.3, at 10-4.
72. See L. W., 812 So. 2d at 552; S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 1057
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
73. 812 So. 2d at 551.
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her daughter from the abuse.74 The petition further alleged that the parents'
two sons were at risk of prospective abuse because of the father's behavior
with his stepdaughter.75 The parents denied the allegations and were ap-
pointed an attorney by the trial court.76 After a hearing on the matter, the
court determined that the allegations were proven by the greater weight of
evidence.77 Subsequently, the trial court held a disposition hearing at which
the same attorney represented the parents." The court decided to adhere to
the disposition and the children were removed from the parents' home.79
Thereafter, the mother obtained the services of a different attorney, while the
father continued to be represented by the same attorney.8 After a period of
over a year, the mother was still unable to have any contact with her daughter
and the father could have no contact with any of his children.8' In November
2000, both parents retained new counsel and filed writs of habeas corpus to
set aside the orders of adjudication and disposition based on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.8 2 The trial court denied the petitions on the basis that, as a
matter of law, the remedies requested were not available.8 3
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal acknowledged that this
was the first time a Florida court had addressed the issue of competent coun-
sel as it relates to a dependency proceedings.8 4 In this case, the First District
Court of Appeal held consistent with the position taken by an overwhelming
amount of jurisdictions, 5 that an indigent parent, who has a constitutional
right to court-appointed counsel in dependency proceedings, also has a right
to competent counsel. 86 The court also determined as a matter of first im-
pression, that the criminal standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 7
applies to juvenile dependency proceedings.88 This standard would be util-
ized in determining whether court-appointed counsel was effective, as is nec-
essary to protect the parent's constitutional right to court-appointed counsel
74. Id. at 552.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 552.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 553.
82. Id.
83. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 554.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 556.
87. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
88. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 556.
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in dependency proceedings.89 The district court also determined that the ap-
propriate method for challenging the effectiveness of court-appointed coun-
sel is by a petition for writ of habeas corpus.90 Understanding that their de-
cision held extensive implications, the First District certified to the Supreme
Court of Florida the questions as to whether parents who are constitutionally
entitled to court-appointed counsel in dependency proceedings are also enti-
tled to competent assistance of counsel; and if so, is the proper procedure by
which to raise a claim of incompetent assistance of counsel a petition for
habeas corpus.9'
B. S.B. v. Department of Children & Families
In the meantime, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Florida was
presented with a similar issue in S.B. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies.92 In S.B., a mother sought to set aside an order adjudicating her two
children dependent.93 In 1998, the court held an arraignment hearing on the
issue of dependency but the mother ("S.B."), who was personally served and
had notice of the hearing, failed to appear.9" At trial the children's fathers,
who had completed their case plan and been awarded custody, appeared and
gave their consent to the adjudication of dependency. 95 "The court pro-
ceeded as if S.B. had consented as well, pursuant to section 39.506(3) of the
Florida Statutes.' ,96 S.B. and her appointed counsel were present at the dis-
position hearing, at which time S.B.'s children were adjudicated dependent.9 7
Thereafter, S.B.'s attorney filed a motion to vacate and set aside the finding
of consent by default, declaring in the motion that she had sent the judge a
letter in lieu of attending to which the judge responded, indicating he could
not accept ex parte communications.98 There was no subsequent ruling on
S.B.'s motion and she did not appeal her children's adjudication of depend-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 557.
91. Id. at 558.
92. 825 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
93. Id. at 1058.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing that section 39.506(3) of the Florida Statutes states, "[fjailure of a person
served with notice to personally appear at the arraignment hearing constitutes the person's
consent to a dependency adjudication.").
97. S.B., 825 So. 2d at 1058.
98. Id.
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ency.99 S.B. then filed a motion to dismiss and remedy the decision of the
trial court based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 00
The Fourth District held that although S.B. had a right to appointed
counsel, her right was not a constitutional right but a statutory one, and that
she has no right to challenge her counsel's performance other than filing a
malpractice action.'0' The court stated that the Supreme Court of Florida has
indicated only two situations in which a parent's right to counsel is a consti-
tutional right. 0 2 The first circumstance in which a parent has a constitutional
right to counsel, under the Due Process Clause of the United States and Flor-
ida Constitutions, is in proceedings involving permanent termination of pa-
rental rights, and the second is when the proceeding, because of its nature,
may lead to criminal charges.'0 3 In its analysis, the court rejects the First
District's holding that a constitutional right to counsel necessarily implies a
right to competent counsel."°M In doing so, the court asserts a dependency
proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, and therefore, a criminal defen-
dant's right to counsel and an indigent parent's right to counsel in a termina-
tion proceeding are different.0 5 That is, competent counsel is not a protec-
tion afforded indigent parents under due process considerations. 
06
In addition, the Fourth District Court of Appeal declined to extend the
right to counsel, to include the assistance of competent counsel, because if
the same relief recognized in post conviction criminal cases were afforded
parents, it would serve to further disrupt the lives of the children years after a
dependency decision was made.0 7 In concluding, the court stated that it does
not recognize a right to competent counsel in a dependency proceeding
whether the right to counsel is constitutional or statutory and that S.B.'s peti-
tion is insufficient and will not be treated as a writ of habeas corpus.'0 8 Sub-
sequently, the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida for
review. 9
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1058.
102. S.B., 825 So. 2d at 1059.
103. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980).
104. S.B., 825 So. 2d at 1060.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1061.
109. S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. SC02-2262, 2003 WL 21543565, at *l
(Fla. July 10, 2003).
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C. The Supreme Court of Florida Decides
On July 10, 2003 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's holding in S.B. v. Department of Children and Fami-
lies,"' which directly conflicts with the First District Court of Appeal's hold-
ing in L. W. "' That is that the right to court appointed counsel does not in-
clude a conclusive right to "collaterally challenge the effectiveness of coun-
sel."" 2 The Supreme Court of Florida contends that dependency proceedings
are civil in nature and it reiterates its decision. In the case of In re D.B.,' ,3
the court found that there is only a definitive constitutional right to counsel in
dependency proceedings under two circumstances: when the proceedings
may result in the permanent termination of parental rights, or when a parent
may be charged with criminal child abuse." 4  In all other circumstances the
right to counsel is not conclusive, rather the case-by-case approach estab-
lished in Potvin v. Keller... must be applied to determine if the right to coun-
sel in that particular dependency case is constitutional, and if not, it is merely
a statutory entitlement." 
6
Furthermore, the court distinguishes the litigants in L. W. from the liti-
gant in S.B., finding that in L. W. the parents faced criminal charges, thus they
had a constitutional right to counsel, unlike in S.B. where the defendant was
not criminally charged, thereby rendering her entitlement to counsel a statu-
tory right.'" In its holding, the Supreme Court of Florida made the inference
that only when there is a constitutional right to counsel... in a dependency
proceeding is there a right to pursue a collateral proceeding questioning the
competence of court-appointed counsel." 9 The Supreme Court of Florida
ultimately disapproved of the First District Court of Appeal holding in L. W.,
to the extent that it conflicts with its holding in S.B.." °
110. Id.
11. L.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 812 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
112. Id.; S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *1.
113. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
114. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *2 (citing In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980)).
115. 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975) (citing Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974)
which suggested, that the right to counsel in dependency proceedings would be dependent on
the potential length of the parent-child separation, the extent of restriction on parental visita-
tion, the presence or absence of parental consent, the presence or absence of disputed facts,
and the complexity of the proceeding).
116. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *3.
117. Id. at *3-4.
118. See D.B., 385 So. 2d at 90; Potvin, 313 So. 2d at 703.
119. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *5.
120. Id. at *5.
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VI. THE ERROR OF THEIR WAYS
In Florida, an indigent defendant in a dependency suit is entitled to
competent assistance of counsel only if he qualifies for a constitutional right
to counsel under either the Mathews v. Eldridge 21 or the Potvin v. Keller
balancing test. For this reason, the Supreme Court of Florida's handling of
S.B. is reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of
Lassiter.22 These two decisions make a parent's right in his or her child
determinant on the loss of personal liberty or a judicial prophecy that a pro-
ceeding will not end in the severance of the parent-child relationship.1
23
These cases are both inconsistent and symbolic of a giant step back in the
effort to ensure indigent parents receive fair access to and just results in court
proceedings. 124
The scales of justice in Lassiter and S.B. appear to have been unbal-
anced before the first fact was spoken before a judge. In both of the cases
the courts began with a presumption that criminal defendants have more of a
right to physical liberty then a parent has to his or her "flesh and blood."'1
5
Moreover, the two cases require the indigent defendants to overcome a hap-
hazard cases-by-case analysis, which has been criticized as an improper
method by which to protect fundamental rights. 26 In Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services, the Court left the constitutional appointment of counsel in
termination proceedings to be determined by the state courts on a case-by-
case basis.2 7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida in S.B. determined
that only parents who have a constitutional right to counsel have the right to
121. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see infra Section V.A.
122. Compare S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at * 1, with Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18 (1981).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18; S.B., v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 1057
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *1.
126. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)). A flexible case-by-case analysis was overruled in Gideon v. Wain-
wright. Id. Additionally, in 1998 the Florida Legislature passed section 39.013 of the Florida
Statutes, because of numerous appeals and inconsistent rulings resulting from the case-by-case
analysis. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NOVA L. REV. 139,
145 (1994) [hereinafter Dale 11].
127. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
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competent assistance of counsel and with two exceptions,128 a constitutional
right to counsel in Florida is determined on a case-by-case analysis. 29
A. The Problems with the Lassiter Case-By-Case Method of Review
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, a North Carolina Court of
Appeal sought to terminate the parental rights of an indigent mother without
providing her counsel. 30 In 1975, a North Carolina district court found
Abby Gail Lassiter's son to be neglected and removed him from her home,
placing him in the state's custody. 3' One year later, Ms. Lassiter was con-
victed of second-degree murder and sentenced to serve twenty-five to forty
years in prison. 32 In 1978, the Department of Social Services initiated a
proceeding to terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights in her son.' 133
Ms. Lassiter appeared at the termination hearing but was not accompa-
nied by counsel nor was she offered counsel by the court. 3 4 Without the
assistance of counsel, Ms. Lassiter failed to object to hearsay testimony, ar-
gued with the state's witness instead of cross examining her, and did not
utilize avenues of defense available to her. 35 At the conclusion of the hear-
ing, the court ordered that Ms. Lassiter's parental rights be severed. 36
On appeal, Ms. Lassiter's counsel argued that the court's failure to ap-
point counsel at the termination hearing deprived her of the due process
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3' The North Carolina
Court of Appeal denied the claim stating that the invasion of Ms. Lassiter's
individual privacy was not sufficient to warrant the appointment of coun-
sel. 38  Subsequently, the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied Ms.
128. The two exceptions are when the proceedings may result in permanent termination of
parental rights, or when a parent may be charged with criminal child abuse. In re D.B., 385
So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980).
129. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *5 n.1. The case-by-case analysis that garners a parent a
constitutional right to counsel in Florida is governed by the test adopted in Potvin v. Keller,
313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975), in which the court stated, "[T]he right to counsel in dependency
proceedings would depend on the potential length of parent-child separation, the degree of
parental restrictions on visitation, the presence or absence of parental consent, the presence or
absence of disputed facts, and the complexity of the proceedings." Id.
130. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 22.
131. ld. at 20.
132. ld. at 40.
133. Jd. at 20-21.
134. ld. at 22.
135. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 53-56.
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Lassiter's petition for review, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 1
39
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of North Caro-
lina Court of Appeal. 40 In this case the Court did not decide the scope of the
due process right to counsel, but rather left the decision for a case-by-case
determination.' 4' Justice Stewart, writing for the majority pursued a two-step
analysis of the issue. First, he concluded that the precedents of both criminal
and civil due process decisions have established a "presumption that an indi-
gent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may
be deprived of his physical liberty."' 142 The Court balanced this presumption
against the factors established in Mathews v. Eldridge, '41 the private interest,
the state interest, and the risk of error in existing procedures) 44 In weighing
those factors against the presumption the majority rejected a per se rule, in
favor of a case-by-case analysis stating:
If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest, the
State's interests were at their weakest, and the risk of errors were
at their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not
overcome the presumption against the right to appointed coun-
sel .... But since the Eldridge factors will not always be so dis-
tributed, and since 'due process is not so rigid as to require that the
significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must
always be sacrificed,' (citation omitted), neither can we say that
the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every ter-
mination of parental rights proceeding. 45
The case-by-case method of review suffers from several defects. A ju-
dicious analysis of this issue is found in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Las-
siter. In his dissent Justice Blackmun austerely criticizes the majority for
resorting to an "ad hoc," "thoroughly discredited," case-by-case analysis.'46
He also points out that the majority uses the same analysis as he does in
weighing the three factors listed in Mathews v. Eldridge, with both finding
139. Id.
140. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34.
141. Id. at 31-32.
142. Id. at 26-27.
143. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
144. Id. at 321.
145. Lassiter, 452 U.S at 31-32 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)).
146. Id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the "ad hoc" case-
by-case approach was "thoroughly discredited nearly 20 years [prior] in Gideon v. Wain-
wright." Id.
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"the private interest weighty, the procedure devised by the state fraught with
risk of error, and the countervailing governmental interest insubstantial."' 47
Yet, he states the Court refuses to
follow this balancing process test to its logical conclusion ... and
announces that a defendant parent must await a case-by-case de-
termination of his or her need for counsel. Because the three fac-
tors 'will not always be so distributed,' ... the Constitution should
not be read to 'requir[e] the appointment of counsel in every paren-
tal termination proceeding.
Justice Blackmun further points out that Mathews itself rejected such an
approach, stating that in the case the Court reasoned that "'procedural due
process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding pro-
cess as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.""' 49 He
further argues that a case-by-case analysis is inconsistent, cumbersome, in-
trusive, and ultimately inadequate to protect parents' rights. 50
In addition, the rationale for a case-by-case analysis is less than influen-
tial and rests on dubious precedent. 5 ' Justice Blackmun points out in his
dissent, that the majority ignored precedent by neglecting to note that prior
due process analysis had focused on "different decision making contexts, not
different litigants within a given context."'5 2 The court also neglects to dis-
cuss the precedent set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright,'53 wherein the Court
overturned Betts v. Brady,'54 rejecting the flexible case-by-case analysis in
favor of an absolute right to counsel in criminal proceedings.'55 The reason
behind the rejected "totality of the circumstances" test in Gideon is equally
applicable to parents in termination of parental rights proceedings: an un-
147. Id. at 48-49.
148. Id. at 49.
149. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344).
150. Id. at 51.
151. Jd. at 40.
152. Id. at 49; see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344. The Lassiter majority's reliance on Gagnon
to justify case-by-case inquiry is misplaced. Gagnon 's adoption of a case-by-case analysis for
probation revocation proceedings is based on the non-adversarial nature of the proceedings,
the rehabilitative focus of the probative system, and the attenuated liberty interest of a con-
victed probationer. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-89. These rationales do not apply to a par-
ent seeking to preserve their undiminished parental rights in a fully adversarial parental sever-
ance proceeding. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50 n.18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Jeffery M.
Mandell, Note, The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings,
9 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 554, 558 n.29 (1976).
153. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
154. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
155. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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skilled, indigent defendant confronted with the formidable legal wherewithal
of the state in an adversarial proceeding unable to produce an adequate de-
fense, especially, under indigent circumstances.'56 A case-by-case analysis
also requires that the court prior to a hearing, examine the state's evidence to
determine what, if any, difference legal representation would make.'57 These
are complex questions of fairness that cannot be adequately answered until
after trial, if ever.
B. Similar Problems with S.B.
S.B. is fraught with similar inconsistencies and misleading notions. In
S.B. the court draws a distinction between a constitutional right to counsel
and a statutory right to counsel. 58 In Florida, a constitutional right to coun-
sel is warranted if a parent is at risk of criminal child abuse charges or in a
situation in which a proceeding will permanently terminate a parent's rights
in his/her child. 5 9 All other situations are put to the test, adopted in Potvin,
which looks at the length of the parent-child separation, the degree of paren-
tal restrictions on visitation, the presence or absence of parental consent, the
presence of disputed facts, and the complexity of the proceeding. 6 0
The case-by-case approach advanced by the Court imperils the interests
at stake in the case and the general administration of justice. 6' The Court's
holding essentially implies that unless a parent has a constitutional right to
counsel, he or she is not entitled to effective counsel.'62 Here again, the court
makes a distinction between litigants within the given context and does not
look at the decision-making context as a whole.'63 At the inception of a de-
pendency proceeding, the trial judge cannot be assured that, upon the conclu-
sion of the case, the circumstances will not be such that a parent will not
have permanently lost his or her rights in the child. Whenever a dependency
petition includes a ground for termination according to statute there is ulti-
mately the potential for the permanent termination of parental rights."6 Fur-
thermore, trial court judges cannot foretell whether criminal charges will
result from the facts and evidence brought forth at trial.
156. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
157. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158. S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. SC02-2262, 2003 WL 21543565, at *1
(Fla. July 10, 2003).
159. Id. at *3.
160. ld; see Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. 1975).
161. Lassiter, 425 U.S. at 50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *1.
163. Compare S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at * 1, with Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 49.
164. Wofford v. Eid, 671 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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Therefore, to determine at the beginning of the case whether a parent
has a statutory right to counsel in Florida or a constitutional right is implau-
sible. "'65 Moreover, the case-by-case approach adopted in Potvin, and prom-
ulgated by the Supreme Court's decision in S.B., is impracticable because it
requires that a trial judge determine the complexity of a proceeding that has
yet to occur. If the court recognizes that the circumstances in each case are
different for each litigant it should also recognize that the circumstances,
implications, and the nature of the proceedings involved in a termination of
parental rights suit will also be varied and cannot be predetermined. More-
over, the process advanced by the Supreme Court of Florida produces incon-
sistent results and "invites both confusion and appeal."'"
The court states that S.B. had a statutory right to appointed counsel be-
cause there was "nothing to suggest [that] the Department was planning to
pursue termination of parental rights."' 6 7 However, the end result was that
S.B.'s stature as parent was terminated. Thus, the court leads one to believe
that if the petitioner does not express, at the commencement of the proceed-
ing, that its ultimate goal is to terminate a parent's rights, a parent is not con-
stitutionally entitled to counsel. Even though the consequence might be that
a parent's rights in his or her child are completely and irrevocably lost.'68
Florida's Legislature recognized that providing counsel would be effec-
tive and economic, as well as necessary to the protection of a parent's rights
in his or her child 169 The legislature also recognized that reliance on a case-
by-case approach was both cumbersome and costly. 7° Therefore it recently
passed legislation requiring that indigent parents in dependency proceedings
be appointed counsel by the state. 7' Prior to the passing of this legislation
the appellate courts in Florida were confronted with numerous post verdict
challenges to the fairness of particular proceedings, and expended much en-
ergy in effect, evaluating the performance of trial court judges. 7 2 Yet, the
165. Cf Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S 18, 50 (1981). This can be likened to
Justice Blackmun's statement in his dissenting opinion wherein he criticizes the Court for
expecting a review of the record to determine whether a defendant proceeding without counsel
has suffered an unfair disadvantage. Id.
166. Dale 11, supra note 126, at 145.
167. S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. SC02-2262, 2003 WL 21543565, at *4
(Fla. July 10, 2003).
168. Id.
169. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.408(2), 39.465(1)(a)(4) (1997).
170. Id.
171. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2002).
172. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REV. 819, 828-
89 (1999) (finding that the legislature provides parents with counsel as a practical matter
which should also help ease the appellate docket which had been rife with appeals because
20031
211
: Nova Law Review 28, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
NOVA LA W REVIEW
Supreme Court of Florida has rendered the statutory right to counsel ineffec-
tive, because a statutory right to counsel does not warrant that a parents' lib-
erty interests be adequately represented by competent or effective assistance
of counsel.
17 3
VII. THE NATURE OF A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL PROCEEDING
The Supreme Court in S.B. undermines the authority of a statutory right
to counsel in Florida by denying an indigent parent competent counsel, be-
cause the parent's entitlement does not stem from a constitutional right.
Competent counsel is reserved for persons who warrant a constitutional
right. 74 This is based on the court's perspective that termination of parental
rights proceedings is civil in nature. 75  Because a termination proceeding is
civil in nature, a state is not constitutionally required to appoint counsel. 76
The United States Supreme Court has established, and the Supreme Court of
Florida has adopted, a presumption that counsel need not be provided in civil
cases in which a loss of physical liberty is not at stake.177 The constitutional
appointment of counsel is justified only when the indigent parent can satisfy
the Mathews or Potvin analysis to rebut the presumption that counsel is not
ordinarily provided. 7 s
Yet, to obtain a constitutional right to counsel is an insurmountable feat.
As the court illustrated in Lassiter, a fundamental interest in keeping one's
child, coupled with the extraordinarily high risk of error in a hearing con-
ducted without counsel, does not necessarily outweigh the government's
pecuniary interest in not providing counsel for indigent parents in parental
severance suits. 79  Moreover, Florida provides all indigent parents with
counsel in dependency proceedings, either through a constitutional or statu-
tory entitlement, but will not guarantee that a parent will not lose his or her
child as a result of the incompetence of appointed counsel, if the parent is not
a criminal, or if the state had not initially setout to take the children. 8 ' Yet,
under the old law, lack of counsel at the dependency stage rendered a termination adjudication
invalid).
173. S.B.,2003WL21543565at*l.
174. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S 18, 18 (1981).
175. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *4.
176. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18; S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *1.
177. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at
*4.
178. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31; S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *3.
179. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
180. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *4.
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the loss of liberty, or the perceived loss of liberty, mandates an absolute right
to the appointment of competent counsel for those who could not otherwise
afford it.'
The analyses of appointment of counsel in Lassiter and Gideon are ir-
reconcilable. Gideon fundamentally implies that the appointment of counsel
is essential to a fair trial. 82 Though the holding in that case addresses the
right to counsel for indigent criminal litigants, it has little to do with the dif-
ference between a loss of liberty and the loss of any other fundamental lib-
erty interest.'83 The Court in Gideon focuses not on the final result of litiga-
tion, but instead the process of litigation involved.'84 Gideon analogizes the
fundamental right to freedom accorded by the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment with other
provisions in the.Bill of Rights such as the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause.' "85 This undermines the dubious precedent upon which Lassiter lies,
namely that the inherent nature of the loss of liberty is the premise behind
Gideon. 1
86
Instead, the premise behind Gideon is the notion that a fair trial is not
possible without competent counsel on both sides.'87 Because, "reason and
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system,. . . any per-
son haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."' 88 The Court in Lassiter fails to
delineate a reason why a parent in a termination of parental rights suit is
guaranteed a fair trial without counsel, but an indigent criminal defendant
does not have the same guarantee.
The majority of the decision in Gideon espouses the right to counsel for
litigants in all cases.'89 Justice Black buttresses this position by referencing
Justice Powell's decision in Powell v. Alabama,9° in which he states:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the in-
telligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable, gener-
181. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
182. Id. at 340.
183. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
184. Id.; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18.
185. Id. at 341-42.
186. Lassiter, 452 U.S at 18.
187. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
188. Id. at 344.
189. Id. at 335.
190. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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ally of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put upon trial without proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge to adequately prepare his defense, even though he had
a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. 19 1
The concerns of the Court in Gideon and Powell seem to be: the inabil-
ity of a defendant to determine if charges against them are legitimate; the
inability or difficulty in understanding the law; the lack of knowledge of
rules of evidence and procedure; and the inability to put forth a good quality
defense. 9 2 If this is so, then why does the United States Supreme Court pre-
clude indigent parents in termination suits from their constitutional entitle-
ment of appointed counsel according to these same concerns? Does a case,
in which the state is prosecuting a parent, where the parent stands to lose his
or her child, not involve the same complexities or the potential of confront-
ing the same difficulties?
Besides, it has been said that a criminal trial may be easier to try then a
civil trial.'93 There are certain aspects of a criminal trial that are slanted in
favor of criminal defendants but are not in favor of litigants in termination of
parental rights proceedings.' 94 The accused criminal is presumed to be inno-
cent until the state stockpiles evidence in an effort to overcome that inno-
cence beyond a reasonable doubt.'95 Yet, a parent in a termination of paren-
tal rights proceeding holds an eviscerated presumption of innocence because
the state attorney, with an adept knowledge of the law, is required to estab-
lish a lesser burden of proof'96 against an indigent litigant with virtually no
191. Id.at68-69.
192. Id.
193. Earl Johnson, Jr. & Elizabeth Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally
Enforceable Right to Representation in Civil Cases .for Indigent California Litigants, Part
One: The Legal Arguments, I I LoY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 265 (1978).
194. Id. In S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. SC02-2262, 2003 WL 21543565, at
*4 (Fla. July 10, 2003), the court states that though the procedures and goals of a parental
severance proceeding are different then a criminal proceeding, the issues addressed in criminal
post conviction hearings are part and parcel of dependency proceeding. However they fail to
clarify which procedure these are. Id.
195. Johnson & Schwartz, supra note 193, at 265.
196. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
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legal propensity.'97 Furthermore, personnel of the court have a responsibility
to screen the stages of criminal proceedings in order to make sure the inno-
cent go free and the guilty are prosecuted.' The prosecutor in a criminal
case also has an affirmative duty to reveal any favorable information pertain-
ing to the accused.'9 9 These same safeguards are not available to litigants in
civil proceedings.
The Court in Lassiter neglects to take notice of the court's rational in
Gideon."°° If the Court had examined the logic behind Gideon, it could not
assert the presumption that the right to counsel is only necessary when a per-
son's physical liberty interest is at stake. Gideon clearly stands for the
proposition that under the constitution, there is no difference in the quality of
the process based merely on the difference in the sanctions involved."0'
Moreover, the cases relied on in Lassiter do not support the presumption that
"physical confinement is the only loss of liberty grievous enough to trigger a
right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause."2 2 The Lassiter
court blindly applies this presumption, never considering the origin of the
presumption or why criminal defendants warrant more due process protec-
tion then indigent parents.
VIII. MAKING THE CASE FOR COMPETENT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Indigent parents have a right to counsel under Florida's Constitution;
therefore a right to competent counsel should naturally follow. Both the
United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Florida have de-
clared the right to effective assistance of counsel to be a basic extension of
the right to counsel. 20 3 "While the right to counsel may flow from, and have
its origins in, the Sixth Amendment in the criminal context and concepts of
due process under the United States and Florida Constitutions in the depend-
ency arena, the goal to be achieved is the participation of counsel acting as
competent counsel." 2°4
197. Johnson & Schwartz, supra note 193, at 265.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S 18, 18 (1981).
201. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
202. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 785-89 (1973); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-94 (1980).
203. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); N.S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family
Servs., 843 So. 2d 898, 904 (2003).
204. N.S.H.. 843 So. 2d at 904.
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The state has no interest in providing incompetent advocates or denying
parents relief. At first blush, money appears paramount; but society's para-
mount interest should be in the just determination of a person's rights and
privileges. Protecting an indigent parent's right to counsel and competent
assistance of counsel is crucial to preserving faith in America's justice sys-
tem. In a system in which a large percentage of Americans feel as though
the legal system is biased against the poor and minorities, and the majority
feel that the affluent and corporations have the upper hand, faith in the sys-
tem is rapidly eroding.0 5 In the courts, trust is essential because there "soci-
ety and institution come together in ways that really define who we would
like to think we are as a society-fair, open, and protective of the rights of
every individual."2 6
Furthermore, the money required to finance post-trial hearings for inef-
fective assistance of counsel is slight when compared with the costs of long-
term foster care. There are over 500,000 children in foster care in the United
States and approximately 34,292 in Florida.207  Therefore, states have an
economic interest in making certain that children are not needlessly sepa-
rated from their families, since years of foster care will likely be more costly
then appellate review of issues regarding incompetent counsel.
Aside from the economic advantage of leaving children in the custody
of their parents, when possible, Florida's disposition favors protecting chil-
dren and their relationship with their natural parents.20 8 If a parents' incom-
petent counsel has an affect on the court's adjudication, the state has a com-
pelling interest in reviewing the case so as not to remove a child needlessly
from his or her family. Thus far, the state has yet to be required to prove that
there is a safer and healthier environment available for children alleged to be
abused and neglected. Especially recently, in light of the crisis the Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services has faced.20 9 Permanently severing
parental rights is no guarantee that the child will be placed in more loving or
205. See National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System, Na-
tional Action Plan: A Guide for State and National Organizations, available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAmtPTCNatlActionPlanPub.pdf (last vis-
ited July 26, 2003).
206. Id. at 9 (quoting Frank A. Bennack, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Hearst Corporation).
207. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Safety, Permanency, Well-being: Child Wel-
fare Outcomes 1999: Annual Report (2002), at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/
publications/cwo99/index.html.
208. In re E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 1992) (citing Burk v. Dep't of Health & Re-
hab. Servs., 476 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1985)).
209. See Timothy Arcaro, Florida's Foster Care System Fails Its Children, 25 NOVA L.
REV. 641 (2001).
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safe surroundings. Therefore, it makes social and economic sense to provide
parents with review of their claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, there is a due process question in permitting the state to
appoint counsel without providing a judicial remedy for the counsel's inef-
fective assistance. If parents are not permitted to appeal adjudication based
on the incompetence of court-appointed counsel, they will not be afforded a
remedy that befits their loss. An indigent parent in a termination of parental
rights suit stands to lose rights in his or her child as a result of an attorney's
incompetence. Because a termination of parental rights suit is defined as
civil in nature, the usual remedy for one dissatisfied by counsel's perform-
ance is to bring a malpractice suit against the attorney.2"' A civil malpractice
suit will not accomplish the goal of regaining custody; the only relief a par-
ent may seek is monetary damages.2'
IX. CONCLUSION
The extent to which one is deprived is of critical importance in the due
process computation, the process to which an individual is entitled is in part
determined "by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss. ' ' '212 Is there a loss more grievous then the removal of a child from its
parents? According to the Supreme Court of Florida and the United States
Supreme Court, the answer is yes. Based on their Constitutional interpreta-
tions, a parent losing his or her child is not a significant enough deprivation
to warrant the standard of due process protection.
Neither the language of the Constitution of the United States, Florida's
State Constitution, nor the society they fashion require that the Constitution
be interpreted to deny the poor an entitlement to governmental assistance in
exercising their basic rights. A parent, whether indigent or affluent, has a
fundamental right to conceive and raise his or her child.2 13 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized this right in upholding "[t]he fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child."2 4 There is a compelling public interest in encouraging the
maintenance and protection of the intact family. Constitutional interpreta-
tions should not conclude with the provision of protections for family integ-
rity, but must further compel the government to provide the necessary fortifi-
210. In re Ak. V., 747 A.2d 570 (D.C. 2000).
211. See In re Azia B., 626 N.W.2d 602, 612 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001).
212. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S 18, 40 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
213. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
214. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
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cations to parents in preserving their constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est.
While state courts have acknowledged the precedents of the United
States Supreme Court, most courts have chosen to operate independently by
"interpreting rights more broadly then the United States Supreme Court. 215
For example, contrary to the Court's holding in Lassiter, most state courts
and legislatures have determined that an indigent parent's right to assistance
of counsel in a termination of parental right suit is part and parcel of the fun-
damental right to family integrity protected by the Constitution.21 6 In fur-
therance of the states' advanced perception of due process standards and
fundamental fairness, logic and common sense should compel states to con-
clude that, "if a parent's constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in
appropriate dependency proceedings is to consist of something more than a
meaningless formality, that right must include the right to effective assis-
tance by the attorney who is appointed.
217
215. Young, supra note 9, at 249.
216. See id.
217. L.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 812 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
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